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Abstract 
The primary contingency engineering capability within the United States Air 
Force is provided by Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operations Readiness Squadron, 
Engineer (RED HORSE). This thesis examines the macroscopic organizational structure 
of RED HORSE; that is, the manner in which RED HORSE resources (personnel and 
equipment) are organized collectively, above the unit (squadron or flight) level. It builds 
on the findings of the Air Combat Command - sponsored RED HORSE 2010 Strategic 
Study, and focuses on issues of geographic location and chain of command above the unit 
level, as the study found these two topics were found to be vital to the accomplishment of 
the RED HORSE mission. Working in direct cooperation with ACC, this research uses 
value focused thinking and multi-attribute preference theory to create a hierarchical 
structure depicting the goals and objectives of a qualified decision maker (ACC/CEX). 
The research effort generated and evaluated 20 alternatives. The decision analysis model 
recommends an optimal macroscopic organizational structure whereby RED HORSE 
units are assigned to different theater commands as the most preferred alternative. 
Extensive sensitivity analysis showed that the model is very reactive to changes in 
objective and evaluation measure weights, indicating that further research is required. 
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ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE MACROSCOPIC 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF RED HORSE 
I. Introduction 
General Issue 
The United States Air Force (USAF) has long recognized the requirement to 
possess a contingency engineering capability to meet the demands of global force 
projection. To satisfy this contingency engineering requirement, a military structure 
within Civil Engineering has been established. The primary element of this structure is 
RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, 
Engineer), and it possesses a heavy construction capability not available in other Air 
Force engineering units. Because of its capabilities, RED HORSE is the USAF 
organization called upon to establish the initial presence of US military forces. 
RED HORSE is comprised of active duty, Air National Guard (ANG), and Air 
Force Reserve (AFRES) units (squadrons and flights), totaling seven squadron 
equivalents and nine equipment sets. Together, these units possess a three-fold mission, 
including: Providing initial response in Multi-Theater War (MTW) scenarios, supporting 
the newly established Air Expeditionary Force (AEF), and offering Operations Other 
Than War (OOTW) support as required. 
As with all organizations, the way that RED HORSE is organized plays a vital 
role in allowing it to achieve its objectives. The internal organizational structure of RED 
HORSE units has remained relatively constant since its inception. Similarly, its 
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macroscopic organizational structure has not experienced substantial changes during that 
time either, despite its increasing and diverse contingency engineering responsibilities 
(MTW, AEF, and OOTW). The macroscopic structure is defined as the overarching 
organizational hierarchy that employs the RED HORSE force as a whole; that is, the 
command and control structure above the unit level that manages all existing RED 
HORSE units (active duty, guard, and reserve squadrons and flights) and their 
accompanying resources (personnel, equipment, vehicles, etc). For example, the 
macroscopic organizational structure of a USAF CE squadron is depicted in Fig 1.1. The 
squadron falls under the 
command of the Support Group 
Commander; the Support Group, 
along with three other groups, 
fall under the command of a 
Wing Commander; the Wing 
Commander, along with other 
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Fig 1.1 - CE Squadron's Macroscopic 
Organizational Structure 
the command of a Numbered Air Force (NAF); the NAF, along with other NAFs, falls 
under the command of a Major Command (MAJCOM). Note this macroscopic structure 
does not include any of the internal workings of the CE squadron itself. 
RED HORSE's existing macroscopic organizational structure is confusing at best. 
In an attempt to become more flexible and enable it to support its three missions, RED 
HORSE's active duty units have been placed under the administrative control (ADCON) 
of different Numbered Air Force (NAF) commanders during peacetime, while 
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maintaining their operational control (OPCON) at the MAJCOM level. However, this 
has created conflicting chains of command, and raised questions as to the boundaries of 
responsibility and authority over the utilization and employment of RED HORSE units. 
The Air Reserve Component (ARC) of RED HORSE, comprised of its ANG and 
AFRES units, also encounters differing chains of command. This component forms over 
half of RED HORSE's total force, and has experienced numerous difficulties during 
attempts to integrate them into the contingency support picture. These units report to 
both state and federal agencies, and also suffer from split ADCON and OPCON 
authorities once activated to federal service. 
Air Combat Command recently commissioned the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic 
Study, aimed at identifying and improving upon deficiencies within RED HORSE. 
Among its findings were the shortcomings inherent in RED HORSE's existing 
macroscopic organizational structure. The changing and unpredictable global 
environment in which it operates, an aging vehicle and equipment fleet, and a crippling 
reliance on transportation were also found to detract from RED HORSE's ability to 
continue to provide the critical contingency support for which it was founded. 
Research Objectives 
This research effort builds on the findings and propositions posited by the RED 
HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, addressing one of the specific uncertainties arising out of 
the study; the adequacy of the existing macroscopic organizational structure prevalent in 
RED HORSE. This thesis identifies the goals and objectives contributing to the 
macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE, as defined by RED HORSE 
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experts (ACC/CEX). It investigates the importance and impact of each of these 
objectives in the macroscopic organizational decision process. Finally, this study 
suggests potential changes to the current macroscopic structure employed among active 
duty and Air Reserve Component (Guard and Reserve) RED HORSE units. Specifically, 
this research effort serves to answer the following queries: 
- What organizational structure is most suitable for the heavy construction 
and contingency engineering capabilities provided by RED HORSE? 
- What criteria are most important in developing an optimal organizational 
structure for RED HORSE? 
Overview 
The Literature Review (Chapter 2) of this thesis documents the history behind 
RED HORSE. It discusses the organization's inception during the Vietnam War, as well 
as the evolution of its current structure. This chapter also presents the findings of the Air 
Combat Command - sponsored RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, specifically 
identifying those findings that spawned this research effort. Finally, this chapter provides 
an introduction to decision analysis (DA) and the value-focused thinking (VFT) process 
that was used to accomplish this study. 
The Methodology section (Chapter 3) of this document provides a defensible, 
transparent, and quantitative methodology to assist USAF decision makers in 
appropriately structuring RED HORSE. It presents an in-depth discussion of the DA 
theory and VFT process used in this thesis, applying them directly to the decision 
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opportunity at hand; namely analyzing and evaluating the macroscopic organizational 
structure of RED HORSE. 
The Results and Analysis portion of this thesis (Chapter 4) discusses precisely 
how the methodology was applied to the decision opportunity. It identifies a qualified 
decision maker or decision maker's representative (in this case the ACC/CEX), and 
solicits the different (and oftentimes conflicting) values that contribute to his decision. It 
quantifies the values and preferences of the decision maker, permitting the generation of 
twenty alternatives aimed at addressing those specific values. These alternatives are then 
ranked based on the degree to which they achieve the objectives of the decision maker. 
Further, the chapter discusses the sensitivity analysis performed on the model, providing 
insight into the fluctuation in the ranking of alternatives as the decision maker's degree of 
preference changes. 
Finally, the Recommendations and Conclusions section (Chapter 5) of this 
document presents the most preferred alternative, as posited by the hierarchical model. It 
provides a summary of the research conducted and the limitations inherent in this study, 
as well as opportunities to expound upon the findings provided in this thesis. 
Scope 
This research effort is concerned with the macroscopic organizational structure of 
RED HORSE. It only addresses those issues of geographic location and chain of 
command above the unit level. It does not address unit level issues such as the personnel 
skills mix, vehicle replacement, and unit training. A list of assumptions used to further 
hone the scope of this thesis are provided in Chapter 4. 
1- 5 
Limitations 
Due to the complexity of the RED HORSE organizational structure, it is 
impossible to conceive and account for every little subtle nuance that contributes to the 
decision-making process. Logical assumptions had to be made to simplify and guide the 
modeling process. However, these assumptions limited that ability of the model to 
address each relevant topic. 
In addition, this research was concerned with only macroscopic issues of 
structure; it did not address microscopic, unit level matters. These topics include the unit 
type code (UTC) distribution within a unit, the adequacy of the training regimen within a 
unit, or the state of the vehicle fleet existing within a RED HORSE unit. These unit-level 
issues often dictate manning and resource requirements however, and any discussion of 
organizational structure must account for these essential microscopic level matters. 
Finally, the VFT process is one that relies heavily on the inputs of a single group 
or individual. The solicitation of objectives and sensitivity analysis are designed to 
identify and minimize the impact of any biases inherent in the obtained inputs. Due to 
the initially subjective nature of this process however, not all of the biases may have been 
accounted for and/or eliminated, and may have affected the results posited by this study. 
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II. Literature Review 
This chapter provides the foundation for this research effort, presenting 
information that documents the history of RED HORSE and the theory behind its 
employment. The current structure of RED HORSE, its mission, and its chain of 
command is discussed. This chapter also presents the threats to which RED HORSE 
must be able to respond, and the future trends impacting RED HORSE's employment. 
These aspects of RED HORSE provide an evolutionary roadmap of its current 
organizational structure and dictate the requirements of any future RED HORSE 
macroscopic organizational structure. Therefore, it is important to understand these 
facets prior to developing an effective macroscopic organizational structure. 
Finally, this chapter includes an introduction to decision analysis, presenting the 
basic concepts of value-focused thinking (VFT) that will be applied in this research 
effort. 
History of United States Air Force (USAF) Combat Engineers 
The heritage of USAF combat engineers is one that outdates the Air Force itself, 
beginning prior to the Air Force's existence as an independent service. Originating as a 
small unit within the Army Signal Corps, the role of USAF combat engineers continued 
to expand through the first and second World Wars, and into the Korean Conflict era 
[10:1]. Although the USAF was broken out as a separate service in 1947, it did not 
possess an organic engineering capability until the mid-1960's [10:3]. Beginning in the 
post-WWII era, Special Category Army With the Air Force (SCARWAF) units were 
responsible for accomplishing all contract and troop construction engineering 
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requirements for the USAF [31:17]. These requirements specifically included, 
"rehabilitation and repair of Air Force bases and facilities.. .and ... construction or 
improvement of airfields...[9:1]." Although these units were placed under the operational 
control of the USAF, they were organized, trained, and supplied by the Army, and 
remained categorized as Army assets under the 1947 joint services agreements [31:17]. 
During the Korean Conflict, it became evident that the USAF required an organic 
combat engineering capability. In his analysis of the role of engineers in Korea, Col R. I. 
Mulberry (an engineering field commander during the conflict) stated: 
'The Air Force has vital need for the Engineer Aviation Forces. They are not 
combat engineers, and not construction engineers, but specialists in the art of 
building airfields... a critical support element... rich in equipment which, if 
operational, provides a tremendous construction potential... They need to be 
integrated into the Air Force ... They should be building all of the peacetime 
construction of the Air Force as training for wartime construction [23:114]." 
The lessons learned from the Korean Conflict, combined with the Lebanon Crisis of 
1958, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, vividly 
demonstrated the USAF's need for an organic combat engineering capability [10:3]. 
In response to this new requirement, the USAF developed Prime Base Engineer 
Emergency Force (BEEF) Teams. The theory behind these organizations was to train and 
equip the engineers that operated and maintained bases in peacetime to respond to 
contingency situations in support of air power around the world. These units possessed 
both recovery and mobility teams; recovery teams to maintain essential operation and 
maintenance services during and immediately following enemy attack, natural disasters, 
and other emergencies, and mobility teams to respond to unforeseen contingencies or 
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special warfare operations around the world [10:3]. Although these teams were effective, 
they provided the USAF neither the heavy repair nor the construction capability it 
required [6:2]. 
During the early stages of the Vietnam Conflict, President John F. Kennedy 
encouraged the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to use the US presence in South Vietnam as an 
opportunity to test counter-insurgency equipment and strategies in a guerrilla 
environment [24:11]. At the same time, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 
inquired as to the USAF's ability to construct an operating airfield within enemy territory 
[30]. In response, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown requested permission to 
stand-up two active duty squadrons to provide the same heavy repair capabilities 
currently supplied by Army engineers and Navy Seabees [8:7]. Upon approval in the fall 
of 1964, the 554th and 555th Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operations Repair 
Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) squadrons were activated in Oct 1965, and deployed 
to the Southeast Asian Theater in Feb 1966 [31:29]. By the end of the Vietnam War, 6 
RED HORSE units had been created and deployed to the Southeast Asian Theater 
[31:33]. 
Today, the USAF maintains a military structure within Civil Engineering 
designed to respond to and satisfy its contingency engineering requirement. This 
structure consists of two distinct units (Prime BEEF and RED HORSE), each possessing 
unique qualifications and accompanying resources. Current doctrine dictates the use of 
Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF) squadrons as the primary means of 
supporting the continued presence of forward-located USAF units. In contrast, doctrine 
calls upon Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer 
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(RED HORSE) squadrons to establish the initial presence of US military forces, as they 
possess a heavy construction capability not available in Prime BEEF. 
Current RED HORSE Posture 
The USAF currently supports 7 RED HORSE squadron equivalents in order to 
accomplish its current mission (discussed in the following section). Table 2.1, 
reproduced from the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [l:Section 7.4.2.1], summarizes 
these existing RED HORSE units, their sizes, and their locations. These units are 
comprised of Air Combat Command (ACC), United States Air Forces in Europe 
(US AFE), and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) active duty forces, as well as Air Reserve 
Component (ARC) forces. The ARC consists of Air National Guard (ANG) and Air 
Force Reserve Command 
(AFRC) units. These forces 
Table 2.1 - Demographics of Current RED HORSE units 
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RHS - RED HORSE Squadron 
RHF - RED HORSE Flight 
ARC - Air Reserve Component 
ANG - Air National Guard 
AFRC - Air Force Reserve Command 
(active duty and ARC) are 
located both in the Continental 
United States (CONUS) and 
outoftheCONUS 
(OCONUS). In addition, the 
ANG and AFRC units are 
divided into geographically 
separated flights and paired 
with another ANG or AFRC 
sister flight. These sister 
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flights can be morphed together to provide all of the capabilities of a fully staffed and 
equipped RED HORSE squadron. 
As indicated in Table 2.1, Det. 1, 823 RHS and 31 RHF do not possess a squadron 
equivalent. Det. 1, 823 RHS is the 69 personnel assigned to the ACC Silver Flag 
Exercise Site at Tyndall AFB, FL, responsible for the training of active duty and ARC 
Civil Engineers and Services personnel assigned to Prime BEEF and Prime Readiness in 
Base Services (RIBS) units. 31 RHF, located in Camp Darby, Italy, is classified as an 
Engineer Support Unit (ESU). It consists of 41 military personnel charged with 
maintaining the 2 vehicle and equipment sets pre-positioned in the European Theater 
[l:Section 10.2.6.1]. 
Figure 2.1, taken from the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [l:Section 4.3.4], 
further illustrates the geographic separation between units, and the pairings between 
ANG and AFRC units. It also points out the collocation between many of the existing 
units - specifically 254 and 354 RHFs, and 819 RHS and 219 RHF. 














Det 1,307 RHS    823 RHS      ^Se 
(Det 1,823 RHS) 
Figure 2.1  RED HORSE Unit Locations (ACC, PACAF, USAFE, AFRC & ANG) 
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Current RED HORSE Mission 
According to the ACC sponsored RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, the RED 
HORSE mission is: 
To provide the Air Component Commander a theater-level combat engineering 
force delivering highly mobile, rapidly deployable, self-sufficient heavy 
engineering operations and special capabilities not available from any other Air 
Force source [l:Section 4.1.1]. 
To further quantify the tasks encompassed in this mission, RED HORSE maintains a 
Mission Essential Task List (METL), reflecting its core capabilities in "...a format 
consistent with the Air Force Task List (AFTL) [LSection 4.2.1]." The five core tasks 
identified by the RED HORSE METL are as follows [LSection 4.2.1]: 
- Provide heavy construction operations (horizontal and vertical) 
- Provide bare base development (beddown, utilities, and water production) 
- Perform batch plant and quarry operations (explosive and mechanical 
aggregate production) 
- Provide asphalt and concrete batch plant operations 
- Provide base denial (explosive and non-explosive) 
These METLs reflect the tasks that a RED HORSE unit must be able to perform in a 
contingency situation. The two contingency scenarios that RED HORSE is called upon 
for support are a Major Theater War (MTW) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). 
Although the actions taken in these two environments can appear extremely similar, they 
are characterized by key differences; namely, war "...encompasses large-scaled, 
sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests 
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[l:Section 5.4.1]," while OOTW "...is conducted to deter war, resolve conflict, promote 
peace, or support civil authorities [l:Section 5.4.1]." 
Major Theater War 
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) states that the US Armed Forces should 
be postured in such a manner to support two simultaneously occurring Major Theater 
Wars.  The 2-MTW scenario currently identified for the US military encompasses 
operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) and on the Korean peninsula. As such, plans are 
focused on these two theaters to project requirements and develop support plans for use 
in a MTW contingency. RED HORSE's mission, as it relates to the 2-MTW scenario, is 
defined by a deployment timeline designed to provide the maximum support to deploying 
units, and a prioritization of its contingency tasks according to their degree of necessity. 
To adequately develop operational plans for a 2-MTW scenario, the requirements 
of the deploying forces and their resources must be identified. Support forces in a 
wartime environment require adequate ports, lines of communication, safe 
communication sites, logistical frameworks, airfields, bases of operation, etc. 
Installations in forward areas require protection from enemy forces, including the ability 
to rapidly recover from damage inflicted as a result of enemy attacks. In addition, mobile 
forces require continual preparation of defensive fighting positions (DFPs) and support 
bases. These requirements dictate the deployment timeline, identifying the tasks RED 
HORSE must be able to support. The most critical characteristic in supporting these 
requirements is responsiveness. As stated by the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study: 
The most essential key to wartime construction is speed. Because of rapidly 
changing situations and the time necessary to make decisions and gather 
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resources, actual construction work must proceed with extraordinary rapidity to 
meet mission requirements on time [l:Section 5.5.5.2.2]. 
To meet the 2-MTW requirements, RED HORSE units must arrive in theater 
quickly and accomplish heavy construction tasks in the most expedient manner possible. 
Obviously, construction cannot begin until adequate personnel and assets arrive in theater 
and at the identified work sites. To ensure the appropriate number of personnel and 
equipment arrive expediently, CE planners have established a deployment timeline. In 
reference to the SWA and Korean theaters (the most probable MTW arenas), Table 2.2, 
taken from the RED HORSE Jab|e 2 2 Expected Row of RED H0RSE Units for 2.MTW Scenario 
2010 Strategic Study 
[l:Section 5.5.4], shows the 
expected flow of RED HORSE 
units into each theater for the 
2-MTW scenario. As819RHS 
and 219 RHF have just recently been stood up, their deployment timelines have yet to-be- 
determined (tbd). 
RED HORSE's construction requirements in a MTW scenario consist primarily of 
beddown tasks. These tasks allow deploying units to establish operations in a 
contingency environment. Although standard beddown tasks can be accomplished by 
both Prime BEEF and RED HORSE units, RED HORSE has been identified specifically 
to complete the following tasks [l:Section 5.5.5.1]: 
■ Erecting unsheltered aircraft revetment 
■ Placing concrete or laying asphalt for aircraft parking 
■ Constructing earth berms and dikes for fuel bladders 
' RED HORSE 
Squadron Equivalent 
SWA First KöreaWiNMiillt 
SWA KOREA S'.VA Bism 
819RHS&219RHF tbd tbd tbd tbd 
820 RHS Day 65 Day 3 
823 RHS Day 65 Day 3 
200 RHS & 201 RHF Day 9 Day 20 
202 RHS & 203 RHF Day 999 Day 40 
307 RHS & Det 1 Day 3 Day 55 
554 RHS In-Place In-Place 
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■ Erecting Harvest Falcon aircraft hangars (ACH), Frame 
Supported Tension Fabric Shelters (FSTFS), and dome 
shelters 
■ Erecting Harvest Falcon general purpose, extra-large, and 
large shelters 
■ Erecting revetment for mission critical vehicles - e.g. fire 
and crash rescue vehicles; petroleum, oil, and lubricant 
(POL) vehicles, etc. 
■ Constructing earth berms and access roads for bomb dumps 
■ Installing expeditionary aircraft arresting systems 
■ Constructing aircraft wash racks 
■ Constructing Aircraft Generating Equipment (AGE) and 
vehicle wash racks 
■ Constructing K-span and Super K-span shelters (with or 
without asphalt or concrete pads) 
RED HORSE's beddown tasks can be further prioritized by classifying them 
according to their overall importance relative to the success of the mission. The 
classifications of these requirements are those dictated by the Joint Engineer Planning 
and Execution System (JEPES) - the fundamental system that formally addresses 
contingency engineer requirements. These classifications are as follows: 
-    Critical - these are the tasks that are required in direct support of air 
operations that ensure the launch and recovery of tactical type aircraft within 
72 hours after the arrival of engineers. These tasks include the following: 
■ Installing airfield lighting systems 
■ Installing expeditionary and mobile aircraft arresting 
systems 
■ Constructing aircraft POL bladders and berms 
■ Providing temporary power to mission critical facilities 
(command posts, control tower, aircraft squadron 
operations, water purification points, etc.) 
Accomplishment of these requirements does not imply that beddown tasks are 
completed; instead it assumes that the minimum requirements of runway, 
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taxiway, water, communications, fueling and arming capabilities, and parking 
ramp are available [l:Section 5.5.5.2.4]. 
- Essential - tasks in direct support of the flying mission and typically required 
to complete the beddown phase of the deployment qualify as essential tasks. 
Failing to accomplish these tasks will adversely impact sortie generation. 
Essential tasks include [l:Section 5.5.5.2.4]: 
■ Erecting aircraft and vehicle revetments 
■ Constructing ammunition open storage pads and berms 
■ Constructing aircraft and AGE wash racks 
■ Providing Army Patriot Missile Battery support 
- Necessary - all other combat support and combat service support tasks 
required during the actual period of the conflict are classified as necessary 
tasks. Although these tasks would be required in any regional conflict, they 
are given a lesser importance due to various reasons including work-arounds, 
host nation support, and execution versus deliberate planning force flow. 
Although this work is identified for RED HORSE accomplishment, it could be 
completed utilizing other resources (contract, host nation support), or just 
counted as negligible due to its lesser impact on the overall mission [l:Section 
5.5.5.2.4]. 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) 
Although the concept of OOTW has existed for a generation, it was not 
established explicitly as a military mission until the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) [l:Section 5.4.1]. OOTW can be basically defined as all operations other than 
war that encompass the use of military capabilities across the whole range of military 
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operations short of war [l:Section 5.4.1]. Table 2.3, taken from the RED HORSE 2010 
Strategic Study [l:Section 5.4.1], reflects the range and types of activities encompassed 
in OOTW, per AFDD 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War. The right column 
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displays exclusive OOTW activities, while the left column indicates those activities 
solely under the label of "combat operations." The middle column lists those activities 
that can be construed as either combat operations or OOTW, depending on the 
environment in which they occur. 
The theory behind the accomplishment of OOTW is to maintain US interests in 
foreign territories and preserve the level of daily tensions between nations below the 
threshold of armed conflict [l:Section 5.4.1]. According to the RED HORSE 2010 
Strategic Study, the use of the military "...in non-traditional roles is a proactive approach 
predicated on the belief that inaction can be costly over the long term or unacceptable to 
US ideals, broad interests, and public opinion [l:Section 5.4.1]." 
Over the past five years, RED HORSE units have been deployed in support of 
OOTW more than 122 separate times [l:Section 5.4.3]. Although these deployments 
have been largely concentrated in the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Central 
Command (CENTCOM) theaters, RED HORSE's presence has been felt in all major 
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theaters around the globe [l:Section 5.4.3], as shown in Figure 2.2. It should be noted 
that data characterizing the operations in support of the Kosovo Conflict have not yet 
been made available, but could 
PACOM 
Fig 2.2 RED HORSE OOTW Deployments by Theater 
significantly increase the amount 
of support provided by RED 
HORSE to the European 
Command (EUCOM) theater. 
Historically, RED HORSE is 
employed 39% of the time to 
accomplish Critical Construction, 30% of the time to support Humanitarian/Civic 
Assistance (HCA) ventures, and 11% of the time to complete Exercise Related 
Construction (ERC) projects [l:Section 5.4.3]. Figure 2.3, taken from the RED HORSE 
2010 Strategic Study 
[l:Section 5.4.3], 
illustrates the full range 
of RED HORSE 
deployments, as 
categorized by mission 
types. 
Disaster Relief      aher 





Fig 2.3 RED HORSE Deployments by Mission Type 
Historically, the type of OOTW mission has not played a major role in 
determining the capabilities required by a RED HORSE unit [l:Section 5.4.3]. Rather, 
OOTW deployments emphasize the imperative ability of RED HORSE to be highly 
responsive - to all parts of the world [l:Section 5.4.3]. Future projections for RED 
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HORSE OOTW missions include responding quickly to national disasters and military 
threats, mandating that units are light, lean, and self-sufficient, with heavy assets pre- 
positioned in various locations around the world [l:Section 5.4.3]. 
Expeditionary Aerospace Force (AEF) 
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the fragmentation of its components into 
independent countries, the US no longer has an identified adversary for which to prepare. 
As such, the threats faced by today's military are more nebulous than at any other time in 
history. In addition to the general military and conventional threats prevalent throughout 
the latter half of the 20th century, there are now numerous asymmetrical threats for which 
the US military and the USAF must be prepared. As the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic 
Study states: 
This has caused an evolution in strategy that now requires a more global 
response capability, one that relies less on a permanent presence on foreign soil 
and more on a CONUS-based agile response that projects lethal force anywhere 
in the world on short notice [l:Section 5.3.1]. 
In an effort to provide this global response capability in a manner that provides 
consistency and flexibility in meeting its contingency requirements, the Air Force has 
implemented the AEF concept. The AEF is the Air Force's initiative to "organize, train, 
equip, and sustain itself to provide rapidly responsive, tailored aerospace forces for the 
21st Century military operations [l:Section 5.3.1]." This approach has resulted in the 
reorganization of the Air Force's mobility forces to meet ongoing and unforeseen 
contingencies on a predictable, rotational basis. AEFs are pre-determined sets of forces 
(aircraft, equipment, and personnel) from which tailored force packages can be employed 
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in support of theater commanders [l:Section 5.3.2]. It consists of a lead wing from a 
base that is augmented as required with additional weapons systems, personnel, and 
resources from other bases. Together, the identified units from these various bases form 
an AEF comprising over 150 aircraft and 10,000 -15,000 personnel. As part of each 
AEF, Prime BEEF personnel - sourced from the bases of the lead wing and augmenting 
units - are assigned to support any generic contingency engineering requirements that 
may arise during the deployment of any AEFs. 
Having established 10 AEFs, the Air Force is able to implement a 15-Month 
rotational schedule whereby predetermined forces are capable of responding to any 
contingencies that may arise. Figure 2.4, taken from the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic 
Study, illustrates this 
rotational schedule 
[l:Section 5.3.3]. This 
rotational schedule occurs 
by placing two AEFs on 
"stand by" for a three- 
month period, after which 
they stand down and 
resume normal training and 
exercises while the next 
15 Month Cycle 
Stand-down 
Deployment/On Call I Normal Training and Exercises 
Spin-Up/ 
Deploy Prep 
- 2 AEWs on-call for "pop ups" at all times 
-1 mobility wing on-call during each AEF window 
Figure 2.4 AEF 15-Month Rotational Cycle 
two AEFs stand by. 
In addition to those forces identified as part of an AEF, two Air Expeditionary 
Wings (AEW) exist to provide composite wing support as needed to the deployed AEFs. 
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These AEWs are based at Mountain Home AFB, ID and Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, and 
are comprised primarily of strike and support aircraft [IrSection 5.3.3]. These AEWs 
obtain engineering support from their respective Prime BEEF units, similar to AEFs. 
Also as part of the AEF concept, five separate mobility wings have been 
established. These mobility wings (a.k.a. enablers) are not tied to any particular AEF; 
instead they provide support during operations other than war (OOTW) scenarios where 
combat aircraft would not be required. In this manner, enablers are able to provide on- 
call support to deployed AEFs or AEWs as required. Finally, non-deploying personnel 
(civilians, strategic withholds, etc.) are identified to provide support from their home 
stations locations to those forces deployed worldwide. 
Since Prime BEEF forces assigned to the AEF or AEW are capable of providing 
the typical level of engineering support required in a contingency, RED HORSE's 
purpose in the AEF is to fulfill any potential heavy engineering requirements that are 
beyond the capabilities of deployed Prime BEEF forces [IrSection 5.3.4]. Unlike Prime 
BEEF units however, there are not enough RED HORSE units to assign one per AEF. 
Therefore, RED HORSE supports the AEFs and AEWs as an enabler, providing the reach 
back, on-call capability to support contingencies as required. This role is depicted in 
Figure 2.5 below. 
Figure 2.5 RED HORSE and The Expeditionary Air Force 
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To provide this on-call contingency support, substantial portions of a RED 
HORSE unit are always on standby to furnish the reach-back heavy construction 
capability. This standby responsibility is rotated among the three active duty ACC RED 
HORSE squadrons and the three ARC RED HORSE squadron equivalents [l:Section 
5.3.4]. Once solicited for support, these standby units are required to respond anywhere 
in the world with a 16-person advance team within 16 hours, followed by a 148-person 
self-sustaining construction team within 96 hours [l:Section 5.3.4]. (The advance team is 
responsible for preparing the deployed location for the arrival of the construction team). 
Standby units are also used to support "pop-up" requirements throughout the world, 
similar to the mobility wings identified in the AEF concept. Finally, the standby RED 
HORSE has the flexibility to assign personnel as required to support priority 
requirements - i.e. placing troop training projects on hold to support an AEF, re- 
deploying personnel early from a lesser priority deployment, etc [l:Section 5.3.4]. 
Other Mission Parameters 
Aside from these aspects of the RED HORSE mission that govern the 
employment of its units, the following are four additional parameters that govern the 
theory behind RED HORSE employment as put forth by the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic 
Study [l:Section 4.1.2]: 
-    Deployed RED HORSE squadrons are theater assets and support air 
component commander's priorities as the order of battle dictates 
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- Personnel and equipment are primarily planned as air transportable. Although 
sealift is a common mode of transportation, logistics detail in the Unit Type 
Code (UTC) database is based on an airlift configuration 
- Deployed squadrons are self-sufficient and capable of independent operations 
in remote, austere environments. This self-sufficiency includes organic 
medical support, services, vehicle maintenance, logistics, and contracting. 
RED HORSE is dependent on availability of fuel, a water source, construction 
materials, and other inherent resources, but possesses many capabilities which 
allow them to use local raw resources for self-sufficiency (e.g. water well 
drilling, quarry operations, etc.) 
- Deployed squadrons are capable of operating in elevated security threat 
environments. While RED HORSE units will not generally operate 
independently in more than a Level 1 threat environment, the mission may 
require operating in locations where little or no protective security force is 
present. Hence, deployed squadrons are equipped and trained in ground 
defense measures, organic convoy, and work-party security. Level I exposure 
includes small-scale threats conducted by agents, sympathizers and partisans, 
and agent supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. 
The theory behind RED HORSE employment is not without its flaws though. In 
order for RED HORSE to accomplish its "critical" mission requirements, it must be on 
site with all required equipment from the beginning of the contingency. However, RED 
HORSE does not possess an in-house airlift capability, nor has it been assigned dedicated 
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airlift. The employment of RED HORSE units, like most all other military units, is 
extremely dependent upon logistics and transportation systems external to its own 
organization. As stated in the RED HORSE 2010 Study, 
The fundamental vulnerability of this concept [RED HORSE employment] has been its 
reliance on timely air and sealift or sufficient lead-time to move CONUS based 
equipment packages into theater when needed [l:Section 4.7]. 
This dependence upon logistics and transportation systems make RED HORSE 
susceptible to circumstances beyond its control. As such, RED HORSE cannot guarantee 
that it will arrive in theater with all resources required to accomplish the mission, 
according to the timeline designated by doctrine. 
Chain Of Command 
Currently, there is no uniform chain of command for RED HORSE units during 
peacetime. Rather, most RED HORSE units are called to serve two masters, falling 
under the administrative control (ADCON) of one organization, and the operational 
control (OPCON) of another. In order to understand how these control functions are 
subdivided, the functions themselves must be understood. Abridging the definitions put 
forth for these hierarchical terms from Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study states that ADCON 
pertains to that organization exercising control over "...organizing, training and 
equipping the unit or personnel, as well as who accomplishes disciplinary and 
administrative actions [l:Section 4.5.2]." Conversely, it summarizes OPCON as 
applying to the organization that"... exercises overall authority over mission 
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requirements, assignments, movement, and all other aspects of the mission [l:Section 
4.5.2]." 
Table 2.4, taken from the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [l:Section 4.5.2], 
depicts the various reporting agencies for RED HORSE active duty and reserve units. As 
can be seen, the associated Numbered Air Force (NAF) has ADCON over active duty and 
ARC RED HORSE units, while the parent major command (MAJCOM) maintains 
OPCON. 
Table 2.4 - RED HORSE reporting agencies 
], .^     Unit,   ' , • ADCON j Üsfe# 
820 RHS Nellis AFB, NV 12 AF HQACC 
823 RHS 
Det 1,823 RHS 
Hurlburt Field, FL 







Malmstrom AFB, MT 








Osan AB, ROK 
Camp Murray, WA 








Det 1, 307 RHS 
Kelly AFB, TX 







Camp Perry, OH 







Camp Blanding, FL 





31 RHF Camp Darby, IT 31 FW HQ USAFE 
NOTE:    7 AF headquartered at Osan AB, ROK 
9 AF headquartered at Shaw AFB, SC 
10 AF headquartered at NAS Fort Worth JRB, TX 
12 AF headquartered at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 
The peacetime chain of command is much more bureaucratic for ANG RED 
HORSE units however. As the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study summarizes, these 
units 
".. .typically answer directly to the Assistant Adjutant for Air at the respective 
State Military Departments. However, since the Assistant Adjutant for Air is 
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normally a traditional "guardsperson," the fulltime Executive Support Staff 
Officer (ESSO) for air provides command management for routine and daily 
functions. The ESSO fulfills the policies and decisions of the Assistant Adjutant 
for Air. The Assistant Adjutant for Air in turn reports to The Adjutant General 
(TAG) of the respective state. Depending on the state, the TAG may or may not 
have a direct link to the Governor. In many cases, the State Military 
Departments answer to a Department of Public Safety which is headed by one of 
the governor's cabinet members. The actual title of this department may vary 
from state to state, but its function remains constant. The Department of Public 
Safety provides a central focal point and political command functions for 
agencies that deal with public safety interests... [l:Section 4.5.2]." 
Further, all peacetime readiness functions of the ANG are managed under the direct 
guidance of the National Guard Bureau in Washington D.C. Among those functions 
included are "...providing facilities (construct and maintain), training areas, material 
acquisition, budget management, equipment maintenance, legal management, training 
and ultimately activation [l:Section 4.5.2]." Although guard training is technically a 
federal activation procedure, the management of this function remains under state control 
[l:Section 4.5.2]. For purposes other than training, either the state or federal government 
may invoke activation of the ANG. Although state activation procedures vary, they are 
typically administered through the respective Department of Public Safety or an 
Emergency Information Center (EIC) that is managed either out of the Department of 
Public Safety or State Military Department. Once activated, the guardsperson essentially 
becomes a state employee for the duration of the activation period [l:Section 4.5.2]. 
During times of war, the command relationships discussed thus far do not hold. 
Instead, air component commanders have OPCON of deployed RED HORSE units. 
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Oftentimes, these units combine to form a composite RED HORSE group when two or 
more units are deployed in support of the same theater of operations. The command of 
such a composite group is assigned to the air component command engineer or the 
designated RED HORSE squadron commander [l:Section 4.5.2]. 
Current Threats 
With the United States remaining as the lone world superpower, the U.S. military 
has experienced a ".. .major paradigm shift from the bipolar Cold War mentality to a 
post-Cold War reality [l:Section 5.3.1]." In doing so, the United States can no longer 
prepare for a single, known, and tangible opponent; instead, we must now operate in an 
unpredictable environment that encompasses a number of possible enemies who have the 
potential to threaten regional stability, international interests and values, or even national 
defense at various levels of engagement - ranging from global nuclear conflict to 
regional conventional attacks. As such, U.S. forces must be prepared to not only provide 
support in response to two separate MTWs, but also to meet general threats (any action 
against US positions and aircraft), conventional threats (theater ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles), and asymmetrical threats (chemical and 
biological weapons, radiological weapons, toxic industrial chemical agents, terrorists, and 
special operations forces). These threats will mandate the capabilities required of US 
forces in the future, thereby defining the future Concept of Operations (ConOps) for 
USAF CE forces, including RED HORSE. As such, these threats could impact the most 
effective way to organize RED HORSE from a macroscopic perspective. Hence, each of 
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these threats must be accurately defined in order to understand how they will specifically 
affect RED HORSE. 
General Threat 
General threats can be described as those directed against US airpower and its 
support elements anywhere in the world. As air power is most vulnerable while 
concentrated on the ground, AF Civil Engineers must be prepared to meet the full 
spectrum of enemy threats, and recover from any damaged inflicted on US assets 
[l:Section 5.2.2]. Although these threats can be minimized (pest control), most will have 
to be met actively - airbase ground defense - or passively - i.e. hardened shelters; 
camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD); chemical and biological defense 
ensembles. These threats can surface in both MTW and OOTW scenarios. For RED 
HORSE, the general threat necessitates that it is postured to effectively accomplish 
expedient heavy construction operations prior to and after an attack. 
Conventional Threat 
Currently there is no single country in the world capable of preventing the US 
from achieving and maintaining air superiority in any conventional situation [l:Section 
5.2.3]. However, conventional weapons such as theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), carrying conventional payloads, pose a direct threat to 
US bases worldwide. These delivery systems are cheaper to obtain and maintain than 
full-scale air forces, making their proliferation in the future most likely. Although these 
adversarial weapons systems are currently incapable of accurately targeting and 
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eliminating pivotal friendly assets, the introduction of global positioning satellite (GPS) 
systems will soon upgrade their capabilities. Technological improvements will also 
improve these delivery systems, allowing for larger payloads, longer ranges, and lower 
detection signatures [l:Section 5.2.3]. These improvements will increase the threat to 
friendly assets substantially, providing the ability for adversaries to accurately target 
critical resources. 
Similar to general threats, conventional threats can occur in either of the primary 
contingency scenarios (MTW or OOTW). Despite the scenario, USAF CEs must be able 
to support against the entire spectrum of conventional threats (either actively or 
passively), as well as provide expedient damage recovery operations. For RED HORSE, 
its mission currently remains the same in response to a conventional threat as to a general 
threat - accomplishing expedient heavy construction operations in a threat environment. 
Asymmetrical Threat 
Threats not falling within the definition of general or conventional are termed as 
asymmetrical by the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [l:Section 5.2.4]. Asymmetrical 
threats are primarily weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - i.e. nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) weapons - but they also include attacks from terrorists and special 
operations forces [l:Section 5.2.4]. These weapons can be delivered by conventional 
(combat aircraft or artillery) or unconventional (terrorists or UAVs equipped with 
asymmetrical payloads) means. Should they be delivered unconventionally, friendly 
forces will have minimal, if any, warning. Further, these weapons are capable of striking 
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any target at any location. As such, enemies will most likely seek these less expensive 
alternatives to counter USAF superiority [l:Section 5.2.4]. 
Although Air Mobility Command (AMC) is tasked with air operations and NBC 
defense missions, they are not organized, equipped, or manned to accomplish the latter of 
these missions. It was proposed to utilize the current capabilities of Prime BEEF teams, 
however the RAND and Pope/Bragg studies proved that the capabilities of these units 
were insufficient [l:Section 5.2.4]. Another option to meet these threats is to task RED 
HORSE. Currently RED HORSE is able to provide required heavy construction 
capability, but possesses sufficient NBC capability for short-term self-sustainment only. 
If RED HORSE was chosen to provide NBC defense, its capabilities must be expanded 
significantly beyond those currently existing [l:Section 5.2.4]. 
Future Trends 
Analyzing future trends to determine their effect on military operations has long 
been a custom in the US military. In his Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) 
dissertation, Maj. James T. Rybum points our this ancient custom 
The great airpower strategist, Giulio Douhet wrote, "He who intends to build a good 
instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like [29:9]." 
In addition to the posture, mission, and threats for which RED HORSE is 
currently designed to operate, there are several emerging trends that will impact RED 
HORSE's future capabilities and ConOps. These trends could have an impact on the 
most effective way to organize RED HORSE units from a macroscopic perspective. The 
primary future trends are jointness and force protection. 
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Jointness 
In any future role, CE and RED HORSE will be increasingly expected to work 
with joint and coalition forces, but must be prepared to operate independently [l:Section 
5.2.5]. From a military perspective, there are currently several means to accomplish 
contingency engineering requirements. Included among these are AFCAP, LOGCAP, 
Army Construction Battalions, Navy SEABEES, 49 Munitions Maintenance Squadron, 
Prime BEEF, and RED HORSE. It is imperative not only that RED HORSE's role with 
respect to comparable capabilities in other services is defined, but that its role relative to 
the CE capabilities present within the USAF is defined as well [25:3]. Further, it is 
essential that the roles of each of the military CE units can be employed effectively and 
jointly, without compromising the capability of any individual unit. 
Force Protection 
Other trends that are emerging have the potential to pose significant threats to the 
safety of US personnel at home and abroad. Out of necessity, force protection 
considerations have become of the utmost priority in any deployment scenario. 
Previously, RED HORSE was able to rely on its assigned force protection specialist and 
the weapons, convoy, and personal security training undergone by all unit personnel. 
However, certain emerging trends have the potential to increase the threat to U.S. 
personnel beyond the level to which RED HORSE is currently capable of meeting. If 
these trends continue, they could significantly affect the manner in which RED HORSE 
is structured. The trends directly contributing to the increased emphasis on force 
protection can be quantified as global trends and general military trends. 
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Global Trends - these include factors such as overpopulation, cultural clashes, 
lack of natural resources, and increasing presence of non-national entities 
[l:Section 5.2.6.1]. These conditions will directly contribute to an increase in the 
number of humanitarian projects undertaken by US forces (i.e. Somalia, Kosovo, 
etc.). It is imperative that military roles in such engagements are clearly defined, 
as troops will be armed for self-defense purposes. Training must be accomplished 
to provide US troops the ability to employ non-lethal means of self-defense to 
avoid turning the local populace into enemies [l:Section 5.2.6.1]. In the CE 
community, RED HORSE stands to incur an increase in its operations tempo as a 
result of increased humanitarian projects. As such, they must be equipped with 
the self-defense skills to sufficiently protect themselves while not impacting the 
host nation any more than necessary. 
General Military Trends - military-specific factors that could affect future 
missions deal primarily with advances in technology [l:Section 5.2.6.2]. It can be 
assumed that technology and weapons will be developed and introduced at the 
same rate as technology growth. This exponential growth of technology 
combined with the likelihood of national foes to exploit non-traditional 
vulnerabilities will require thorough intelligence monitoring and continual 
communications security [l:Section 5.2.6.2]. Deployed forces must be able to 
work with both of these services to ensure their intelligence is current and their 
systems are secure. These issues directly affect RED HORSE as it is the initially 
2-26 
deployed engineering unit for most contingencies and possesses the greatest 
chance of encountering these latest threats. As such, RED HORSE must ensure 
that its personnel possess the proper training and equipment to counter any such 
attacks. Currently, four emerging military trends exist [l:Section 5.2.6.2]: 
Lasers - available now, the capabilities of these weapon are increasing to 
cause blindness, damage sensors, and track firing positions. It is very 
likely that these systems will become smaller (human portable and vehicle 
mounts), less expensive, and more difficult to detect (with little to no 
warning). Laser eye protection will be required by deploying troops, 
requiring new equipment and training 
Radio Frequency Radiation - also available now, the capabilities of these 
weapons are increasing to damage electronics and injure people. 
Currently technology to combat this threat is cost-prohibitive, but needs to 
be explored to provide sufficient protection to friendly personnel and 
assets. At a minimum, RED HORSE units should undergo awareness 
training to prepare them for this possible threat. 
Infectious Disease - dangerous flora and fauna, weather, and climate 
significantly contribute to the threat of infectious diseases facing 
deploying US forces. With an increase in humanitarian missions, AF units 
(including RED HORSE) will be deployed to underdeveloped parts of the 
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world more frequently, increasing the susceptibility of personnel to 
infectious diseases. Deploying units must be able to deploy with qualified 
medical technicians who can quickly identify these threats and respond 
effectively. In addition, deploying units should undergo medical safety 
training that has been tailored to address the specific deployed 
environment prior to deployment. 
Culture - as humanitarian missions increase and US units operate in 
underdeveloped regions of the globe, cultural differences will become 
greater. These differences will affect the manner in which work is 
accomplished in the region - contract negotiation, religious sensitivies, 
acceptable/unacceptable behavior, etc. RED HORSE and other units must 
receive adequate cultural training to ensure accomplishment of mission 
objectives. 
Recommendations of the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study 
In response from MGen Robbins' (current HQ AF/CE, previously ACC/CE) 
directive to analyze RED HORSE from the perspectives of "Relevant, Ready, and Right 
Sized," The RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study generated 13 hybrid proposals [l:Section 
7], listed the 11 most prevalent strategic improvements [l:Section 9], and identified two 
specific areas of further study [l:Section 10]. These recommendations put forth by the 
RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study provide direction and guidance for further research 
into matters pertaining to RED HORSE, including this thesis. 
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Hybrid Proposals 
Of the 13 hybrid proposals developed, eight addressed unit-specific issues such as 
increasing manpower authorizations, adjusting authorized UTCs (the skills mix present 
within a RED HORSE squadron), and changing the vehicle fleet makeup within a unit. 
The remaining five proposals specifically addressed reorganization topics from a 
macroscopic perspective. The first addresses the "Relevant" aspect of the study, aimed at 
improving RED HORSE's core capabilities to fulfill its customer's demands. This 
proposal is: 
-    Proposal #3: Reorganize RED HORSE into a joint setup, while 
maintaining its existing UTC setup. This proposal mandates that 
RED HORSE should be organized in peacetime as it is in wartime. As 
RED HORSE is involved in joint operations with increasing 
frequency, it should maintain a joint organizational structure to 
alleviate the transition period currently required when deploying to a 
joint contingency. It further suggests that RED HORSE should adopt 
an organizational structure similar to those of its Army (Army 
Construction Battalions) and Navy (Seabees) counterparts [l:Section 
7.4.1.3]. 
The remaining four hybrid proposals all addressed the "Ready" criterion of the 
study, aimed at improving the responsiveness and flexibility of RED HORSE. These 
proposals are as follows: 
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Proposal #4: Forward stage 55% of RED HORSE vehicle and 
equipment sets overseas to support MTW and OOTW theaters. 
There are two primary advantages of this proposal: reducing the 
weight of CONUS RED HORSE units and decreasing the time 
required for vehicles and equipment to arrive at a contingency 
location. Historically, RED HORSE has been very heavy and difficult 
to transport due to the vehicles and equipment it requires to 
accomplish its mission. This has resulted in its under-utilization in 
contingency situations. Forward locating vehicle and equipment sets 
in various global theaters would reduce RED HORSE's transportation 
requirement to personnel only. This would drastically decrease the 
weight of RED HORSE, currently the limiting factor in scheduling 
airlift, allowing for faster response. In addition, vehicle and 
equipment sets would already be located in the contingency theater, 
dramatically reducing the time required to transport the vehicle and 
equipment sets to the contingency location [l:Section 7.4.2.1]. 
Proposal #5: Relocate one ACC and one AFRC CONUS RED 
HORSE unit to establish more co-located units and partnerships 
for improved training and efficiencies. This proposal advocated the 
relocation of 823 RHS from its current location at Hurlburt Field, FL 
to Barksdale AFB, LA to co-locate with Det 1, 307 RHS. It also 
proposed relocating 307 RHS from Kelly AFB, TX to Nellis AFB, NV 
to co-locate with 820 RHS. These relocations would allow CONUS 
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units to pool vehicle and equipment resources. Currently, RED 
HORSE does not possess a full contingent of vehicle and equipment 
assets; those they do possess are in extremely high demand. Co- 
locating units would allow active duty units to take advantage of the 
AFRC resources that are not fully utilized, while providing additional 
training opportunities to AFRC personnel. In addition, these proposed 
relocations would position all units closer to major transportation hubs 
(air, land, and sea), increasing the transportation options for movement 
of RED HORSE resources. Increasing the availability of equipment 
and decreasing the distance it must travel would both increase RED 
HORSE's readiness [l:Section 7.4.2.2]. 
Proposal #6: Establish RED HORSE forward operating presence 
in SWA, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM theaters for a permanent 
TDY presence. This proposal is similar to proposal #4; that is, 
forward locating RED HORSE assets in contingency theaters to 
decrease the time it takes to arrive and begin operations at a 
contingency location. In addition to this basic premise, this proposal 
advocates forward-locating personnel along with vehicle and 
equipment assets. This would further reduce RED HORSE's response 
time by pre-positioning all required resources (personnel, vehicles, and 
equipment) in global theaters. This would significantly improve the 
familiarity of RED HORSE personnel to operate in the various 
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contingency theaters around the globe, increasing its effectiveness in 
contingency environments [l:Section 7.4.2.3]. 
-    Proposal #7: Realign 31 RHF from USAFE to ACC. Implementing 
this proposal would align the RED HORSE resources existing in 
EUCOM with the MAJCOM tasked with identifying and supporting 
MTW requirements for the EUCOM and CENTCOM theaters. This 
realignment would streamline the chain of command, forming a single 
force provider of RED HORSE capability (ACC) for all unified 
commands. In addition, it would improve the ability to fund 31 RHF 
requirements [l:Section 7.4.2.4]. 
Strategic Improvements 
The RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study also posits eleven strategic improvements 
for enhancing RED HORSE's capabilities and missions. These suggestions are 
overarching approaches to improving RED HORSE's ability with respect to "Relevant, 
Ready, and Right Sized." Of the eleven suggestions, seven deal with internal 
organizational issues such as increasing manpower authorizations, adjusting authorized 
UTCs, and changing the vehicle fleet makeup within a unit. The remaining four pertain 
directly to macroscopic organizational issues, most of which have already been discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter. All four of these strategic improvements pertain to the 
"Ready" perspective of the study, attempting to improve RED HORSE's responsiveness 
and flexibility [l:Section 9]. These suggestions are: 
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- Forward stage more vehicle and equipment assets to support both 
MTW and OOTW theaters of operation 
- Create co-located active duty and AFRC relationships 
- Establish a RED HORSE forward operating location in CENTAF for 
ACC RED HORSE personnel to provide a permanent presence 
(similar to the Navy Seabee's concept) 
- Improve ACC's ability to provide RED HORSE forces and necessary 
assets to multiple theater CINCs by realigning 31 RHF from USAFE 
to ACC 
Areas of Further Study 
Finally, the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study identifies two specific areas of 
further study that could potentially enhance RED HORSE's ability to perform. One of 
these areas of study specifically addresses a macroscopic organizational issue of RED 
HORSE; namely, the reorganizing of active duty RED HORSE units to streamline its 
peacetime and/or wartime command structures (i.e. ADCON and OPCON). This 
scenario also includes the realignment of 31 RHF under ACC, as discussed in the 
previous two sub-sections. Within this proposition, the study puts forth three 
organizational options: 
- Organizational Option #1: Stay the same. This is the status quo 
alternative that maintains the current chains of command for active 
duty units; that is, OPCON held by ACC, and ADCON held by two 
different NAFs [l:Section 10.2.5.1]. 
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- Organizational Option #2: Realign 820 RHS to 9th AF. This 
alternative reorganizes all active duty units so that each falls under the 
ADCON of 9th AF (CENTAF). This option streamlines the peacetime 
chain of command by centralizing all three active duty units under one 
NAF. In addition, it maintains NAF influence in the employment of 
RED HORSE. This alternative does not alleviate the differing 
wartime and peacetime chains of command however, as ACC would 
maintain OPCON [l:Section 10.2.5.2]. 
- Organizational Option #3; Establish an ACC RED HORSE 
Group Under HQ ACC. This organizational option entirely 
streamlines the command of active duty units, by bequeathing 
ADCON and OPCON to HQ ACC. Although this is the ideal situation 
from a command perspective, it removes any influence over RED 
HORSE employment that the NAFs (and their respective theater 
commands) currently have. [l:Section 10.2.5.3]. 
Decision Analysis and Value-Focused Thinking 
Decision analysis (DA) is a prescriptive approach to decision-making. It provides 
the structure and guidance that allows imperfect people to think systematically in difficult 
situations, thereby reaching good decisions. It aids decision makers not only in 
structuring complex decisions, but also in identifying sources of uncertainty, representing 
that uncertainty in a systematic way, and in providing a framework, models, and tools for 
handling decisions where there are multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives [3:4]. 
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Figure 2.6 best represents the typical DA process [14:2-2]. This process depiction 
is modified from the original one put forth by Clemen, whereby he further classifies the 
third step (Decompose and Model the 
1. Identify the Decision 
Opportunity & 
Understand Objectives 
2. Identify Alternatives 
3. Decompose & Model 
the Decision Opportunity 
4. Choose the Best Alternative 






Decision Opportunity) into three sub- 
modeling steps [3:6]. The flowchart in Fig 
2.6 illustrates the iterative process 
characteristic of DA. It posits a method to 
identify, structure, and analyze any DA 
dilemma. Once insight is gained from 
initially accomplishing the process, this 
method then offers the decision maker an 
opportunity to revisit the objectives, 
alternatives, and model that comprise the 
decision opportunity. This iterative process 
allows for continuous improvement 
throughout the analysis [17]. 
Within DA, there are two possible methods of approach, Alternative-Focused 
Thinking (AFT) and Value-Focused Thinking (VFT). These two approaches are 
illustrated in Figure 2.7 [16]. AFT, termed by Keeney, is the standard decision making 
approach. It identifies potential alternatives and evaluates those alternatives based upon 
the merits of each alternative. According to Keeney, this traditional approach "is 
reactive, not proactive. Furthermore, it is backward; it puts the cart of identifying 
alternatives before the horse of articulating values" [13:33]. Moreover, this approach 
7. Implement the 
Preferred Alternative 
Figure 2.6 - Modified DA Process Flowchart 
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fails to clearly define a procedure of how to identify and structure the objectives of the 
decision maker, nor does it 
Alternative-Focused Thinking 
Initial 
Alternatives -K   Evaluate 
Value-Focused Thinking 
Values 
New & Initial 
Alternatives 
indicate how to utilize the 
objectives to guide the decision 
maker's thinking [12:4]. 
Conversely, VFT (also 
termed by Keeney) is a proactive 
approach, focusing on the values 
of the decision maker rather than 
generating alternatives [13:33]. 
Figure 2.7 - Alternative and Value Focused Thinking Approaches 
This approach challenges the 
decision maker to consider the purpose in making his or her decision. Challenging the 
decision maker in such a way oftentimes uncovers hidden objectives not yet considered. 
VFT improves communication among decision makers, leads to more productive 
information gathering, enhances coordination of interconnected decisions, facilitates 
involvement of multiple stakeholders, generates better alternatives, and identifies more 
appealing decision opportunities [13:33]. In addition, the creative nature of VFT to 
generate new alternatives that did not exist previously, allows it to best meet the needs of 
the decision maker by expanding the spectrum of possible solutions beyond those that 
currently exist [3:200]. 
This chapter summarized the history of RED HORSE and the theory behind its 
employment. RED HORSE's current structure, mission, and chain of command were 
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discussed, and the threats to which RED HORSE must be able to respond, as well as the 
future trends impacting RED HORSE employment were presented. Finally, this chapter 
included an introduction to decision analysis, presenting the basic concepts of value- 
focused thinking (VFT). The next chapter will provide a detailed review of the DA and 
VFT processes, directly applying them to the decision opportunity at hand; namely, 
suggesting the best macroscopic organizational design for RED HORSE. 
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III. Methodology 
This chapter describes the DA and VFT processes in more detail, applying them 
directly to the decision opportunity at hand; namely suggesting the best macroscopic 
organizational structure for RED HORSE. It will employ the modified DA process 
flowchart (Fig 2.6) to outline the proposed methodology to be used in accomplishing this 
research. Throughout this chapter, the decision process of purchasing a car will be used 
to further illustrate each step of the DA procedure. 
Identify the Decision Opportunity and Understand Objectives 
As illustrated in the DA flowchart presented in chapter 2, the first step in any DA 
process is to accurately identify the decision opportunity, and understand the objectives 
that contribute to that decision opportunity. 
1. Identify the Decision 
Opportunity & 
Understand Objectives 
Identifying the Decision Opportunity '     Figure 3.1 - Step 1 in the 
DA process 
Identifying the decision opportunity consists of 
three separate steps. The first is to isolate and define the specific decision that needs to 
be made. The second is to determine the decision maker; that is, the most appropriate 
person to make that decision. The third is to posit a value function; that is, the 
compelling reason for which a decision maker would be interested in the analysis [16]. 
In purchasing a car, the decision opportunity would be deciding which car to buy, the 
decision maker would most likely be the person purchasing the car, and the value 
proposition would be "to select the best vehicle for me." 
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Isolating the decision for this research opportunity was based upon issues 
identified during the ACC-sponsored RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. Several of the 
queries in the study raised the question of whether or not RED HORSE was effectively 
organized from a macroscopic perspective [25:3-5]. The study addressed these issues 
and suggested an alternative organizational structure based primarily upon a Delphi 
method of decision making [l:Section 10.2]. In addition, the study posited four strategic 
improvements and five separate proposals that addressed altering RED HORSE's 
macroscopic organizational structure. However, the approach taken in the study only 
accounted for the operational objectives of a RED HORSE unit; it did not take into 
account the entire range of objectives of a potential decision maker faced with the 
opportunity to define the macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE. As such, 
a decision opportunity was identified to suggest the best macroscopic organizational 
structure for RED HORSE, based on the findings of the study and taking into account all 
of the objectives a decision maker would employ in making this determination. 
The decision maker for any decision opportunity must be qualified to resolve the 
specific query identified as the decision opportunity. He/she must be knowledgeable 
about the subject encompassing the decision opportunity, and have sufficient influence in 
the area of the decision opportunity to express qualified opinions and accurate statements 
about the subject. The decision maker for this research focus, and for any organizational 
matters involving USAF CE units, is Civil Engineer (AF/CE), currently a Major General. 
However, a combination of the time consuming, iterative nature of the DA process and 
the AF/CE's exhaustive schedule made it impractical to continually work with him 
throughout the duration of this study. Therefore, a decision maker's representative was 
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required; this person must be qualified to provide insight into the opinions and attitudes 
of the decision maker. For this study, the decision maker's representative will be the 
Chief, Readiness Division, Directorate of The Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Combat 
Command (ACC/CEX), currently LTC Brent Chubb. The ACC/CEX is the person 
tasked with the OPCON of all active duty RED HORSE units, and traditionally been the 
person to set RED HORSE policy. As such, the ACC/CEX is qualified to speak for the 
decision maker on matters pertaining to RED HORSE and its macroscopic organizational 
structure. As a bonus, the current ACC/CEX was also the person tasked by ACC/CE 
with overseeing the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. The ACC/CEX is adequately 
qualified to fill the role of the decision maker's representative, and will be referred to as 
such throughout the remainder of this presentation. 
Identifying the decision opportunity also includes defining a value proposition. 
As discussed previously, this study addresses the macroscopic organizational issues 
raised by the ACC/CE, and the value proposition should reflect the priorities of the 
decision maker and the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. Once the value proposition 
is established, the objectives can be defined. 
Fundamental and Means Objectives 
The next step in the VFT process is to identify the objectives of the decision 
maker. When purchasing a car, the decision maker (consumer) would have to determine 
what he/she desires in a vehicle in order to identify his/her objectives. Perhaps the 
decision maker is only concerned with safety, performance, and price. These would be 
his/her fundamental objectives. Further categorization of safety could include the 
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accident survival rate of that particular make of vehicle, and the existence of safety 
features in the vehicle such as seatbelts, airbags, and child-safety locks. These would 
both be means objectives, as they further classify the fundamental objectives of the 
decision maker. Means objectives for performance could be acceleration, handling, and 
the "smoothness" of the ride. The fundamental objective of price would not have any 
means objectives, as it is already adequately quantified. 
To adequately identify objectives, initial assumptions must first be made to refine 
the scope of the identified decision opportunity, because it will not be feasible to address 
all aspects of a decision opportunity within the confines of this thesis. Once these 
assumptions are developed and validated by the decision maker's representative, 
objectives can be identified. These objectives are first identified through discussions and 
interviews with the decision maker's representative, and then further classified as either 
fundamental or means objectives. 
The identification process is accomplished by soliciting from the decision maker 
(or decision maker's representative) the factors that contribute to his/her decision - i.e. 
asking "what is important?" Throughout this process, Keeney's eight suggestions for 
identifying objectives must be applied: develop a wish list; identify alternatives; consider 
problems and shortcomings; predict consequences; identify goals, constraints, and 
guidelines; consider different perspectives; determine strategic objectives; and determine 
generic objectives [13:35]. 
Once a list of objectives is developed, they must be identified as either 
fundamental or means objectives. Means objectives are those that contribute to other 
objectives, while fundamental objectives are those that are important because they 
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indicate what the decision maker is actually trying to accomplish [3:44]. To assist in 
identifying means and fundamental objectives, two questions can be posed with respect 
to each objective: "Why is that important?" and "What does that mean?" If the answer to 
the former question is important only because of how it impacts another objective, then 
that objective is a means objective. If the answer to the former question is because the 
objective is one of the primary reasons of interest in the decision opportunity, then it is a 
fundamental objective. Similarly, if the answer to the second question entails additional 
objectives, then those additional objectives are means objectives [17]. 
The decision maker's fundamental objectives are the cornerstone for any decision 
model as they are the central factors contributing to the decision maker's verdict in a 
particular situation [3:532]. These objectives comprise the foundation for the value 
hierarchy, and provide overarching guidance when considering possible alternatives in 
the decision making process. The following are essential guidelines for identifying 
fundamental objectives, as presented by Clemen [3:533-534]: 
- The set of objectives must be complete, including all relevant aspects of a 
decision. 
- The set of objectives should be independent of one another; that is, attributes 
should not be closely related such that each objective can be easily defined 
and evaluated without considering the other attributes. 
- Each objective should differentiate between available alternatives. 
- The set of objectives should be as small as possible and accurately defined, 
keeping them manageable and easy to understand. 
- The set of objectives should not be redundant. 
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-    The set of objectives should be independent; that is, the decision maker should 
be able to easily think about each attribute without considering others. 
As Keeney indicates, if the fundamental objectives do not meet all of these 
criteria, the objective should be defined differently, or it should be considered a means 
objective [13:34]. Once the list of fundamental objectives has been ascertained, they can 
be organized in a value hierarchy. The upper levels of this hierarchy are comprised of the 
decision maker's fundamental objectives, while the lower levels are comprised of the 
means objectives that further describe the fundamental objectives. It is imperative that 
this structure accurately reflects the perspectives of the decision maker, as the lowest 
levels of the hierarchy will serve as the basis for developing evaluation measures. These 
evaluation measures are then used to score or evaluate alternatives. The value hierarchy 
is discussed more in-depth later on in this chapter. 
The fundamental and means objectives presented in this research will be solicited 
from the decision maker's representative. A series of interviews will be conducted with 
the decision maker's representative, at Langley AFB, in order to discern those things of 
value that contribute to his decision in setting policy for RED HORSE, including the 
macroscopic organizational structure of its units. Since aspects of the RED HORSE 2010 
Strategic Study addressed issues pertaining to RED HORSE's macroscopic 
organizational structure, a strawman value hierarchy will be constructed to guide the 
objective solicitation process with the decision maker's representative. In addition to 
guidance, a strawman also provides a starting point for the objective solicitation 
procedure. This particular strawman will reflect potential fundamental and means 
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objectives based upon the discussions and findings contained within the RED HORSE 
2010 Strategic Study. 
Identifying Alternatives 
The next step in the DA process is to identify alternatives, shown in Fig 3.2. 
Since the value hierarchy is comprised of the fundamental objectives defining the goal of 
the decision maker, it can be used as a basis for designing good alternatives for the 
decision opportunity [15:23]. Commensurate with the 
principles of VFT, understanding the objectives first allows 
the generation of better alternatives. Further, it allows the 
design of alternatives such that they specifically address the 




2. Identify Alternatives 
Fig 3.2 - Step 2 in the 
DA Process fundamental objectives of the decision opportunity. 
Alternative generation is a vital part of the analysis process; simply put, "If you want 
better decisions, find better alternatives [18]!" To find better alternatives, several 
alternative generation techniques will be used in support of this research effort. These 
techniques include developing strategy generation tables, maximizing of fundamental 
objectives, and using creativity approaches. 
Howard posits that the best approach to alternative generation involves the 
creation of a strategy generation table [11:684]. This technique is particularly useful 
when "...alternatives are made up of 'bundles' of characteristics [15:48]." Strategies are 
defined by selecting from among the available characteristics in each of many areas. 
Possible outcomes (characteristics) of each objective in the hierarchy are listed in 
separate columns, each column headed by the appropriate objective. Combining all of 
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these columns creates the strategy generation table; choosing from among the various 
possibilities of each objective generates different strategies. These strategies do not 
provide exact alternatives, but instead provide an overall direction for an alternative 
[15:48]. As such, not all of the possibilities need to be listed underneath each objective. 
Rather, the strategy generation table identifies those alternatives that have the most 
potential and would benefit from more in-depth analysis [15:47]. 
Keeney indicates that focusing on the fundamental objectives can provide a start 
to the process of alternative generation. He suggests concentrating on one particular 
objective and developing an alternative that maximizes the value of that objective, 
without taking into account any of the other fundamental objectives. This process is then 
repeated for each objective, providing an initial range of potential alternatives. Keeney 
then recommends expanding the bounds of this technique by focusing on two objectives 
at a time, and then three, and then four, each time attempting to generate alternatives that 
satisfy each of the objectives taken into account. This process continues until all of the 
objectives have been considered simultaneously. All the generated alternatives should 
then be assessed to determine if it is possible to combine any of them into a single 
alternative [13:39]. 
Clemen recommends the use of creativity techniques to develop alternatives. 
Among those he suggests are fluent and flexible thinking, idea checklists, brainstorming, 
and metaphorical thinking. He posits that creativity is essential in developing 
alternatives, as the alternatives themselves define the bounds of any decision opportunity 
[3:203-206]. 
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Finally, the status quo and "maximum" alternatives should always be included in 
any decision opportunity [18]. The status quo is the way things are currently operating. 
The "maximum" alternative is one in which all of the fundamental objectives are set at 
their highest levels (i.e. maximized). Once this ideal alternative has been determined, it 
can be analyzed to determine which constraints are preventing its employment in the real 
world [12:221]. 
Recalling the car example, the alternatives would be comprised of the different 
available vehicles on the market. Obviously, a consumer would have many makes and 
models of vehicles from which to choose - i.e. a Chevrolet Silverado truck, a Nissan 
Sentra, Ford Windstar minivan, and a Plymouth Prowler would all be feasible alternatives 
Decompose and Model the Decision Opportunity 
Decomposing and modeling the decision opportunity 
will be accomplished in this study by utilizing a value 
hierarchy, evaluation measures, multi-attribute preference 
theory, objective and evaluation measure weights, and the 
overall value function. These methods and concepts, 
discussed in this section, provide the tools required to 
logically model and mathematically evaluate which 
organizational structure is the best for RED HORSE. 
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Value hierarchies are the structure that reflects the decision maker's objectives, as 
solicited in the first step of the DA process. The upper levels of the value hierarchy are 
comprised of the decision maker's fundamental objectives. Although the fundamental 
objectives identify the overall issues of importance to the decision maker, they are not 
specific enough to allow for an accurate assessment of alternatives. Lower levels of the 
hierarchy are required to explain what is meant by the higher, more general levels 
[3:532]. The lower levels of the hierarchy are comprised of the means objectives that 
further describe the fundamental objectives. These lower levels can be obtained by 
asking the question "What is meant by that?" When a distinct response can no longer be 
obtained, that objective can safely be assumed to be the lowest level of the hierarchy - 
actually serving as an evaluation measure [17]. (Evaluation measures are discussed more 
in-depth in the "Evaluation Measures" section). In this manner, value hierarchies serve 
to decompose the decision maker's fundamental objectives into practical evaluation 
measures, ensuring that each fundamental objective is capable of being logically 
assessed. This logical decomposition of the value hierarchy provides a pictorial 
representation of the structure of the decision maker's objectives and evaluation measures 
[17]. 
Kirkwood remarks that value hierarchies must be complete, non-redundant, 
independent, operable, and small in size [15:16-19]. Completeness occurs when each 
level of the hierarchy, when assessed as a group, covers all of the issues required to 
evaluate the overall decision objective. Non-redundancy means that each objective and 
evaluation measure is exclusive; none of them share the same (or parts of the same) 
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definition. These two aspects of value hierarchies, completeness and non-redundancy, 
are also known as mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE) [15:17]. 
Independence implies that the preference for the score of one evaluation measure is not 
dependent on the score of any other evaluation measure. Operable indicates that the user 
understands and concurs with the value hierarchy. The small in size consideration 
expresses that a smaller value hierarchy is more easily understood and communicated. 
To validate the structure of the value hierarchy, the same two questions posed 
previously should be asked: "Why is that important?" and "What does that mean?" 
Asking the first question of any objective in the hierarchy should allow the analyst to 
proceed downward through the structure; conversely, asking the latter question of any 
objective in the hierarchy should allow the analyst to ascend through the structure [17]. 
Once the decision maker concurs that the value hierarchy accurately reflects his/her 
objectives, the value hierarchy is considered complete. 
For this research effort, a strawman value hierarchy will be developed, based on 
the information put forth in the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. This strawman will 
be used as a basis to solicit the decision maker's value hierarchy. This will be 
accomplished at the same time, and in the same way, as the decision opportunity's 
objectives are obtained; through discussions and interviews with the decision maker's 
representative. 
A value hierarchy for the decision of purchasing a car is shown in Fig 3.4. This 
hierarchy illustrates the three fundamental objectives of safety, performance, and price, as 
well as the means objectives that further classify each of the fundamental objectives. The 
gray boxes in Fig 3.4 denote evaluation measures. 
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Fig 3.4 - Value Hierarchy for Car Example 
Evaluation Measures 
Evaluation measures are the methods and standards that assess the degree to 
which alternatives attain the decision maker's objectives [15:12]. They are the elements 
of the value hierarchy that transform the decision analysis process from a qualitative 
nature to a quantitative tool for measuring the degree to which each alternative meets the 
decision maker's preferences, according to the constructed value hierarchy [14:2-9]. In 
establishing these quantitative aspects of the hierarchy, the analyst must pay careful 
attention to the developing the type of scale used for each measure, ensuring each 
measure passes the clarity test, and maintaining neutrality in each measure. 
Evaluation measures also answer the question of "What does that mean?," 
referring to the sub-criteria or objective directly above it in the value hierarchy. To 
accomplish this, evaluation measures provide scales of performance that are 
characterized as either natural or constructed, and either direct or proxy [15:24]. Kloeber 
defines each of these scales and gives particular examples, as follows [17]: 
Natural - in general use and common interpretation by all (profit) 
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Constructed - developed for a particular objective (level of security classification) 
Direct - focuses on the attainment of the objective (profit) 
Proxy - focuses on the attainment of an associated objective (GNP for economic 
well being) 
The type of scale used for evaluation measures depends on the preference of the decision 
makers and stakeholders of the decision opportunity. Referring back to the car example 
(Fig 3.4), the evaluation measures of "price" (measured in dollars), "acceleration" (time, 
in seconds, to go from 0-60 mph), and "number of seatbelts" in the vehicle would all be 
natural, direct scales. The scales of each of these measures (dollars, time, and number) 
are in common use, can be easily understood by all, and directly measure the attainment 
of objectives (price, acceleration, and seatbelts). Conversely, "handling" and 
"smoothness of ride" do not have obvious scales with which they can be measured. 
Perhaps "handling" could be as comfort of the driver, indicated by the presence of 
systems that enhance the vehicle's handling (i.e. power steering, power breaks, cruise 
control, etc.). This scale would be characterized as constructed (the presence of these 
systems comprise a scale specifically developed to measure "handling") and proxy 
(focuses on the driver's comfort as an indication of the vehicle's "handling"). 
"Smoothness of ride" may be measured by the number of times that the driver hits his/her 
head on the ceiling when driving. This scale would be characterized as constructed (a 
scale specifically developed to measure "smoothness of ride") and direct (numbers are in 
common use and easily understood by all). 
Howard indicates that the critical factors in scale construction are that scales be 
precise, specific, and pass the "clarity test" [11:684]. The clarity test, also known as the 
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clairvoyance test [17], asks whether a clairvoyant, capable of seeing into the future, 
would be able to determine what the score would be for each alternative, according to the 
scale developed for each evaluation measure. Clemen further notes that no interpretation 
or judgment should be required of the clairvoyant [3:75]. Kershchus points out the 
tradeoff that exists when constructing the scales for evaluation measures; namely, the 
effort spent in developing the scales, the ease of gauging each alternative against the 
scale, and the capability of communicating the results obtained from utilizing the scales 
of the evaluation measures [14:2-10]. 
Maintaining neutrality is one final consideration that must be addressed when 
constructing evaluation measures. When establishing the evaluation measures, 
maintaining neutrality is imperative to ensure an analysis that is not biased towards any 
potential alternative. To guarantee this, the evaluation measures must not indicate a 
direction (i.e. increase sales, decrease casualties, etc.) [17]. Rather, the evaluation 
measures merely signify one particular aspect of an objective; value functions (discussed 
in the "Multi-Attribute Preference Theory" section) will indicate direction. 
The evaluation measures for this thesis effort will be developed at the same time, 
and in the same manner, as the value hierarchy and its objectives; through discussions 
and interviews with the decision maker's representative. The scales for the evaluation 
measures will be constructed by soliciting the inputs of a select group of experts from 
823 RED HORSE, Hurlburt Field, Fl, as these personnel have the professional and 
technical expertise to accurately identify practical evaluation measures based on the 
decision maker's representative's objectives. 
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Multi-Attribute Preference Theory 
Multi-attribute preference theory is the part of the decomposition and modeling 
step that allows an analyst to standardize the scores attained from the various evaluation 
measures throughout the value hierarchy. The difficulty here is in combining scores that 
relate to different units of measure, as each evaluation measure can be constructed with a 
different scale. For example, when purchasing a car, it is difficult to compare "price" 
(with units of dollars) with the "handling" of the car (with units of comfort). "Price" 
possesses a direct, natural scale while "handling" involves a constructed, proxy scale. 
This example illustrates the difficulty present when attempting to standardize various 
evaluation measure scores. 
To alleviate this difficulty, a unitless, dimensionless value (or utility) function is 
assigned to each evaluation measure. Using these functions, the scores for each 
evaluation measure can be transformed into values (or utilities) and standardized 
throughout the entire VFT model. Converting the evaluation measure scores to 
standardized values (or utilities) allows the analyst to combine and compare them with 
one another, providing an established method of identifying the overall worth to the 
decision maker of that evaluation measure score. Herein lies the significance of multi- 
attribute preference theory [19]. 
Multi-attribute preference theory focuses on decision opportunities characterized 
by multiple, competing objectives. It provides the decision maker opportunities to 
examine and compare alternatives against competing objectives. Multi-attribute 
preference theory quantifies the objectives by constructing evaluation measures, develops 
and assigns weights (discussed in the "Assessing Weights" section) to each objective and 
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evaluation measure, and translates the evaluation measure scores into standardized, 
dimensionless units of measure (value or utility). These values (or utilities) are then 
combined into an overarching value function, generating a single overall value (or utility) 
for each alternative and characterizing how well each alternative meets the decision 
maker's objectives [20]. This system of value (or utility) functions allows a decision 
maker to resolve his/her decision opportunity by trading off increased value on one 
objective for decreased value on another [3:534]. In an environment characterized by 
multiple competing objectives, multi-attribute preference theory suggests the most 
valuable alternative to a decision maker by specifically relating the alternatives to the 
decision maker's objectives. 
Value and Utility Functions 
As posited in the previous section, value (or utility) functions are required to 
transform evaluation measure scores into dimensionless units. This section discusses the 
difference between value and utility functions, and the independence considerations of 
these functions. It then addresses the different means of reflecting value functions for 
evaluation measures with continuous and discrete scales. Finally, it discusses the 
monotonicity requirement of all value functions. 
The difference between value and utility functions lies in the conditions under 
which each is used; value functions are utilized under conditions of certainty, while 
utility functions are used when uncertainty (and accompanying risk) is involved [16]. As 
such, utility functions must incorporate uncertainty and probability, and are more difficult 
to assess. However, both types of functions are derived from the decision maker and 
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must accurately reflect the decision maker's attitude. In addition, both functions must 
maintain the condition of independence. As such, value (and utility) functions must be 
single dimensional functions, reflecting the values (or utilities) associated with only one 
particular evaluation measure score. 
Value functions for evaluation measures with continuous scales can be 
constructed by applying any of a vast array of general curves, each one indicating a 
different perspective of the decision maker. Kloeber defines the four most general curve 
possibilities as follows [21]: 
Linear: Constant returns to scale. This value function shape 
demonstrates an equal preference for each increase in 
outcomes. The decision maker places the same value 
increment on equal increases in evaluation measure outcomes. 
Concave: Decreasing returns to scale. This value function 
shape demonstrates a preference for "lower" outcomes. 
Minimal additional value is gained with further improvements 
in possible outcomes beyond a particular outcome. This curve 
shape is indicative of a risk adverse decision maker. 
Convex: Increasing returns to scale. This value function shape 
indicates a preference for higher outcomes. The decision 
maker places minimal value on outcomes realized before a 
specific "higher" outcome. This curve shape is indicative of a 
risk seeking decision maker. 
Fig 3.5 - Linear 
Value Function 
Fig 3.6 - Concave 
Value Function 
Fig 3.7 - Convex 
Value Function 
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S-curve: Combination of the above. This value function shape 
demonstrates an overwhelming preference for outcomes in a 
particular range. Once that range has been attained, there is 
little value to be gained for further outcomes, until the upper 
end of the range is realized. 
Fig 3.8 - S-curve 
Value Function 
For example, when purchasing a car, a decision maker might consider each dollar worth 
the same. Most likely, he/she would prefer to pay as little as possible for a vehicle. As 
such, his/her value function (Fig. 3.9) would be 
reflected by a linear relationship, indicating that 
each dollar increment reflects the same value 




Fig 3.9 - Linear value function 
for car example 
10K   possibilities (in this case $10K - $30K). 
However, the decision maker may only 
have a preference for a particular range of 
prices. Perhaps, the decision maker is on a tight budget and values the lesser-priced cars 
much more than the more expensive ones. It could be that he/she doesn't have much use 
for cars above $17K. This type of preference would be characterized by a convex 
relationship, as shown in Fig 3.10- indicating ] 
increasing returns to scale for vehicles priced 
below $17K. Value 
In addition, there are two possible 
methods for approximating these curves: 30K 10K 
Fig 3.10 - Convex Value Function 
for Car Example 
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piecewise linear and exponential [15:61]. Piecewise linear is most practical to use when 
the evaluation measure being considered has a relatively small number of possible 
different scoring levels [15:61]. These functions identify specific values for the different 
scoring levels, and assigns value to the remaining scores by connecting these identified 
point in a linear fashion. In order to utilize these functions however, the relative value 
increments must be specified between possible evaluation measure scores [15:62]. One 
of the evaluation measures in the car example is acceleration; that is, the time, in seconds, 
required to increase the car's speed from 0-60 mph. Assuming that the realistic range 
of acceleration times varies from 12 (maximum) to 2 (minimum) seconds, the consumer's 
preferences along this range can be identified. Fig 3.11 illustrates a possible single 
dimension value function constructed in a 
piecewise linear manner. As can be seen, 
values are assigned to particular possible Value 
outcomes (in this case 12, 8,4, and 2 
seconds), and these identified points are 
connected in a linear fashion to complete the 
function. 
12      10       8        6        4       2 
Acceleration (seconds) 
Fig 3.11 - Piecewise Linear Single 
Dimensional Value Function 
Exponential value functions are preferred when there are many possible outcomes 
for evaluation measure scores, and utilizes an exponential constant (p) to reflect the 
decision maker's attitude. The exponential constant is used to determine the decision 
maker's value according to the following relationship: 
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1 -fr- ■«w 
p 
1 - -fr" vg 
n,P* 
H L 
Xi   -x. 
, otherwise 
(2.1)      where: 
Vj(Xj) = the exponential single dimensional value function 
x i = the actual evaluation measure score 
X|L = the lowest possible evaluation measure score 
X|H = the highest possible evaluation measure score 
p = the exponential constant 
To identify p, the evaluation measure score corresponding to the decision maker's 
midvalue (v(x) = 0.5) is determined. This midvalue is then normalized with respect to 
the range of possible evaluation measure outcomes as follows: 
Xi -Xi 
Z0.5 = (2.2) where: 
X; z0 5 = the decision maker's normalized midvalue 
= the actual evaluation measure score 
L = the lowest possible evaluation measure score 
H = the highest possible evaluation measure score 
Tables are then employed, yielding specified values of p, dependent upon normalized 
midvalues. The result is a value function that takes on one of the curves illustrated in Fig 
3.12. The shape of the curve is dependent upon the value of p. The exponential single- 
P = i 
p = 5 
p = 0 
P = -5 
P = -l 
Fig 3.12 - Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function 
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dimension value function becomes increasingly linear as p approaches oo or -oo. 
Conversely, the curves take on more of an exponential shape as p departs from oo or -oo. 
The linear shape of the function indicates risk neutrality, indicated by p = 0. 
Monotonicity is another requirement for value (or utility) functions [21]. This 
characteristic ensures that only one value is reflected for each evaluation measure scores. 
As such, a more preferred evaluation measure score always reflects a greater value, while 
a less desired evaluation measure score always reflects a lesser value. Value functions 
can be either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing. Each of these 
functions assigns a maximum value (1) to the best possible evaluation measure score and 
a minimum value (0) to the worst possible evaluation measure score. However, 
monotonically increasing functions reflect a "more is better attitude," indicating that the 
higher the evaluation measure score, the more value it is to the decision maker. 
Conversely, monotonically decreasing functions reflect a "less is more" attitude, 
indicating that the higher the evaluation measure score, the less value it is to the decision 
maker. Figs 3.5 - 3.12 all illustrated monotonically increasing functions; that is, the 
value apportioned by the decision maker increases along the entire range of outcomes as 
they go from worst to best. 
For this research effort, value functions will be solicited from the decision 
maker's representative. These functions will reflect his attitude on the potential 
outcomes of each evaluation measure. These outcomes will be ascertained utilizing the 
expertise of qualified individuals from 823 RED HORSE, Hurlburt Field, Fl. 
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Assessing Weights 
In an environment with multiple, competing objectives, decision makers will most 
oftentimes feel that one objective is more important than another. Assigning weights 
allows a decision maker to assign relative importance to each of the fundamental and 
means objectives and evaluation measures present in the value hierarchy. As all the 
weights on any particular level must sum to 1, the decision maker effectively partitions 
out the amount of weight he/she desires to place on any particular objective or evaluation 
measure. However, increasing the weight of any objective or evaluation measure can 
only be done at the expense of another objective or evaluation measure. This 
phenomenon is known as the corresponding tradeoffs condition [15:231]. 
For this thesis, weights will be generated using swing-weighting techniques. 
Swing weighting directly compares objectives by presenting the decision maker with 
hypothetical outcomes [3:547]. It directly compares two objectives by presenting the 
decision maker with two scenarios. The first scenario presents one objective at its best 
possible outcome (highest value) and the other objective at its worst possible outcome 
(lowest value); the second scenario provides the opposite outcomes for the two objectives 
being addressed. During both scenarios, all objectives not being addressed are held 
constant. The decision maker is then asked to identify which scenario he/she would 
prefer and by how much (i.e. 2 to 1, 3 to 1, 3 to 2, etc.). Whichever objective is indicated 
to be most important is then retained as the measuring stick (the control objective) to 
which all other objectives are compared. The remaining unanalyzed objectives in the 
hierarchy are then compared (one at a time) to this control objective. In this manner, 
each objective will be rated against the same control objective, providing standardized 
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weightings for each objective. Since all the weights on a particular level must sum to 
one, all weights can be solved for by direct substitution, as shown in the following 
example accomplished for the three car objectives: safety (S) performance (P), and price 
(C): 
The weight of safety (S) is worth twice a much as the weight of performance (P): 
Ws = 2WP 
The weight of price (C) is worth twice as much as the weight of performance (P): 
Wc = 2WP 
Recalling that all the weights must sum to 1: 
Ws+ WP + Wc = 1 
By direct substitution, the weight of performance (P) can be calculated: 
2WP + WP + 2WP = 1 
WP = 0.2 
Therefore, the weights of safety (S) and price (C) can be calculated as well: 
Ws = 0.4           and      Wc = = 0.4 
An advantage of swing weights is their sensitivity to the range of values an 
evaluation measure score can undertake [3:549]. This provides an ability to compare 
evaluation measures that may have vastly different scales in terms of magnitude (i.e. cost 
of a house vs. cost of a piece of candy). 
For this study, the weights will be solicited directly from the decision maker's 
representative. Since he is the one who identified the fundamental and means objectives 
present in the value hierarchy, he is also the one most qualified to assign the appropriate 
weights to each objective and evaluation measure. 
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Overarching Value Function 
In value analyses characterized by multiple, competing objectives, it is necessary 
to develop an overarching value function. As Kirkwood states, this function 
".. .combines the multiple evaluation measures into a single measure of the overall value 
of each evaluation alternative [15:53]." This overall value function must also be easily 
understood by and accurately reflect the attitudes of the decision maker. Although there 
are several forms of the value function in existence, the additive value function is the one 
most commonly used in cases that have multiple, competing objectives [15:230]. The 
additive value function presents a weighted average of the single dimensional value 
functions employed by each evaluation measure, utilizing the following relationship [19]: 
n 
V(x)=    2   WI-MM        (2.3)        where: 
i = 1 V(x) = the total value 
n = the total number of single dimensional value functions 
W| = the weight assigned to the corresponding single 
dimensional value function 
Vj(Xj) = the single dimensional value function 
This function relies upon the critical assumption that the objectives to which it is being 
applied possess mutual preferential independence; more specifically, the decision 
maker's attitudes towards one objective are independent of his/her attitudes towards the 
other objectives [15:238]. This function also denotes that the corresponding tradeoffs 
condition holds between any two objectives [20]. Utilizing the additive value function 
produces one overarching value for each alternative by combining the values obtained 
from the evaluation measures' single dimensional value functions. Obtaining one 
overarching value for each alternative then permits comparison between alternatives with 
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respect to how well they achieve the decision maker's objectives. This comparison 
allows for the ranking of alternatives so often desired by decision makers. 
1. Identify the Decision 
Opportunity & 
Understand Objectives 
2. Identify Alternatives 
3. Decompose & Model 
the Decision Opportunity 
4. Choose the Best Alternative 
The Remainder of the DA Process 
The entire DA process is illustrated in Fig 3.13. Once the first three steps have 
been accomplished, the next step is to choose the best alternative. This step selects the 
alternative with the greatest utility or expected 
value after developing the single dimensional 
value (or utility) functions, constructing the 
overarching value function, and applying the 
power additive value function. This alternative 
will be the one that ranks the highest in the 
deterministic rankings produced after applying 
these analysis tools. 
The fifth step in the process involves 
performing sensitivity analysis on the objectives 
and evaluation measures weights. Sensitivity 
analysis indicates how the model reacts to slight 
changes in one or more of its various aspects. If 
the results of the analysis alter due to these 
slight changes, the model is said to be sensitive to these changes, and further analysis 
may be required to investigate more carefully these sensitive aspects [3:7]. 






7. Implement the 
Preferred Alternative 
Fig 3.13 -The Remainder of 
the DA Process 
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The sixth step in the process is a determination of the sufficiency of the analysis. 
Based upon the previous steps in the DA process, further analysis may be required, 
characteristic of the iterative nature of the DA process. Clemen offers several potential 
reasons for required further analysis, 
the decision maker's perception of the problem changes, beliefs about the likelihood of 
various uncertain eventualities may develop and change, and preferences for outcomes 
not previously considered may mature as more time is spent in reflection [3:7]. 
Results obtained through sensitivity analysis could also provide a requirement for further 
analysis. Further analysis could include refining the definition of the objectives present 
in the model, or changing some of the objectives in the model (include new or remove 
existing objectives) [3:7]. However, this step may be outside the scope of this research, 
and it oftentimes spawns related studies. Resolution sometimes occurs without this step, 
but can only be reached if the decision maker is comfortable with the final model and its 
results, lending validity to the analysis effort. 
Once resolution is achieved, the only remaining step is to implement the preferred 
alternative, as identified by the model. This final step is outside the scope of research; it 
is entirely up to the decision maker and may or may not happen. Some of the factors 
possibly influencing an alternative's implementation include the practicality of the 
alternative, political factors influencing the decision maker that were not accounted for in 
the model, a change in the decision maker's priorities during or after the analysis, or a 
change in the decision maker during or after the analysis. 
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As this chapter discusses, one of the goals of the DA process is to put forth an 
alternative based on the decision maker's objectives and attitudes. Clemen points out that 
the DA process has other goals as well: 
Decision analysis not only provides a structured way to think about decisions, but also 
more fundamentally provides a structure within which a decision maker can develop 
beliefs and feelings, those subjective judgements that are critical for a good solution [3: 
7-8]. 
This chapter described the DA and VFT processes, applying them directly to the 
decision opportunity for this thesis effort; suggesting the best macroscopic organizational 
structure for RED HORSE. It outlined these processes using a modified DA process 
flowchart, and used the decision process example of purchasing a car to illustrate each 
step of the DA and VFT processes. The next chapter will discuss the accomplishment of 
these steps in undertaking this thesis effort, and provide the results obtained through 
employing these processes. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
This chapter presents the model developed according to the methodology outlined 
in the previous chapter. It also provides the deterministic results from analysis conducted 
according to the VFT model. 
Identify the Decision Opportunity and Understand Objectives 
The first step of the DA process consisted of two separate parts: identifying the 
decision opportunity and understanding the objectives that contribute to that decision 
opportunity. 
Identifying the Decision Opportunity 
The three-part process of identifying the decision opportunity entailed isolating 
and describing the specific decision that needed to be made, distinguishing a qualified 
decision maker, and defining a value proposition to guide the research effort. The first of 
these parts, isolating and defining the specific decision that needs to be made, was 
accomplished via the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. The results of the study 
posited several hybrid proposals, strategic improvements, and areas of improvement 
designed to improve the capabilities, effectiveness, and overall efficiency of RED 
HORSE [l:Sections 7, 9-10]. A number of these findings addressed issues of 
organizational structure from a macroscopic perspective - i.e. RED HORSE as a whole 
instead of internal squadron adaptations (such as varying the UTC mix of a squadron). 
The large number of propositions relating to this matter pointed to a requirement for 
further investigation; hence this research effort aimed at addressing those queries. 
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The second part of identifying the decision opportunity is to distinguish a decision 
maker capable of providing qualified input to the decision making process. The 
USAF/CE is the decision maker for all policy issues affecting any aspect of USAF CE. It 
was not practical to utilize the USAF/CE personally for this research effort. As such, the 
ACC/CEX was identified as a qualified decision maker's representative (see Chapter 3). 
During the course of this research effort however, the identified decision maker's 
representative changed due to a Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA), characteristic 
of the military environment. Col James T. Ryburn replaced LTC Brent Chubb as 
ACC/CEX in late August 2000 as the ACC/CEX. Since the ACC/CEX is charged with 
setting policy for, and possesses OPCON of, RED HORSE active duty units, Col Ryburn 
possessed the same qualifications as his predecessor with regards to the office he holds, 
and his participation was solicited for this research effort. Although Col Ryburn did not 
have the familiarity with the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study as LTC Chubb, he did 
possess extensive experience in the RED HORSE community, serving in RED HORSE 
units twice [2:1-2], and accomplishing an investigative report addressing the missions 
and mobility configurations for RED HORSE [29]. His qualifications are highlighted in 
his biography, provided in Appendix F. Col Ryburn's overwhelming experience, 
combined with his position as ACC/CEX, made him highly qualified to serve as the 
decision maker's representative. 
Preliminary discussions with the decision maker's representative were dedicated 
to updating him on the proposed emphasis of this research effort, ensuring it was 
commensurate with his desires. Based upon the findings posited in the RED HORSE 
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2010 Strategie Study and the decision maker's representatives' desires, these discussions 
resulted in the following value proposition that served as a guideline for this study: 
To provide an objective, traceable, and robust analysis to identify the most 
effective macroscopic organizational structure that will allow RED 
HORSE to meet its strategic objectives in the future. 
The decision maker's representative supported this statement as an accurate reflection of 
RED HORSE priorities, stating that it answers one of the central questions posed by the 
HQ AF/CE in initiating the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [26]. The decision 
maker's representative's concurrence with the value proposition validated the emphasis 
of this research effort, and fulfilled the third requirement of identifying the decision 
opportunity. 
Fundamental and Means Objectives 
Once the decision opportunity was adequately identified, the fundamental and 
means objectives were solicited from the decision maker's representative. Prior to this 
solicitation however, several assumptions first had to be made to limit the scope of this 
thesis. In addition, strawmen hierarchies were constructed to help guide the solicitation 
process. These strawmen provided additional insight into the decision opportunity, based 
upon the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, and the experiences of active duty CE 
officers familiar with RED HORSE operations. 
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Assumptions 
Prior to any model development, the scope of the research effort had to be refined. 
This was done by declaring several initial assumptions, aimed at concentrating this 
analysis solely on the issues affecting the macroscopic organizational structure of RED 
HORSE. These initial assumptions were: 
- RED HORSE is capable of accomplishing all of its current missions provided 
it has the required resources (personnel, equipment, funds) in place 
o   Specifically, it can fully accomplish its OOTW and AEF missions, and 
can fulfill its MTW mission as well as it can now 
- RED HORSE will have sufficient funds to accomplish any mission required 
- RED HORSE can accomplish its missions in any theater, and in any 
environment 
RED HORSE and Prime BEEF ConOps will remain as they currently exist 
o   Roles and responsibilities of these two CE functions remain the same 
- Only existing Active Duty and ARC RED HORSE units are considered 
o   No existing units will be disbanded; no new units will be formed 
Units will remain manned and equipped at current levels 
o   Equipment and personnel will not be added or removed on a unit basis 
OOTW project distribution will continue along current trends 
o   Theater and project type broken out as shown on p.2-12 
These initial assumptions focused this study, and guided the strawman construction and 







To provide a guide to objective solicitation, two value hierarchy strawmen were 
constructed. The first of these strawmen (Fig 4.1) was based on the priorities and 
findings posited in the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, emphasizing the "Ready, 
Relevant, and Right- 
Sized" approach 
requested by the 
ACC/CE who 
commissioned the 
study. Along with 
these objectives, this 
strawman also indicated potential evaluation measures, shown by the gray boxes in Fig 
4.1. In addition, an alternate value hierarchy was explored, utilizing RED HORSE's 
three missions (MTW, OOTW, and AEF) as objectives. However, this hierarchy was 
abandoned as it did not capture the preferences of the decision maker's representative 
across the entire spectrum of the decision opportunity. 
To provide additional guidance, a second value hierarchy strawman was 
constructed, 
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inputs of a panel 
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Fig 4.2 - Second Value Hierarchy Strawman 
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personnel, familiar with RED HORSE and USAF CE contingency operations. This 
strawman characterizes the decision opportunity via missions-oriented and political 
fundamental objectives. The political objective possessed second-tier objectives in the 
foreign policy, Air Force, and national arenas as well. The gray boxes in this strawman 
again indicate proposed evaluation measures. As a note, the panel felt that foreign policy 
considerations would be a factor in the decision opportunity, but wasn't sure how to 
quantify such an influence (hence no gray boxes relating to the "Foreign Policy" 
objective). 
Both of these strawmen were developed in advance of the first meeting with the 
decision maker's representative. Based upon his inputs, the amended value hierarchy 
strawman was eventually used as a baseline upon which the objective solicitation process 
with the decision maker's representative was founded. 
Identify Alternatives (Part I) 
Prior to soliciting objectives from the decision maker's representative, a set of 
initial alternatives had to be developed. These initial alternatives were derived from the 
findings of the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. The initial list of alternatives were: 
-    Status Quo 
o   RED HORSE force remains as is, with differing chains of command 
(ADCON and OPCON), and multiple locations 
As-is with unified command 
o   RED HORSE force possesses a unified command (possibly headquartered 
at ACC, AMC, or PACAF), while maintaining multiple locations 
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-    CONUS Super-Unit 
o   RED HORSE force possesses a unified command (possibly headquartered 
at ACC, AMC, or PACAF), and is stationed at one location within the 
CONUS 
Global Force 
o   Units stationed in and assigned to each theater (CONUS, SOUTHCOM, 
CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM). 
Although this list of alternatives was not all-inclusive, it provided an adequate amount of 
choices to differentiate between potential options. This differentiation helped identify 
key areas of interest in the study, and assisted in the model generation effort. 
Decompose and Model the Decision Opportunity 
Once the value proposition was validated, assumptions outlined, and an initial list 
of alternatives developed, model generation commenced. As this study reflects the 
preferences of the decision maker's representative, the model was founded almost 
exclusively on input from the decision maker's representative. 
Objectives Solicitation and Decision Maker's Value Hierarchy 
The solicitation of objectives was conducted through interviews with the decision 
maker's representative, and was based upon the agreed upon value proposition. To 
provide clarity to the process, an experienced DA recorder annotated the dialogue that 
occurred during the interviews. During the initial interview (October), the decision 
maker's representative indicated that his primary two objectives were the responsiveness 
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of RED HORSE, and the political considerations surrounding a decision concerning the 
macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE. He further specified that 
responsiveness meant "getting people and equipment to the war (contingency, 
deployment location, etc.)," and entailed being responsive to doctrine, troop training, and 
war plans. In addition, the decision maker's representative stated that political 
considerations posed substantial ramifications on the global stage and in the Air Force 
[26]. During the second interview, the decision maker's representative indicated an 
additional primary objective of "Readiness." According to the decision maker's 
representative, this objective entailed ensuring that RED HORSE personnel were 
adequately trained on and familiar with the equipment sets they would be using in a 
contingency situation [27]. 
Once the decision maker's representative identified these objectives, he was 
shown the amended value hierarchy strawman (Fig 4.2). He agreed that the strawman 
reflected his basic objectives, but wanted to amend the second and third tier objectives 
and include different evaluation measures. Fig 4.3 shows the value hierarchy developed 
,  err 
i   Location of        j   Location of 
I    Personnel | Vehicles and 
ma ü 
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Fig 4.3 - Decision Maker's Representative's Value Hierarchy 
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and used as the structure underlying this research effort. This value hierarchy was based 
entirely on the decision maker's representative's inputs. Again, the portions shown in 
gray are the evaluation measures for this hierarchy, and are discussed in the "Evaluation 
Measures" section, presented later in this chapter. 
Primary Objectives 
As shown in Fig 4.4, the primary (or first-tier) objectives are "Responsiveness," 
"Readiness," and "Political Considerations." The remaining objectives and evaluation 
measures present in the value hierarchy 
served to further define and evaluate these 
three primary objectives. 
"Responsiveness" addressed the 
ability of RED HORSE to quickly arrive at 
a contingency location with resources 
What is the Best 
Macroscopic 
Organizational 
Structure for RH? 
r 
Responsiveness Readiness Political 
Considerations 
Fig 4.4 - Decision Maker's 
Representative's Primary 
Objectives 
(personnel and equipment). The decision maker's representative stated that it was 
imperative to meet the delivery requirements of the customers, and that this ability was 
directly dependent on time and money. Because sufficient funds were provided by one of 
the initial assumptions, the decision maker's representative indicated that time was the 
primary contributor to the responsiveness criteria. More specifically, time referred to 
how long it took to transport equipment and personnel to the contingency [26]. This 
concern is highlighted in its two second-tier objectives, described later in this chapter. 
"Readiness" was defined as the ability of RED HORSE units to adequately train 
and familiarize themselves with their vehicles and equipment. The decision maker's 
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representative highlighted the importance of having personnel trained and familiar with 
the actual pieces of equipment with which they would be required to perform their given 
contingency tasks. This familiarity directly affects a RED HORSE unit's ability to 
accomplish its taskings, and would contribute significantly to any decision involving the 
macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE [27]. 
"Political Considerations" referred to the organizational and governmental 
influences that affect the decision making process of a macroscopic organizational 
structure for RED HORSE. These influences included both domestic and foreign 
attitudes and regulations that govern the manner in which RED HORSE is organized and 
employed. The decision maker's representative indicated that the political effects of a 
reorganized structure would be felt throughout the Air Force - from the guard and 
reserves, to existing active duty commands, to CE personnel themselves. He stressed the 
importance of accounting for these effects in the model [26]. 
The remaining discussion in this section further describes these three primary 
objectives through the means objectives identified by the decision maker's representative. 
Responsiveness 
Fig 4.5 reflects the means objectives and evaluation measures that further define 
the primary objective of "Responsiveness." The two means objectives relating to 
"Responsiveness" are "Location of Personnel" and "Location of Vehicles and 
Equipment." Both of these means objectives address the dispersion of RED HORSE 
resources throughout the globe. The more dispersed the resources, the closer they will be 










Fig 4.5 - Primary Objective 
of Responsiveness 
contingency site. In addition, the decision 
maker's representative indicated that the weight 
of each unit is one of RED HORSE's major 
drawbacks. Weight is critically important to 
theater planners when scheduling airlift, as each 
available airframe has weight and size limitations. 
Theater planners prioritize incoming units based 
on the unit's capabilities vs. its size and weight. 
Currently, RED HORSE requires multiple aircraft 
and airframes in order to arrive in theater with its 
associated assets, making it "hard to sell to theater planners [26]". In contingency 
planning, airlift is a precious resource, and theater planners are extremely hesitant to 
commit multiple airframes for RED HORSE deployment. If RED HORSE was lighter 
(i.e. not as much equipment required to be transported) it would be seen as much more of 
a bargain to theater planners, and receive a higher prioritization for receiving airlift. 
Forward locating assets would potentially minimize the amount of airlift required to 
deploy RED HORSE units [26]. 
As stated in the initial assumptions, the two required resources of RED HORSE 
considered in this study are personnel, and vehicles and equipment. "Location of 
Personnel" in this model referred to the theaters in which personnel were located. The 
decision maker's representative noted that transporting personnel isn't as time consuming 
as transporting vehicles and equipment, but the transporting process still requires time 
(the basis of responsiveness for this study). In addition, the decision maker's 
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representative indicated that his preference for personnel location varied with respect to 
each of the five theaters (CENTCOM, CONUS, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM) 
[26]. Therefore, these five theaters were reflected as evaluation measures, and are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
RED HORSE's other required resource is vehicles and equipment. Therefore, 
"Location of Vehicles and Equipment" referred to the theaters in which these resources 
are located. For this study, "Responsiveness" was essentially a time consideration; the 
closer equipment is to a potential contingency location, the less time it will take to arrive 
at that location. However, the decision maker's representative also indicated that the 
increase in responsiveness realized by forward locating vehicles and equipment varies, 
depending upon the theater (CENTCOM, CONUS, EUCOM, PACOM, and 
SOUTHCOM) in which they are pre-positioned [26]. Therefore, these five theaters were 
again reflected as evaluation measures, and are discussed later in this chapter. 
Readiness 
Fig 4.6 reflects the evaluation measures that further 
define the primary objective of "Readiness." This primary 
objective indicated the ability of RED HORSE units to 
adequately train and familiarize themselves with their 
designated equipment sets. The decision maker's 
representative stressed the importance of this familiarity 
when it comes to task proficiency. As with the means 
objectives for "Responsiveness," the importance of this 
Readiness 
1 
Fig 4.6 - Primary Objective 
of "Readiness" 
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familiarity was dependent upon the theater in which the personnel were located 
(CENTCOM, CONUS, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM) [27]. As such, each of 
these theaters served as evaluation measures to quantify "Readiness," and is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Political Considerations 
Fig 4.7 reflects the means objectives and evaluation measures that further define 
the primary objective of "Political Considerations." This primary objective is further 
described by the means objective "Air Force" and the evaluation measure "Global 
Constraints." Both of these address the different types of political influences that would 
effect the decision maker's consideration of a macroscopic organizational structure for 
RED HORSE. "Air Force" pertains to the organizational influences internal to the USAF 
that affect the utilization and organization of RED HORSE. These were the Air Force 
specific factors contributing to a decision of RED HORSE's macroscopic organizational 
mkm iMofcm K^I ■— mmm wmsm l#$ti m®m K&aiiiüSliLjiA   Si'.-:"\-:.t3iJlS   Sito".ii\.T(,:sMl   fcaiJLiiiiiSi 
Fig 4.7 - Primary Objective of 
Political Considerations 
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structure [26]. As "Global Constraints" was deemed to be an evaluation measure, it will 
be discussed in the "Evaluation Measures" section of this chapter. 
"Air Force" was further quantified by two third-tier means objectives: "Change of 
Control" and "Managerial Considerations." "Change of Control" represented the discord 
created by removing an organization's currently existing control over RED HORSE. 
Altering RED HORSE's macroscopic organizational structure would inevitably entail 
shifting the lines of authority from their current positions. The decision maker's 
representative indicated that there would be a tremendous "emotional cost of pulling a 
RED HORSE from a NAF," or any other unit currently possessing control [26]. This 
move would inevitably result in adverse political ramifications among organizations 
internal to the USAF. The third-tier means objective of "Managerial Considerations" 
referred to the ability of a commander to maintain the integrity of his/her command at an 
appropriate level. Changes in the macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE 
would likely involve altering the level at which command is placed, as well as the 
responsibility given to each level of command. Changes in either of these managerial 
facets could impair RED HORSE's ability to accomplish its mission. According to the 
decision maker's representative, it is imperative that RED HORSE control be held at a 
level and rank commensurate with its mission [26]. Both third-tier objectives were 
additionally characterized by fourth-tier means objectives. 
"State Influences" and "DoD Influences" further defined the third-tier means 
objective "Change of Control". Each of these fourth-tier means objectives addressed 
existing controls that could potentially be altered due to a change in RED HORSE's 
macroscopic organizational structure. "State Influences" represented the affects of 
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altering state influences over RED HORSE. These altered influences could include 
changes in active duty unit locations, altered ARC missions and/or locations, and the 
political repercussions that may arise due to these altered influences. The decision 
maker's representative indicated that members of Congress (each keeping the interests of 
his/her own state in mind) had the final say in military posture, including the locations of 
RED HORSE units nationwide [26]. As such, state influences would be a significant 
player in the macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE, and was further 
quantified by the evaluation measures "ARC Units" and "Active Duty Units," both of 
which are discussed in the "Evaluation Measures" section of this chapter. Similarly, 
"DoD Influences" addressed the political ramifications of altering existing federal 
influences on RED HORSE. The decision maker's representative indicated that RED 
HORSE currently receives input from a number of federal organizations, among them 
NAFs; MAJCOMs; Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA); the 
Installation and Logistics, Engineers (ILE) department of Air Staff; and the executive 
branch. A change in the influence of any of these players could create discord within the 
Air Force and the federal branch, making it a consideration in determining the 
macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE [26]. To account for this federal 
discord, the evaluation measures of "MAJCOMs and Higher HQs" and "NAF and 
OCONUS bases" were developed, and are discussed in the "Evaluation Measures" 
section of this chapter. 
"Streamlined Command" and "Level of Command" further characterized the 
third-tier means objective "Managerial Considerations." Each of these fourth-tier means 
objectives addressed the managerial aspects that could potentially be affected due to a 
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change in RED HORSE's macroscopic organizational structure. "Streamlined 
Command" denoted the efficiency of RED HORSE's command and control. This means 
objective accounted for how unified RED HORSE's command would be, and how well 
its ADCON and OPCON command structures matched, denoted by its evaluation 
measures "Unity of Command" and "Matching Structures," both of which are discussed 
in the "Evaluation Measures" section of this chapter. "Level of Command" indicated the 
level at which overarching authority is maintained in an organizational structure. This 
means objective accounted for both the organizational level of command (MAJCOM, 
NAF, Theater Command, or wing levels) as well as the rank associated with that 
command level [26]. The evaluation measures "Command Level" and "Rank of 
Command" further quantified this fourth-tier means objective, and are discussed in the 
next section. 
Evaluation Measures and Value Functions 
In the decision maker's representative's value hierarchy (Fig 4.3), there were a 
total of twenty-four evaluation measures developed for this research effort. Each of these 
evaluation measures were developed in the same manner as the fundamental and means 
objectives identified in the previous section; they were solicited from the decision 
maker's representative during interviews in October and November, and various 
discussions that followed. This section defines these evaluation measures as they relate 
to their primary objectives ("Responsiveness," "Readiness," and "Political 
Considerations"). In addition, the scales and the value functions developed for each 
evaluation measure are presented. Each of these evaluation measures were constructed in 
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a piecewise linear fashion; none of them utilized the exponential method discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
Responsiveness 
As shown in Fig 4.5, there were ten evaluation measures developed for the 
primary objective of "Responsiveness," five for each of its two means objectives. Each 
of these evaluation measures indicated the decision maker's representative's preference 
for having RED HORSE resources located in various theaters around the globe. As this 
research effort assumes that no RED HORSE units will be added or removed from those 
currently existing, the existing number of squadron equivalents (7) and equipment sets 
(9) served as constraints as to the maximum number that could be forward located in a 
theater. The scales for each of the "Responsiveness" evaluation measures were natural, 
direct scales. The "Location of Personnel" evaluation measures assessed the number of 
squadron equivalents (in units of 0.5 squadron equivalents) located in a particular theater; 
this is a natural scale (number of squadron equivalents) that focuses on the attainment of 
the specific objective (location of personnel). Similarly, the "Location of Vehicles and 
Equipment" evaluation measures assessed the number of equipment sets located in a 
particular theater; this too is a natural scale (number of equipment sets) that focuses on 
the attainment of the specific objective (location of equipment sets). 
The first evaluation measure of "CENTCOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating personnel in SWA. As shown in Fig 4.8, the 
decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to personnel in the CENTCOM 
theater of operations were linear in nature. This indicated that the decision maker's 
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CENTCOM Personnel Value Function 
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Squadron Equivalents in Theater 
Fig 4.8 - Value Function for CENTCOM Personnel 
representative placed the same value 
increment on each additional increase 
in personnel located in theater - i.e. 
each additional squadron equivalent 
increased the value of the decision 
maker's representative the same 
amount. 
CONUS Personnel Value Function 
The evaluation measure of "CONUS" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating personnel in CONUS. As shown in Fig 4.9, the 
decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to personnel in CONUS were 
slightly concave in nature. This 
concavity was comprised of two 
separate linear regions - between 0 
and 6 squadron equivalents, and 
between 6 and 7 squadron equivalents. 
The decision maker's representative's 
preferences indicated that every time 
an additional squadron equivalent was located in CONUS, the decision maker's 
representative placed the same amount of value increase on that increase of personnel 
(within each region of linearity). Fig 4.9 also shows that the majority of the decision 
maker's representative's value (90%) had been realized once 6 squadron equivalents 
were located in CONUS; minimal additional value could be gained from locating further 
squadron equivalents in theater. The decision maker's representative indicated 6 
0.0    0.5    1.0    1.5    2.0    2.5    3.0    3.5    4.0    4.5    5.0    5.5    6.0    6.5    7.0 
Squadron Equivalents in Theater 
Fig 4.9 -Value Function for CONUS Personnel 
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EUCOM Personnel Value Function 
squadron equivalents as the 90% mark as that was the number of squadron equivalents 
currently located in CONUS. He cited recent operations in Kosovo and Bosnia as 
proving the benefits of maintaining this number of squadron equivalents in CONUS from 
a responsiveness standpoint [28]. 
The evaluation measure of "EUCOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating personnel in the European theater of operations. 
As shown in Fig 4.10, the decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to 
personnel in EUCOM were concave 
in nature. This indicated decreasing 
returns for placing additional 
squadron equivalents in theater, 
according to the decision maker's 
representative's preferences. 
Specifically, the majority of the 
decision maker's representative's value (90%) could be realized after locating 0.5 
squadron equivalents in the European theater; very little additional value could be 
obtained by placing more squadron equivalents in this theater. The decision maker's 
representative indicated that 0.5 squadron equivalents in the European theater would be 
sufficient to respond to any unforeseen contingencies, as very few unanticipated 
contingencies have historically arisen in that theater [27]. 
The evaluation measure of "PACOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating personnel in the Pacific theater of operations. The 
decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to personnel in PACOM are 
0.0   0.5    1.0    1.5    2.0    2.5    3.0    3.5    4.0    4.5    5.0    5.5    6.0    6.5    7.0 
Squadron Equivalents in Theater 
Fig 4.10 - Value Function for EUCOM Personnel 
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shown in Fig 4.11. Similar to the decision maker's representative's preferences in 
regards to personnel in CENTCOM, his preferences in regards to personnel in PACOM 
were linear in nature; the decision 
maker's representative placed the 
same value increment on each 
additional increase in personnel 
located in theater. 
The evaluation measure of 
"SOUTHCOM" indicated the 
PACOM Personnel Value Function 
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Squadron Equivalents in Theater 
Fig. 4.11 -Value Function for PACOM Personnel 
decision maker's representative's preference of locating personnel in the Southern theater 
of operations; these preferences are shown in Fig 4.12. Similar to the decision maker's 
representative's preferences in 
regards to personnel in EUCOM, his 
preferences in regards to personnel in 
SOUTHCOM were concave in 
SOUTHCOM Personnel Value Function 
S  0.6 
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nature. The decision maker's 
Fig 4.12 - Value Function for SOUTHCOM Personnel 
representative again indicated that 0.5 
squadron equivalents in the Southern 
theater would be sufficient to respond to any unforeseen contingencies, as very few 
unanticipated contingencies have historically arisen in that theater [27]. 
The second evaluation measure of "CENTCOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating vehicles and equipment in SWA. Fig 4.13 shows 
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that the decision maker's 
representative's preferences in regards 
to vehicles and equipment in the 
CENTCOM theater of operations as 
linear. 
The evaluation measure of 
"CONUS" indicated the decision 
CENTCOM V&E Value Function 
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Fig 4.13 - Value Function for CENTCOM 
Vehicles and Equipment 
maker's representative's preference of locating vehicles and equipment in CONUS. As 
shown in Fig 4.14, the decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to 
vehicles and equipment in CONUS were concave in nature. Similar to the value function 
for CONUS Personnel, this concavity 
was comprised of two separate regions 
of linearity - between 0 and 6 
equipment sets, and between 6 and 9 
equipment sets. The decision maker's 
representative indicated 6 equipment 
sets as the 90% mark as that was the 
CONUS V&E Value Function 
0.8 
»  0.6 
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number of equipment sets currently located in CONUS. He cited recent operations in 
Kosovo and Bosnia as proving the benefits of maintaining this number of equipment sets 
in CONUS from a responsiveness standpoint [28]. 
The evaluation measure of "EUCOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating vehicles and equipment in the European theater of 
operations. As shown in Fig 4.15, the decision maker's representative's preferences in 
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regards to vehicles and equipment in 
EUCOM were concave in nature. 
This indicated decreasing returns for 
placing additional equipment sets in 
theater, according to the decision 
maker's representative's preferences. 
Half of the decision maker's 
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representative's value could be realized after placing a single equipment set in theater, as 
there have been very few unforeseen contingencies in that theater historically. The large 
majority of the decision maker's representative's value (90%) could be realized after 
locating 3 equipment sets in the European theater, as the decision maker's representative 
was confident that 3 equipment sets could adequately support any unforeseen 
contingencies in that theater [27]. 
The evaluation measure of "PACOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of locating vehicles and equipment in the Pacific theater of 
operations; these preferences were linear, as shown in Fig 4.16 
The evaluation measure of 
PACOM V&E Value Function 
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1  0.4 
0.2 
0.0 0.5  1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 
Equipment Sets in Theater 
Fig 4.16 - Value Function for PACOM 
Vehicles and Equipment 
"SOUTHCOM" indicated the 
decision maker's representative's 
preference of locating vehicles and 
equipment in the Southern theater of 
operations. As shown in Fig 4.17, 
these preferences were also linear. 
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This contrasted with the decision 
maker's representative's preferences 
for locating personnel in the 
SOUTHCOM theater. This contrast 
was explained due to the significant 
amount of increased effort it takes to 
transport vehicles and equipment 
than personnel [27]. 
SOUTHCOM V&E Value Function 
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Vehicles and Equipment 
Readiness 
As shown in Fig 4.6, there were five evaluation measures developed that 
pertained to the primary objective of "Readiness." Each of these evaluation measures 
indicated the decision maker's representative's preference for having RED HORSE 
resources co-located in various theaters around the globe. To train and become familiar 
with equipment, personnel must have the opportunity to gain access to the equipment. 
The decision maker's representative indicated that this requirement would be satisfied as 
long as the personnel and equipment were located in the same theater [27]. A maximum 
number of 7 squadron equivalents could be located in a theater without equipment, since 
this study only utilized those units currently in existence. The scales for each of the 
"Readiness" evaluation measures were natural, direct scales. They each assessed the 
number of squadron equivalents (in units of 0.5 squadron equivalents) located in a 
particular theater without equipment; a natural scale (number of squadron equivalents) 
that focused on the attainment of the specific objective (equipped personnel). 
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The evaluation measure of "CENTCOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of co- locating personnel and equipment in SWA. As shown 
in Fig 4.18, the decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to unequipped 
personnel in the CENTCOM theater of 
operations were linear in nature. 
The evaluation measure of 
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'CONUS" indicated the decision 
Fig 4.18 - Value Function for CENTCOM Readiness 
maker's representative's preference of 
co- locating personnel and equipment 
in the U.S. As shown in Fig 4.19, the 
decision maker's representative's preferences in regards to equipped personnel in 
CONUS were concave in nature. Similar to the previous CONUS evaluation measures, 
this concavity was comprised of two 
separate regions of linearity - between 
0 and 6 squadron equivalents, and 
between 6 and 7 squadron equivalents. 
The decision maker's representative 
again indicated that recent 
contingencies in Kosovo and Bosnia 
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Fig 4.19-Value Function for CONUS Readiness 
proved the benefits of having all 6 CONUS squadron equivalents co-located with their 
equipment sets. 
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EUCOM Readiness Value Function 
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The evaluation measure of 
"EUCOM" indicated the decision 
maker's representative's preference of 
co- locating personnel and equipment 
in the European theater of operations. 
Fig 4.20 illustrates that these 
preferences were linear. Fig 4.20 - Value Function for EUCOM Readiness 
The evaluation measure of "PACOM" indicated the decision maker's 
representative's preference of co- locating personnel and equipment in the Pacific theater 
of operations. These preferences are shown in Fig 4.21. As with the previous value 
functions for the PACOM theater (those addressing the "Location of Personnel" and the 
"Location of Vehicles and 
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Equipment"), the decision maker's 
representative's preferences in regards 
to unequipped personnel in the Pacific 
theater of operations were linear in 
nature. 
Fig 4.21 - Value Function for PACOM Readiness 
The evaluation measure of 
"SOUTHCOM" indicated the decision maker's representative's preference of co- 
locating personnel and equipment in the Southern Theater. These preferences are 
reflected in Fig 4.22. As shown, the decision maker's representative's preferences in 
regards to unequipped personnel in the SOUTHCOM theater of operations were also 
linear in nature. 
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Political Considerations 
As shown in Fig 4.7, there 
were nine evaluation measures 
developed for the primary objective of 
"Political Considerations." One of 
these evaluation measures, "Global 
SOUTHCOM Readiness Value 
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Fig 4.22 - Value Function for SOUTCOM Readiness 
Constraints," directly related to "Political Considerations," while the remaining eight 
pertained to the means objective of "Air Force." 
"Global Constraints" addressed the governmental influences affecting the 
utilization and organization of RED HORSE around the globe. The decision maker's 
representative remarked "Getting the resources to a contingency location is one thing, but 
being able to use them once they are there is another [26]." Governmental influences 
include legislation and foreign policy philosophy adopted by the U.S. government, as 
well as those influences imparted by the local, foreign governments. Because of these 
influences, US forces often encounter difficulties concerning the utilization of in-theater 
assets. The decision maker's representative indicated that various theaters had additional 
regulations concerning the use of American resources. Some of these regulations include 
limiting the types of operations in-theater resources can support, restricting the movement 
of resources within a theater, and the removal of resources from a theater once they have 
fulfilled their intended purpose. As an example, the decision maker's representative 
pointed out the complications that Americans have experienced in Saudi Arabia, stating 
how the Saudis want an American presence, but don't want to project the image of being 
4-26 
used as a staging base against its Arab brethren [26]. These regulations could 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of these resources in various contingency locations 
around the world. The decision maker's representative indicated a desire to locate RED 
HORSE resources in those theaters with the least amount of constraints. Accordingly, 
this evaluation measure possessed a constructed, proxy scale; it was comprised of the 
different theaters in which resources could be located (CENTCOM, CONUS, EUCOM, 
PACOM, SOUTHCOM), and assumed that the theater in which resources were located 
was indicative of the governmental constraints that would be encountered by RED 
HORSE resources located in that theater. Fig. 4.23 illustrates that the decision maker's 
representative indicated that the greatest difficulty was encountered when locating 
resources in CENTCOM 
(corresponding value of 0); while the 
least amount of difficulty was 
encountered when resources were 
located in CONUS (corresponding 
value of 1). The degree of difficulty 
decreased (and the value of the 
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Fig 4.23 - Value Function for Global Constraints 
decision maker's representative increased) as resources progressed from CENTCOM, to 
SOUTHCOM, to PACOM, to EUCOM, to CONUS. 
The remaining eight evaluation measures address the "Air Force," each relating 
directly to its four fourth-tier means objectives. These eight evaluation measures were 
"ARC Units," "Active Duty Units," MAJCOM & Higher HQs," "NAFs & OCONUS 
Bases," "Unity of Command," "Matching Structures," "Command Level," and "Rank of 
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Command." Almost all of these evaluation measures possessed natural, direct scales, 
each scale measuring the number of units or the number of colonels; natural scales 
(number of units or colonels) that focused on the attainment of the specific objective 
(units affected, units in a command, rank of a command, etc.). The only exception was 
the "Command Level" evaluation measure. This measure had a constructed, direct scale; 
a scale comprised of three command level possibilities (base, NAF, and MAJCOM) that 
focused on the attainment of the specific objective (level at which command was held). 
"ARC Units" was the first evaluation measure that accounted for the different 
state influences existing in the current command structure of RED HORSE. These 
influences were comprised of the nine existing ARC units listed in Tbl 2.1. This 
evaluation measure accounted for geographically relocating and/or changing the 
command structure of an ARC unit. Either of these scenarios resulted in an altered state 
influence, and its impact was assessed by the "ARC Units" evaluation measure. As 
shown in Fig 4.24, the decision maker's representative's preferences were reflected by an 
S-curve shape. This implies that 
the decision maker's 
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representative's preferences 
remained relatively unchanged 
along a smaller range of outcomes. 
In this case, the decision maker's 
representative did not perceive 
much of a value difference in changing the influences of 6 units from changing the 
influences of 2 units. The decision maker's representative indicated a minimal value loss 
Fig 4.24 - Value Function for ARC Units 
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as a result of changing the influence of just one ARC unit (only a 10% reduction in 
value); whereas there was a significant loss of value as a result of changing the influences 
of greater than one ARC unit (a loss of at least 30%). 
"Active Duty Units" was the second evaluation measure that accounted for the 
different state influences existing in the current command structure of RED HORSE. 
These influences were comprised of the three existing CONUS AD Units listed in Tbl 
2.1. According to this evaluation measure, a state's influence was impacted as a result of 
geographically relocating a CONUS AD. As can be seen from Fig 4.25, the decision 
maker's representative's 
preferences in regards to affecting 
CONUS AD units were linear; 
each additional CONUS AD units 
affected decreased the value of the 
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Fig 4.25 - Value Function for AD CONUS Units 
"MAJCOMs & Higher HQs" was the first of two evaluation measure that 
accounted for the different DoD influences existing in the current command structure of 
RED HORSE. These influences were comprised of the four existing MAJCOMs (ACC, 
AFRC, PACAF, and USAFE) and two higher headquarters organizations (ILE and the 
Air Force Civil Engineering and Services Agency (AFCESA)) currently affecting RED 
HORSE employment and utilization. This evaluation measure assessed the potential 
impact on the influence of these federal organizations due to a change in the command 
structure of AD or ARC RED HORSE units. For example, if the command structure or 
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MAJCOMs and Higher HQs 
Value Function 
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geographic location of any of the active duty RED HORSE units were changed, these 
DoD organizations may not have the same influence as they currently enjoy - perhaps 
ACC would no longer possess OPCON for AD units, PACAF no longer possessed an in- 
theater RED HORSE unit, or ILE no longer had the same degree of input because each 
unit reported to a different chain of command. As can be seen from Fig 4.26, the 
decision maker's representative's 
preferences were indicated by an S- 
curve shape. For this evaluation 
measure, the decision maker's 
representative did not perceive 
much of a value difference in 
changing the influences of 4 
organizations from changing the influences of 2 organizations. Also, the decision 
maker's representative was not opposed to changing the influence of only one 
organization (only a 10% reduction in value), but he indicated a significant loss of value 
in changing the influences of more than one organization (a loss of at least 30%). 
"NAFs & OCONUS Bases" was the second evaluation measure that accounted 
for the different federal influences existing in the current command structure of RED 
HORSE. These influences were comprised of the four existing NAFs (7 AF, 9 AF, 10 
AF, and 12 AF) and two OCONUS bases (Camp Darby, Italy and Osan, Korea) currently 
affecting RED HORSE employment and utilization. This evaluation measure assessed 
the potential impact on the influence of these federal organizations due to a change in the 
command structure of AD or ARC RED HORSE units. A shift in the existing command 
Fig 4.26 - Value Function for MAJCOMs & Higher HQs 
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structure of RED HORSE units could result in one or more of these NAFs or OCONUS 
bases losing their RED HORSE contingent - i.e. relocating 554 RHS from the Pacific 
Theater (affects 7AF and Osan AB, ROK), placing all RED HORSE units under the 
unified command (OPCON and ADCON) of a MAJCOM (affects all of the NAFs), or 
relocating the 2 equipment sets currently maintained by 31 RHF (affects Camp Darby, 
Italy). Fig 4.27 shows that the decision maker's representative's preferences were 
indicated by an S-curve shape, 
identical to those preferences 
obtained for "MAJCOMs & 
NAFs and OCONUS Bases 
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Fig 4.27 - Value Function for NAFs and OCONUS bases 
Higher HQs." The decision 
maker's representative's 
preferences were relatively 
unchanged along a smaller range 
of outcomes (between 2 and 4 changed influences), while drastically affected before and 
after this range. 
"Unity of Command" was the first of two evaluation measures to address the 
degree to which RED HORSE's command was streamlined. It measured the degree to 
which all RED HORSE units fell under the command of a single organization. The 
decision maker's representative indicated, and Air Force doctrine dictates, that a unified 
command provides maximum flexibility and a clear chain of command for a unit. These 
aspects significantly increase the effectiveness of a unit and are sought after when 
designing unit structure [26]. RED HORSE units have the potential to fall under nine 
different commands for ADCON and/or OPCON - four Theater Commands 
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Unity of Command Value Function 
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Commands 
(CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM) and five MAJCOMs (ACC, AFRC, 
AMC, PACAF, and USAFE). Fig 4.28 reflects the concavity of the decision maker's 
representative's preferences in 
regards to the number of units 
falling under a single command. 
This indicated decreasing returns 
for a greater number of commands 
to which RED HORSE units report. 
Fig 4.28 - Value Function for Unity of Command Specifically, the majority of the 
decision maker's representative's value (60%) had eroded after 3 different commands 
were utilized to organize RED HORSE on a macroscopic scale; utilizing additional 
commands would result in the loss of relatively little additional value. 
"Matching Structures" was the second evaluation measure addressing the 
"Streamlined Command" objective. It specifically measured the degree to which the 
peacetime (ADCON) and wartime (OPCON) command structures matched for each AD 
RED HORSE unit (554 RHS, 819 RHS, 820 RHS, and 823 RHS). ARC units were not 
included in this evaluation measure, as these units possess the same chain of command in 
peacetime and wartime [26]. As 
shown in Fig 4.29, the decision 
maker's representative's 
preferences in regards to matching 
peacetime and wartime command 
structures were linear. This 
Fig 4.29 - Value Function for Matching Structures 
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indicated the same value increment placed on each additional AD RED HORSE unit that 
possessed the same command structure in peacetime as in wartime. 
"Command Level" was the first of two evaluation measures that addressed the 
level of command present in RED HORSE's macroscopic organizational structure. This 
measure assessed the actual level at which RED HORSE command was maintained, and 
the decision maker's preferences are reflected in Fig 4.30. The decision maker's 
representative pointed out that 
failing to maintain RED HORSE 
command at the appropriate level 
would reduce its ability to function 
as intended, significantly impairing 
its ability to accomplish its mission. 
For example, if a RED HORSE unit 
was assigned to a wing commander, 
the ".. .temptation would be far too great for a commander..." to use RED HORSE to 
accomplish base maintenance or construction requirements, rather than reserving it for its 
MTW, OOTW, and AEF missions [26]. This evaluation measure assessed each 
alternative at the lowest level at which command was held. The decision maker's 
representative indicated that he had just as little use for one unit assigned to the base level 
as to having all units assigned to the base level [28]. As discussed previously, this 
evaluation measure possessed a constructed, direct scale, consisting of three potential 
outcomes: base, NAF, and MAJCOM. The only other possible outcome would be HQ 
AF, but that was deemed impractical due to the nature of RED HORSE [27]. As Fig. 
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4.30 shows, the decision maker's representative indicated that the worst level for 
command of a RED HORSE unit was at the base (corresponding value of 0); while the 
best level for command of RED HORSE was at the MAJCOM (corresponding value of 
1). 
"Rank of Command" was the second evaluation measure that addressed the level 
of command present in a macroscopic organizational structure. This measure addressed 
the number of Colonels present within the RED HORSE community. The decision 
maker's representative stated that a commander's rank affects his/her ability to obtain the 
resources required for his/her unit, as well as his/her ability to negotiate among other 
organizations (Air Force or otherwise) for his/her unit's best interests. As such, the 
decision maker's representative indicated a desire to keep the greatest number of 
Colonels within RED HORSE as possible [26]. Currently, there is a Colonel assigned to 
each of the three AD CONUS RED HORSE units. As this research effort assumed that 
no units would be added, three Colonels were deemed the maximum number possible for 
this study. As shown in Fig 4.31, the decision maker's representative's preferences in 
regards to the number of Colonels 
existing in RED HORSE were linear; 
each additional Colonel within the 
RED HORSE organization increased 
the value of the decision maker's 
representative the same amount. 
Fig 4.31 - Value Function for Rank of Command 
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Objective and Evaluation Measure Weights 
Once the decision maker's representative validated the value hierarchy, weights 
were assigned to the objectives and evaluation measures represented in the hierarchy. 
These weights were assigned during the second interview (November), utilizing the 
swing weighting technique. As with the other solicitation processes, an experienced DA 
recorder annotated the dialogue that occurred during the interview to provide clarity to 
the process. 
Swing weighting techniques rely on the tradeoffs prevalent in a decision situation 
involving multiple, competing objectives. Recalling the decision maker's 
representative's value hierarchy (Fig 4.3), these competing objectives are apparent. For 
example, "Responsiveness," "Readiness," and "Political Considerations" all compete 
with one another to determine the best macroscopic organizational structure for RED 
HORSE. Similarly, "Command Level" and "Rank of Command" compete with one 
another to determine the best "Level of Command." Quantifying the tradeoffs that 
existed in the value hierarchy was first accomplished on the lowest level, and then 
advanced up the hierarchy. In this manner, local and global weights were developed for 
all of the objectives and evaluation measures existing in the hierarchy. Local weights are 
ones relevant between evaluation measures and/or objectives existing on the same level; 
whereas global weights are the normalized weights of each evaluation measure or 
objective over the entire value hierarchy. These weights are illustrated in Fig 4.32 
(global weights in parenthesis), and the calculations supporting these weights are 
provided in Appendix A. The remainder of this section describes how the decision 
maker's representative quantified the tradeoffs existing in the value hierarchy. 
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What is the Best 
Macroscopic 
Organizational 
Structure for RH? 
Fia 4.32 - Objective's and Evaluation Measure's Weights 
Political Considerations 
As shown in Fig 4.3, the greatest number of evaluation measures and objectives 
existed in the "Political Considerations" branch of the decision maker's representative's 
value hierarchy. As such, this is where the weight assessment process began, beginning 
at the lowest level and working through the hierarchy from right to left. 
The first tradeoff discussed was the one existing between "Command Level" and 
"Rank of Command." The decision maker's representative indicated "Command Level" 
was twice as important as "Rank of Command." He felt that if command were placed at 
the appropriate level then the commander would be able to obtain the support he/she 
required, regardless of his/her rank [27]. 
The next tradeoff analyzed was the one existing between "Unity of Command" 
and "Matching Structures." The decision maker's representative indicated that these 
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evaluation measures were equal in importance, stating that it was equally valuable to him 
to have all RED HORSE units under one command as it was to have matching command 
structures in AD RED HORSE units. 
Next, the tradeoffs existing between "Streamlined Command" and "Level of 
Command" were identified. This was accomplished by quantifying the decision maker's 
representative's preference between "Matching Structures" and "Command Level." The 
decision maker's representative felt that "Matching Structures" would contribute more to 
the political considerations surrounding a macroscopic organizational decision, and as 
such, was slightly more important. He indicated that the ratio of these two evaluation 
measures was 60/40, resulting in a ratio of 2 - 1 between "Streamlined Command" and 
"Level of Command," indicated by the local weights shown in Fig 4.32. 
The tradeoff between "MAJCOMs & Higher HQs" and "NAFs & OCONUS 
Bases" was quantified next. The decision maker's representative indicated that each of 
these evaluation measures were of equal importance as well. He stated that affecting the 
influence of either one would have significant implications in the political context of any 
macroscopic organizational decision made concerning RED HORSE structure. 
The decision maker's representative next quantified the tradeoff between "ARC 
Units" and "AD Units," indicating that affecting "ARC Units" was twice as significant as 
affecting "AD Units." He stated that AD units are affected all of the time - they are 
organized in a manner to deal with change. Conversely, affecting the command structure 
or location of an ARC unit would cause significant repercussions, as these units are 
comprised of local civilians, unable to rapidly change locations. 
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The tradeoff between "State Influences" and "DoD Influences" was quantified by 
analyzing the evaluation measures "ARC Units" and "MAJCOMs & Higher HQs." The 
decision maker's representative indicated that "ARC Units" was twice as significant as 
"MAJCOMs & Higher HQs." As before, he stated that the impact of affecting ARC 
personnel and organizations was more significant than the impact of affecting AD 
personnel and organizations (such as those comprising "MAJCOMs and Higher HQs"). 
"ARC Units" and "Command Level" were used to quantify the tradeoff that 
existed between "Management Considerations" and "Change of Control." According to 
the decision maker's representative, the relationship between these two evaluation 
measures was 60/40, in the favor of "Command Level." He stated that assigning 
command at an appropriate level was more important than the units that might be affected 
because of such a responsibility shift. These preferences resulted in the weights reflected 
for "Management Considerations" and "Change of Control" shown in Fig 4.32. 
The final tradeoff existing in the "Political Considerations" branch was between 
"Air Force" and "Global Constraints." To quantify this relationship, the ratio between 
"Command Level" and "Global Constraints" was established as 60/40. The decision 
maker's representative stated that internal organizational dynamics were more significant 
to macroscopic organizational structure than regional constraints due to terrain or 
government influences. This resulted in the overwhelming local weight of "Air Force" 
compared to "Global Constraints," as shown in Fig 4.32. 
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Responsiveness 
The evaluation measures and objectives in the "Responsiveness" branch of the 
value hierarchy were quantified next, as this branch had the second most number of 
objectives and evaluation measures. Again, the weight assessment process began at the 
lowest level in this portion of the hierarchy, and worked up through the hierarchy. 
The tradeoffs existing between the five "Location of Personnel" evaluation 
measures were identified first. The relationship between "CENTCOM" and each of the 
other four theaters was quantified. The decision maker's representative stated that RED 
HORSE personnel could be most responsive by being located in the CONUS. He 
expanded his opinion to say that transporting personnel is not that time consuming, and 
by having them in CONUS they could be deployed to any contingency theater. 
Accordingly, the decision maker's representative indicated that the ratio of importance 
between "CONUS" and "CENTCOM" was 70/30. In addition, he indicated that if 
personnel were to be located outside of the CONUS, the most benefit (in terms of 
responsiveness) could be gained by locating those personnel in the theaters with the 
highest MTW potential (PACOM and CENTCOM). As such, he indicated that the 
importance of "CENTCOM" and "PACOM" was equal. He also denoted "CENTCOM" 
to be three times as important as "EUCOM" and "SOUTHCOM" [27]. 
The tradeoffs existing between the five "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" 
evaluation measures were identified next. These tradeoffs were addressed by quantifying 
the relationship between "CENTCOM" and each of the other four theaters, and were very 
similar to the tradeoffs identified for the "Location of Personnel" evaluation measures. 
The primary difference between these sets of tradeoffs was in the weight ratios between 
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the evaluation measures relating to different resources (personnel or vehicles and 
equipment). Similar to RED HORSE personnel, the decision maker's representative 
stated that RED HORSE vehicles and equipment could be most responsive by being 
located in the CONUS. He expanded his opinion to say that although transporting 
vehicles and equipment is time-consuming, having them in CONUS would provide RED 
HORSE the flexibility to deploy to any contingency theater. As such, the decision 
maker's representative indicated that the ratio of importance between "CONUS" and 
"CENTCOM" was 60/40. As with the "Location of Personnel" evaluation measures, he 
indicated that if resources were to be located outside of the CONUS, the most benefit (in 
terms of responsiveness) could be gained by locating them in the theaters with the highest 
MTW potential (PACOM and CENTCOM). Accordingly, he indicated that the 
importance of "CENTCOM" and "PACOM" was equal. Further, he characterized the 
ratio of "CENTCOM" to "SOUTHCOM" as 60/40, and denoted "CENTCOM" to be 
three times as important as "EUCOM" [27]. 
Finally, the relative importance of "Location of Personnel" and "Location of 
Vehicles and Equipment" was established. This was done by quantifying the relationship 
between "CENTCOM [personnel]" and "CENTCOM [V&E]." The decision maker's 
representative again emphasized that the location of vehicles and equipment had a much 
greater impact on "Responsiveness" than the location of personnel. As such, he 
characterized the ratio between these two as 80/20, in favor of "CENTCOM [V&E]" 
[27]. This resulted in the overall weights of these two objectives being overwhelmingly 
skewed towards "Location of Vehicles and Equipment," as shown in Fig 4.32. 
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Readiness 
The last evaluation measures and objectives to be quantified were those in the 
"Readiness" branch of the value hierarchy. Similar to the "Responsiveness" evaluation 
measures, the tradeoffs existing in the "Readiness" branch were quantified by defining 
the relationship between "CONUS" and each of the other four theaters. The decision 
maker's representative indicated that it was most important to have personnel and 
equipment co-located in the CONUS, as this was the theater in which ARC personnel 
were located. These personnel did not have the same exposure to vehicles and equipment 
as AD personnel, and required more opportunity to gain familiarity. The decision 
maker's representative also stated that the importance of co-locating equipment and 
personnel in each of the other four theaters were equal. Consequently, he defined 
"CONUS" to be four times as important as each of the other theaters (all of them being 
equal) [27]. 
Primary Objectives 
After the weights for all the means objectives and evaluation measures were 
identified, the weights for each of the three primary objectives were solicited. To 
accomplish this, the relationships between "CENTCOM [V&E]," "CONUS [Readiness]," 
and "Command Level" were quantified. These three evaluation measures were selected 
for comparison because the decision maker's representative felt that he had the most 
accurate grasp on them (as compared to the remaining evaluation measures within the 
realm of each of the three primary objectives), as indicated by their larger local weights. 
The decision maker's representative characterized the ratio between "CENTCOM 
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[V&E]" and "Command Level" as 60/40. In addition, he identified the ratio between 
"CONUS [Readiness]" and "CENTCOM [V&E]" as 70/30. These relationships resulted 
in the overall primary objective weights shown in Fig. 4.32. As illustrated, 
"Responsiveness" was identified as the most important consideration to the decision 
maker's representative, while "Readiness" was found to be the least important. 
Identify Alternatives (Part II) 
Once the model was completely constructed, alternative generation was revisited. 
This included expanding the five original alternatives used to guide the model 
construction, as well as developing new alternatives that addressed the different 
objectives put forth in the model. As with all DA processes, the Status Quo (things 
remain as they currently exist) and null alternatives (eliminate RED HORSE) were 
automatically included as alternatives. These are represented as Alternatives A and T, 
respectively. There were also five alternatives put forth by the RED HORSE 2010 
Strategic Study that were included for analysis; these are shown as alternatives K, L, M, 
P, and R. In addition, Alternative C was based upon a question posed by the ACC/CE 
when commissioning the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study [25:5]. Additional 
alternatives were developed using the strategy generation table located in Appendix B. 
Although this technique had the potential to produce a plethora of alternatives, only those 
that were deemed feasible (regardless of the difficulty to implement) were generated. 
The strategy generation table lists all twenty-four evaluation measures as column 
headings, listing all the possible outcomes for each evaluation measure beneath the 
appropriate column heading. Alternatives were generated by tracing a path through the 
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table, using the outcomes highlighted in that path to define the proposed alternative. In 
this manner, thirteen additional alternatives were developed. The twenty alternatives 
explored for this research effort are listed on the next four pages. 
A) Status-quo 
All units remain located where they currently are, and maintain their 
existing chains of command. 
B) As-is Semi-Unified 
All units remain located where they currently are, but each of the AD 
units falls under the same NAF for ADCON. AD units still report to 
ACC for OPCON. ARC units remain as-is. 
C) As-is Unified 
All units remain located where they currently are, but all CONUS 
AD units are organized in a group, reporting to one MAJCOM for 
ADCON and OPCON. 
D) Super Unit 
All personnel and equipment (AD and ARC) belong to a single RED 
HORSE organization (probably a wing structure, composed of ARC 
and AD groups), and are co-located in CONUS at an existing AD 
location. This organization reports to a single MAJCOM for 
ADCON and OPCON. 
E) Semi-Super Unit 
All AD and ARC units are co-located in CONUS as an existing AD 
location. All AD units are organized in a group, reporting to a single 
MAJCOM for both ADCON and OPCON. ARC units continue to 
report to AFRC. 
F) As-is Diversified 
All units remain located as-is. Each AD unit reports to a different 
NAF/theater command for both ADCON and OPCON. ARC 
command structure remains as-is. 
G) Diversified 
All AD personnel and equipment are forward located in each theater, 
reporting to that NAF/theater command for OPCON and ADCON. 
ARC command structure and location remain as-is. 
H) Dispersed Equipment 
All personnel located as-is. All equipment is forward located in 
overseas theaters (1 equipment set located in SOUTHCOM, 2 sets 
located in all other theaters). All AD units are organized in a group, 
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reporting to a single MAJCOM for both ADCON and OPCON. 
ARC command structure and location remain as-is. 
I)   MTW Diversified 
CONUS AD units (personnel and vehicles) relocated in each theater, 
with extra vehicle sets located in each projected MTW theater 
(CENTCOM and PACOM). Relocated units report to theater 
commands for ADCON and OPCON. ARC units remain as-is. 
J)  Semi-MTW 
One AD unit (personnel and V&E) assigned to each projected MTW 
theater (CENTCOM and PACOM) for ADCON and OPCON. Most 
likely, the unit relocating to CENTCOM theater would be 823 RHS 
as they are the only full squadron contingent already reporting to 
9AF (CENTAF) for ADCON. Darby sets relocated in each 
projected MTW theater as well. Remaining AD and ARC units 
remain as-is (location and command). 
K) Study MTW Relocation I 
Relocate according to RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study's 
suggestions shown in Tbl 4.1 [l:Section 6.2.3.2.1] below: 
Tbl 4.1 - RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study's Proposed Unit Relocations 
Unit Current Location Proposed Location Remarks 
819 RHS 
Malmstrom AFB 
(Great Falls, MT) 
Camp Pendleton 
(Virginia Beach, VA) 
Co-locate with 219 RHF 
219 RHF 
Malmstrom AFB 
(Great Falls, MT) 
Camp Pendleton 
(Virginia Beach, VA) 
Co-locate with 819 RHS 
202 RHS 
Camp Pendleton 
(Virginia Beach, VA) 
Hurlburt Field 
(Ft Walton Beach, FL) Move into 823 RHS compound 
823 RHS 
Hurlburt Field 
(Ft Walton Beach, FL) 
Camp Blanding 
(Jacksonville, FL) Co-locate with 202 RHS 
307 RHS Kelly AFB (San Antonio, TX) 
Nellis AFB 
(Las Vegas, NV) 
Co-locate with 820 RHS 




(Bossier City, LA) 
Nellis AFB 
(Las Vegas, NV) 
Co-locate with 820 RHS 
& 307 RHS 
These co-located units would form RED HORSE groups (comprised 
of AD and ARC squadrons) commanded by an AD Col. All AD 
units report to a single MAJCOM for ADCON and OPCON; ARC 
units remain as-is. 
L) Study MTW Relocation II 
Relocate according to Tbl 4.1. These co-located units would form 
RED HORSE groups (comprised of AD and ARC squadrons) 
commanded by an AD Col. All groups report to a different theater 
command (except for EUCOM) for ADCON and OPCON. 
Remaining ARC units and 31 RHF remain as-is, but are responsible 
for EUCOM operations. 
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M) Study MTW Relocation III 
Relocate according to Tbl 4.1. These co-located units would form 
RED HORSE groups (comprised of AD and ARC squadrons) 
commanded by an AD Col. All groups report to a different theater 
command (except for EUCOM) for ADCON and OPCON, with 
equipment sets forward located in each theater. Remaining ARC 
units and 31 RHF remain as-is, but responsible for EUCOM ops. 
N) MTW Geared 
2 AD units (personnel and equipment) assigned to groups and 
located in MTW theaters (CENTCOM and Korean peninsula). 
These groups report to the respective NAF/theater command for both 
ADCON and OPCON. 31 RHF (personnel and equipment) remains 
located at Camp Darby, but report directly to USAFE. ARC 
command structure and location remain as-is. 
O) OOTW Geared 
All personnel belong to a single RED HORSE organization 
(probably a wing structure, composed of ARC and AD groups), and 
are co-located in CONUS at an existing AD location. This 
organization reports to a single MAJCOM for both ADCON and 
OPCON. 2 equipment sets are pre-positioned in each theater, under 
control of the NAF/theater command. 
P) Study Co-location 
Command structure for all RED HORSE units (AD and ARC) 
remains as-is. One AD and one ARC unit are relocated to provide 
co-located AD and ARC units at every CONUS, AD RED HORSE 
location. 
Q) Co-located Diversified 
All ARC units co-locate with existing CONUS AD units, forming 
RED HORSE Groups (comprised of ARC and AD squadrons) 
commanded by an AD Col. These groups are assigned to theater 
commands (none assigned to EUCOM) for both ADCON and 
OPCON (command structure of ARC portions would remain as-is). 
31 RHF remains as-is, but is assigned to EUCOM theater command. 
554 RHS remains as-is, but reports to theater command for both 
ADCON and OPCON. 
R) Study Heavy OOTW Hybrid 
Vehicle sets and personnel are located in every theater according to 
projected OOTW demands. 31 RHF merges with projected forward 
located RED HORSE personnel, and reports to EUCOM for 
ADCON and USAFE for OPCON. Command structure does not 
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change for remaining units. MAJCOM influences do not change as 
all CONUS AD units will continue to report to ACC for OPCON. 
Most likely, 820 RED HORSE (currently reporting to 12 AF for 
ADCON) would permanently locate one-half of its unit in the 
SOUTHCOM theater; similarly, 823 RHS (currently reporting to 
9AF for ADCON) would permanently locate one-half of its unit in 
the CENTCOM theater. 
S) Super Personnel 
All personnel belong to a single RED HORSE organization 
(probably a wing structure, composed of ARC and AD groups), and 
are co-located in CONUS at an existing AD location. This 
organization reports to a single MAJCOM for both ADCON and 
OPCON. Vehicle and equipment sets are forward located (falling 
under the control of RED HORSE) in each theater, with an 
additional set located in each projected MTW theater (CENTCOM 
and PACOM). 
T) No RED HORSE 
Eliminate all existing RED HORSE units, farming out its capability 
to Prime BEEF, contractors, or other military organizations 
(SEABEES, Army ESBs, Marine EBs). 
The decision maker's representative expressed a desire to refine the list of 
generated alternatives, to ensure that this study analyzed the alternatives he thought most 
feasible. As such, the list of twenty alternatives was provided to him for approval. To 
add more validity to the study, the decision maker's representative forwarded the list to 
AF/ILE, the position charged with setting policy for all AF CE units. Once there, this list 
was also submitted to the AF/CE, the actual decision maker for all matters of USAF CE 
(including RED HORSE). These personnel agreed that the list of alternatives covered the 




Once the model was constructed and the alternatives were identified, the 
remainder of the DA process was accomplished. This remainder consisted of three parts: 
alternative scoring and ranking, sensitivity analysis, and "what-if' analysis. This section 
presents these three remaining aspects of the DA process. 
Alternative Scoring and Ranking 
The evaluation measures' value functions were used to score all twenty of the 
generated alternatives. Each alternative had a distinct outcome for each evaluation 
measure, and was assigned the score (value) commensurate with that outcome for each 
evaluation measure, as indicated by the evaluation measures' value functions. The 
evaluation measure outcomes for each alternative are shown in Appendix C. 
Next, the overall alternative scores were calculated. Applying the additive value 
function, the global weight of each evaluation measure was multiplied by the score of 
that evaluation measure for each alternative to yield the overall score for that alternative. 
The overall results from these calculations are reflected in the results table located in 
Appendix D. Also included in Appendix D are four charts, illustrating the score each 
alternative received for each evaluation measures, as well as the maximum score possible 
for each evaluation measure. Each of these four charts illustrate different evaluation 
measures as follows: 
Fig D.l - Scores for "Location of Personnel" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.2 - Scores for "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.3 - Scores for "Readiness" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.4- Scores for "Political Considerations" Evaluation Measures 
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Once the overall scores for each alternative were calculated, the alternatives were 
ranked in descending order by score (i.e. the higher the score, the better the alternative). 
The alternatives and their overall scores are reflected in Table 4.2. The model yielded 
Alternative F (As-is Diversified) as the highest ranked alternative. This was to be 
Tbl 4.2 - Alternative Rankings 
Rank Alternative Description Score 
1 F As-is Diversified 0.65400 
2 D Super Unit 0.64938 
3 L Study MTW Relocation II 0.63055 
4 E Semi-Super Unit 0.62712 
5 Q Co-located Diversified 0.62109 
6 M Study MTW Relocation III 0.62036 
7 G Diversified 0.61233 
8 C As-is Unified 0.58726 
9 I MTW Diversified 0.58268 
10 J Semi-MTW 0.56853 
11 K Study MTW Relocation I 0.56740 
12 N MTW Geared 0.56348 
13 B As-is Semi-Unified 0.56092 
14 A Status Quo 0.54870 
15 P Study Co-location 0.54004 
16 S Super Personnel 0.53343 
17 H Dispersed Equipment 0.53274 
18 R Study Heavy OOTW Hybrid 0.52789 
19 0 OOTW Geared 0.40428 
20 T No RED HORSE 0.32188 
expected, as this alternative recommended locating the majority of personnel (6 squadron 
equivalents) and vehicles and equipment (6 equipment sets) within the CONUS, 
achieving 90% of the maximum possible value for each of these evaluation measures. 
Since the decision maker's representative indicated these two evaluation measures to be 
the most important of their respective local evaluation measures, they were also weighted 
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the most - awarding this alternative one of the highest scores for "Responsiveness." In 
addition, Alternative F did not recommend locating any unequipped squadron equivalents 
in any theater, achieving the maximum value outcomes for each of the "Readiness" 
evaluation measures, and attaining the maximum possible score for "Readiness." 
Alternative F also recommended the maximum value outcomes for five ("ARC Units," 
"Active Duty Units," "NAFs & OCONUS Bases," "Matching Structures," and "Rank of 
Command") of the nine "Political Considerations" evaluation measures. "Unity of 
Command" was the only "Political Consideration" in which Alternative F failed to attain 
at least half of the decision maker's representative's assigned value. 
The second and third highest-ranking alternatives were alternatives D (Super 
Unit) and L (Study MTW Relocation II), respectively. As was expected, alternative T 
(eliminate RED HORSE) ranked the lowest. It received no points for any of the 
"Responsiveness" evaluation measures, as it did not recommend having any squadron 
equivalents or equipment sets in any theater. 
Of interest, Alternative A (Status Quo) ranked 14th out of the twenty alternatives. 
This indicates that the current structure of RED HORSE is not commensurate with the 
values of the decision maker's representative. Specifically, this alternative suffered in 
several areas. The two most detrimental evaluation measures for this alternative were 
"Matching Structures" and "Command Level," as it failed to achieve any points for either 
of these evaluation measures. Alternative A did not recommend matching peacetime and 
wartime command structures for any of the four active duty RED HORSE units, and 
maintained control a RED HORSE unit at the base. In addition, it only placed six of 
seven squadron equivalents and six of seven equipment sets in CONUS - the theater 
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identified as most important by the decision maker's representative for each 
"Responsiveness" means objective. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed on each of the twenty-four evaluation 
measures in the decision maker's representative's value hierarchy. This process explored 
the effect on alternative ranking as the global weight of a particular evaluation measure 
changed. However, in accordance with the rules of swing weighting, all local weights 
still had to sum to one throughout the sensitivity analysis. As such, changing the weight 
of one evaluation measure impacted the weight of other evaluation measures. The extent 
of this impact was dependent upon the particular evaluation measure being analyzed (it 
could impact the weight of as many as four other evaluation measures, or as few as one 
other evaluation measure). In instances where only one other evaluation measures was 
affected, a linear relationship existed; more specifically, the increase in the weight of the 
evaluation measure being analyzed was offset by a decrease in the weight of the affected 
evaluation measure. Where multiple evaluation measures were affected, the weight ratios 
between the affected evaluation measures were held constant; more specifically, the 
increase in the weight of the evaluation measure being analyzed was offset by a 
proportional decrease in the weights (according to the original weight ratios between 
these evaluation measures) of the affected evaluation measures. The weights of 
evaluation measures not affected by the weight change of the evaluation measure being 
analyzed remained constant. 
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To conduct the sensitivity analysis, evaluation measure weights were varied from 
their minimum possible values (0) to their maximum possible values (1), with analysis 
being conducted at every tenth. This provided specific intervals (every tenth) along the 
range of possible evaluation measure weights where the ranking of alternatives could be 
examined. In this manner, the sensitivity analysis provided valuable insight into the 
ranking of alternatives, as the global weight of each evaluation measure increased or 
decreased. 
The remainder of this section highlights the sensitivity analysis conducted as it 
affected the evaluation measures of each of the three primary objectives. Only the 
evaluation measures that yielded changes in the recommended alternative (to or from 
Alternative F) will be discussed here. The complete results of the sensitivity analysis are 
contained in Appendix E. 
Responsiveness 
Sensitivity analysis was first conducted on the ten evaluation measures falling 
under the primary objective of "Responsiveness." To increase the clarity of the analysis, 
the ten evaluation measures were analyzed separately, according to the second tier 
objectives to which they related. 
Location of Personnel 
The five evaluation measures relating to the "Location of Personnel" were 
analyzed first. The global weight of "Location of Personnel" was calculated to be 0.0907 
(local weight of "Location of Personnel" multiplied by the local weight of 
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"Responsiveness" - see Appendix B for more details); hence the maximum possible 
global weight of each of these evaluation measures was 0.0907. The ranges of possible 
weights for each of these five evaluation measures, as well as the weight assigned to each 
by the decision maker's representative are illustrated in Fig 4.33. The evaluation 
measure weight 
assigned by the decision 
maker's representative 
for CONUS [Personnel] 
was approximately 50% 
of its maximum 
possible weight, while 
o oqo7 Personnel Weight Ranges 
0.0800 - 
£ 0.0600 - 
O) 
| 0.0400 - 
0.0200 - 
rv nnnn - »1 
0 0.0423 
-< r 0.0181 J* 0.0181 
<► 0.0061                          <» 0.00 
U.UUUU 
CBJTCOM          CONUS             BUCOM            PACOM        SOUTHCOM 
Personnel Evaluation Measures 
Fig 4.33 - Weight Ranges of "Location of Personnel" Evaluation Measures 
the weight assigned to 
each of the other four evaluation measures was less than 25% of the maximum. 
Consequently, the effect of the changes in weight of CONUS [Personnel] was found to 
have the most affect on alternatives. 
The sensitivity analysis varied the weight of each evaluation measure along the 
entire range of its possible weights, with the weights of the remaining four evaluation 
measures being offset proportionally, according to the original weight ratios established 
by the decision maker's representative. These ratios are reflected in Tbl 4.3. For 
"Location of Personnel," 
the weight of CONUS was 
worth the most - seven 
times that of EUCOM or 
Tbl 4.3 - "Location of Personnel" Evaluation Measures Weight Ratios 
Location of Personnel 
TZIXCT CENTCOM CONUS EUCOM PACOM SOUTHCOM 
CENTCOM 3:7 3: 1 1 :1 3:1 
CONUS 7:3 7:1 7:3 7:1 
EUCOM 1 :3 1 :7 1 :3 1 :1 
PACOM 1 : 1 3:7 3: 1 3:1 










PACOM, and 2.3 (a 7:3 ratio) times that of CENTCOM or SOUTHCOM. Similarly, the 
weight of PACOM and CENTCOM were equal, and worth 3 times the weight of 
EUCOM and SOUTHCOM. The weights of EUCOM and SOUTHCOM were equal. 
Fig 4.34 depicts the "Location of Personnel" evaluation measures and their global 
weights. The gray boxes indicate the evaluation measures that yielded changes to the 
recommended alternative during sensitivity analysis. Alternative F remained dominant 
throughout the entire range of possible weights for the other 
two "Location of Personnel" evaluation measures (CENTCOM 
and PACOM); the sensitivity analyses for these evaluation 
measures are discussed in Appendix E. 
Increasing the global weight of locating personnel 
within the CONUS beyond 7.3% resulted in a change in 
preferred alternatives from Alternative F to Alternative D. 
This was to be expected, as Alternative D places an additional 
squadron equivalent in the CONUS (over Alternative F). 
Increasing the importance of placing personnel in CONUS 
increases the flexibility of RED HORSE, the characteristic 
deemed by the decision maker as contributing the most to responsiveness [26]. 
Therefore, this increase in global weight is possible. 
Boosting the global weights of "EUCOM" or "SOUTHCOM" to 4.6% also 
changed the recommended alternative, this time from Alternative F to Alternative G. 
This was logical as Alternative G called for more squadron equivalents to be placed in 
these theaters than any other alternative. Consequently, this alternative became preferred 
PACOM 
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as the importance of locating personnel in either of these theaters increased. The global 
weight escalation of either of these alternatives is unlikely however; neither of these 
theaters is likely to escalate into an unforeseen contingency requiring the immediate 
presence of personnel [28]. 
Location of Vehicles and Equipment 
The five evaluation measures relating to the "Location of Vehicles and 
Equipment" were analyzed next. The global weight of "Location of Vehicles and 
Equipment" was calculated to be 0.3273; hence the maximum possible global weight of 
each of these evaluation measures was 0. 3273. The ranges of possible weights for each 
of these five evaluation measures, as well as the weight assigned to each by the decision 
maker's representative are illustrated in Fig 4.35. The evaluation measure weights 
assigned by the decision maker's representative for CONUS [Vehicles and Equipment] 
was approximately 30% 
of its maximum possible 
weight, while the weight 
assigned to each of the 
other four evaluation 
0.3273 
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Fig 4.35 - Weight Ranges of "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" 
Evaluation Measures 
measures was less than 
25% of the maximum. 
As such, the effect of the 
changes in weight of CONUS [Vehicles and Equipment] was found to have the most 
affect on alternatives. 
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Location of Vehicles and Equipment 
CENTCOM CONUS EUCOM PACOM SOUTHCOM 
CENTCOM 2 :3 3:1 1 : 1 3:2 
CONUS 3:2 9:2 3:2 9:4 
EUCOM 1 :3 2 :9 1 :3 1 :2 
PACOM 1 : 1 2:3 3: 1 3:2 
SOUTHCOM 2 :3 4:9 1 : 1 2:3 
The weight ratios for the "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" evaluation 
measures are reflected in Tbl 4.4. Similar to the "Location of Personnel" evaluation 
measures, the weight of CONUS was worth the most - in this instance, 4.5 times (a 9:2 
Tbl 4.4 - "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" Evaluation Measures rati°) the weiSht of 
Weight Ratios 
EUCOM, 2.25 times (a 
9:4 ratio) the weight of 
SOUTCOM, and 1.5 
times (a 3:2 ratio) the 
weight of CENTCOM and PACOM. The weights of CENTCOM and PACOM were 
equal, and worth 3 times the weight of EUCOM and SOUTHCOM, whose weights were 
equal. 
The gray boxes in Fig 4.36 indicate the "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" 
evaluation measures that yielded changes to the 
recommended alternative during sensitivity analysis. The 
model's preferred alternative changed from Alternative F to 
Alternative D as a result of increasing or decreasing the 
global weights each of these evaluation measures - 
CENTCOM, CONUS, EUCOM, PACOM, and 
SOUTHCOM. 
Increasing the global weight of "CENTCOM 
[V&E]" to 14.2% switched the model's recommended 
alternative from Alternative F to Alternative D. Although 













Fig 4.36 - Global Weights 




equipment in CENTCOM is possible, doubling this importance (required to change the 
preferred alternative) is not likely. 
Boosting the importance of locating vehicles and equipment in CONUS beyond 
12.5% also changed the recommended alternative from Alternative F to Alternative D. 
This increase in importance is possible, as locating vehicles and equipment in CONUS 
provides flexibility to the decision maker; indicated by the decision maker's 
representative as the vital element in allowing RED HORSE to be responsive [27]. 
Decreasing the global weight of "EUCOM [V&E]" to 1.5% also changed the 
recommended alternative from Alternative F to Alternative D. This was also seen as a 
possible occurrence, as the European theater is not likely to experience any unforeseen 
contingencies requiring the immediate presence of vehicles and equipment. 
Diminishing the importance of locating vehicles and equipment in PACOM also 
caused a change in the recommended alternative. This diminished importance is not 
likely to happen however, as PACOM is seen as one of the world's foremost "hot spots," 
requiring the immediate availability of vehicles and equipment. 
Finally, increasing the global weight of "SOUTHCOM [V&E]" resulted in a 
change in the preferred alternative. This scenario is also not likely to happen. As with 
EUCOM, SOUTHCOM is not likely to experience any unforeseen contingency that 
would require the immediate presence of vehicles and equipment. 
Readiness 
Sensitivity analysis was next conducted on the five evaluation measures falling 
under the primary objective of "Readiness." As the global weight of this objective was 
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0.250, the maximum possible global weight of each of the "Readiness" evaluation 
measures was 0.250. The ranges of possible weights for each of these five evaluation 
measures, as well as the weight assigned to each by the decision maker's representative 
are illustrated in Fig 4.37. The evaluation measure weight assigned by the decision 
maker's representative for 
CONUS [Readiness] was 
the largest; here holding 
50% of its maximum 
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Fig 4.37 - Weight Ranges of "Readiness" Evaluation Measures 
possible weight, while the 
weight assigned to each of 
the other four evaluation 
measures was only 12.5% 
of the maximum. As such, variations in the weight assigned to CONUS [Readiness] 
were found to have the most affect on alternatives. 
The ratios for the "Readiness" evaluation measures are reflected in Tbl 4.5. 
Similar to the evaluation measures relating to "Location of Personnel" and those 
addressing "Location of 
Vehicles and Equipment," 
the weight of CONUS was 
worth the most - 4 times 
the weight of any other 
"Readiness" evaluation measure. The weights of each of the other four evaluation 
measures were equal. 
Tbl 4.5 - - "Readiness ' Evaluation Measures Weight Ratios 
Readiness 
CENTCOM CONUS EUCOM PACOM SOUTHCOM 
CENTCOM 1 :4 1 :1 1 : 1 1 : 1 
CONUS 4 4:1 4: 1 4: 1 
EUCOM 1 1 :4 1 : 1 1 : 1 
PACOM 1 1 :4 1 :1 1 : 1 
SOUTHCOM 1 1 :4 1 : 1 1 : 1 
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The sensitivity analysis for the "Readiness" evaluation measures did not yield 
changes to the recommended alternative in any instance; that is, Alternative F remained 
dominant throughout the entire range of weights for each of the evaluation measures. 
The sensitivity analyses for all of the "Readiness" evaluation measures are discussed in 
Appendix E. 
Political Considerations 
Finally, sensitivity analysis was conducted on the nine evaluation measures 
falling under the primary objective of "Political Considerations." In order to conduct 
sensitivity analysis on each of these objectives, the global weight of the means objectives 
to which each evaluation measure directly related had to be determined. Of the nine 
evaluation measures, eight related to 4th-tier means objectives (two evaluation measures 
per 4th-tier means objective), while one evaluation measure (Global Constraints) related 
to the primary objective of "Political Considerations." Since each of the evaluation 
measures related to different means objectives, the maximum weight (and hence the 
range of possible weights) varied for each evaluation measure. The ranges of possible 
weights for these nine evaluation measures, as well as the weight assigned to each by the 
decision maker's representative, are illustrated in Fig 4.38. 
The 4th tier means objectives to which evaluation measures related were "State 
Influences" ("ARC Units" and "AD Units"), "DoD Influences" ("MAJCOMs & Higher 
HQs" and "NAF & OCONUS Bases"), "Streamlined Command" ("Unity of Command" 
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and "Matching 
Structures"), and "Level of 
Command" ("Command 
Level" and "Rank of 
Command"). However, 
since each of the "Political 
Considerations" evaluation 
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only one other evaluation measure, they were related linearly; more specifically, the 
increase in the weight of the evaluation measure being analyzed was offset by a decrease 
in the weight of the affected evaluation measure. As such, ratios between evaluation 
measures did not have to be established to conduct sensitivity analysis. 
The sensitivity analysis for the "Political Considerations" evaluation measures 
yielded changes to the recommended alternative in all four means objectives - "State 
Influences," "DoD Influences," "Streamlined Command," and "Level of Command." 
Sensitivity analysis also resulted in changes to the recommended alternative in the 
"Global Constraints" evaluation measure. In each instance, the recommended alternative 
changed from Alternative F to Alternative D. The evaluation measures affecting these 
means objectives, as well as the "Global Constraints" evaluation measure, are discussed 
below. The sensitivity analyses for all of the "Political Considerations" evaluation 
measures are discussed in Appendix E. 
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Fig 4.39 depicts the evaluation measures assessing "State Influences" and their 
global weights. Sensitivity analysis performed on these evaluation measures 
demonstrated that decreasing the global 
weight of "ARC Units" to 1.9% 
(simultaneously increasing the global weight 
of "Active Duty Units" to 3%) changed the 
recommended alternative. This shift in 
importance is not a likely one however, as 
impacting ARC units will result in more 
Fig 4.39 - Global Weights for "State influences"      severe political repercussions than those 
Evaluation Measures 
arising as a result of affecting AD units. 
Fig 4.40 depicts the global weights of the two evaluation measures relating to 
"DoD Influences". Boosting the penalties associated with affecting MAJCOMs and 
higher HQs to 2.1% (simultaneously 
decreasing the penalties associated with 
affecting NAFs and OCONUS bases to 1.2%) 
changed the preferred alternative. This shift 
in global weights is possible, as MAJCOMs 
and higher HQs have slightly more political 
pull than NAFs and OCONUS bases. This 
Fig 4.40 - Global Weights for "DoD Influences" 
greater amount of political pull could result in        Evaluation Measures 
Political 
Considerations 











a more severe penalty as a result of affecting those organizations. 
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The global weights of the two evaluation measures used to assess the 
"Streamlined Command" means objective are depicted in Fig 4.41. Sensitivity analysis 
performed on these evaluation measures 
demonstrated that increasing the global weight 
of "Unity of Command" to 7.8% 
(simultaneously decreasing the global weight 
of "Matching Structures" to 6.8%) changed 




















Fig 4.41 - Global Weights of "Streamlined 
Command" Evaluation Measures 
importance is possible, but is entirely 
dependent upon the decision maker's (or the 
decision maker's representative's) preferences 
- i.e. it is dependent upon whichever evaluation measure the decision maker envisions as 
contributing the most to achieving a streamlined command structure. 
Fig 4.42 depicts the global weights of the two evaluation measures relating to the 
"Level of Command" means objective. Sensitivity analysis accomplished on these 
evaluation measures ascertained that 
boosting the global weight of "Command 
Level" to 5.5% (simultaneously decreasing 
the global weight of "Rank of Command" to 
1.8%) changed the recommended 
alternative. Similar to the "Streamlined 
Command" evaluation measures, this shift in 
importance is possible, but is entirely 
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Fig 4.42 - Global Weights of "Level of Command" 
Evaluation Measures 
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dependent upon the decision maker's (or the decision maker's representative's) 
preferences - i.e. it is dependent upon whichever evaluation measure the decision maker 
envisions as contributing the most to enabling RED HORSE to have the appropriate 
command authority. 
Finally, the global weights of the means objective ("Air Force") and evaluation 
measure ("Global Constraints") used to assess the primary objective of "Political 
Considerations" are illustrated in Fig 4.43. Sensitivity analysis demonstrated that 
decreasing the global weight of "Air Force" to 28.4% (simultaneously increasing the 
global weight of "Global Constraints" to 4.8%) changed the 
recommended alternative. This shift in importance is 
possible, as the future threats and organizational climates 
(global, as well as those internal to the USAF) could 
Fig 4.43 - Global Weights of 
"Political considerations" mandate a change in priorities. 




"What-if' analysis was performed on the three primary objectives in the decision 
maker's representative's value hierarchy. This type of analysis assessed the effect on the 
model's ranking of alternatives as a result of altering the order of importance of the three 
primary objectives. As previously discussed, the order of primary objective importance 
(heaviest weight) was "Responsiveness" (weight of 0.418), "Political Considerations" 
(weight of 0.332), and "Readiness" (weight of 0.25). The order of importance of the 
three primary objectives was varied such that the alternatives could be evaluated 
according to each possible combination of importance of the primary objectives. These 
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combinations, along with their results are shown in Tbl 4.6. The first row in Tbl 4.6 
depicts the relative importance of the three primary objectives as established by the 
Tbl 4.6 - "What-if" Results 








































decision maker's representative. The remaining rows illustrate how the preferred 
alternative was dependent on the order of importance of the primary objectives. More 
specifically, Alternative F remained the preferred alternative when the weight of 
"Responsiveness" exceeded the weight of "Political Considerations." Conversely, when 
the weight of "Political Considerations" exceeded the weight of "Responsiveness," 
Alternative D was preferred. There were no other changes in the rank of the top five 
alternatives as a result of these changes. In addition, the model was evaluated with all 
three primary objectives equal in importance. Alternative F was again preferred in this 
instance, again without a change in the top five ranked alternatives. 
Summary 
Based upon the decision maker's representative's preferences, Alternative F was 
the recommended alternative. However, sensitivity analysis indicated that fluctuations in 
the global weights of the majority of evaluation measures affected the ranking of 
alternatives, resulting in changes to the preferred alternative 65% (13 out of 20) of the 
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time. In addition, "what-if' analysis showed that the preferred alternative was dependent 
on the relative importance of "Responsiveness" and "Political Considerations;" 
Alternative F was preferred as "Responsiveness" was the heavier weighted of the two 
primary objectives, while Alternative D was preferred otherwise. The model indicates 
that Alternative F best achieves the objectives of the decision maker's representative, as 
defined in the value hierarchy. However, the model's extreme sensitivity suggests that 
further research is required in order to identify the best macroscopic organizational 
structure for RED HORSE. 
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V. Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
This chapter encapsulates the thrust of this research effort. It summarizes the 
analysis performed and results discovered, provides conclusions and recommendations, 
posits areas of additional study, and discusses additional considerations that should be 
accounted for in any future endeavors. 
This study used decision analysis (DA) tools to examine the macroscopic 
organizational structure of RED HORSE; that is, the manner in which RED HORSE 
resources (personnel and equipment) are organized collectively, above the unit (squadron 
or flight) level. This thesis built on the findings of the Air Combat Command sponsored 
RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. This research focused on issues of geographic 
location and chain of command above the unit level, as these two topics were determined 
by the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study to be vital to the accomplishment of the RED 
HORSE mission. Working in direct cooperation with ACC, this thesis used value 
focused thinking (VET) to identify a qualified decision maker's representative 
(ACC/CEX). It then created a hierarchical model (value hierarchy) depicting the 
decision maker's representative's multiple objectives that contribute to a determination of 
the macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE. The value hierarchy 
illustrated the relative importance of each of these goals and objectives, as well as their 
presence in the decision opportunity. Twenty alternatives were generated and measured 
against the evaluation criteria present in the value hierarchy. Finally, the model was 
tested to determine the change in preferred alternatives due to fluctuations in the relative 
importance of each of the objectives. 
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Summary of Analysis and Results 
Tbl 5.1 presents the three highest-ranking alternatives, based on the preferences of 
the decision maker's representative. The model indicated that Alternative F was 
Tbl 5.1 - Top 3 Alternatives 
Alternative Title Description 
F As-is Diversified All units remain located as-is. Each AD unit reports to a different NAF/theater 
command for both ADCON and OPCON. ARC command structure remains as-is. 
D Super Unit All personnel and equipment (AD and ARC) belong to a single RED HORSE 
organization (probably a wing structure, composed of ARC and AD groups), and 
are co-located in CONUS at a single existing AD location. This organization 
reports to a single MAJCOM for ADCON and OPCON. 
L Study MTW 
Relocation II 
Relocate according to the recommendations from RH 2010 Strategic Study. Co- 
located units would form RED HORSE groups (comprised of AD and ARC 
squadrons) commanded by an AD Col. All groups report to a different theater 
command (except for EUCOM) for ADCON and OPCON. Remaining ARC Units 
and 31 RHF remain as-is, but are responsible for EUCOM Ops. 
preferred according to the weights solicited from the decision maker's representative. 
The sensitivity analysis indicated that the model was highly reactive to fluctuations in the 
global weights of the objectives and evaluation measures, recommending changes in the 
preferred alternative 65% (13 out of 20) of the time. Eleven of these preference changes 
alternated between Alternatives F and D. The only other alternatives shown to be 
preferred were Alternatives G and I; the former only occurred when the weights of 
locating personnel in the European or Southern theaters exceeded 67% of the total weight 
given to locating personnel - an unlikely scenario, according to the decision maker's 
representative [28]. Alternative I was only recommended when the global weight of 
locating vehicles and equipment in CENTCOM was doubled to 14.2%. Although it is 
possible that the global weight of this measure would increase, it is not likely that it 
would double in importance, making this an unlikely scenario as well. 
This sensitivity analysis illustrated that changes in the weights of 
"Responsiveness" and "Political Considerations" evaluation measures yielded changes in 
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the preferred alternative. Sensitivity analyses conducted in the arena of "Readiness," 
defined as the ability of RED HORSE units to adequately train and familiarize 
themselves with their vehicles and equipment [27], did not produce any changes. The 
majority of preference changes occurred within the realm of "Responsiveness" - the 
branch of the value hierarchy defined as the ability of RED HORSE to quickly arrive at a 
contingency location with its required resources [26]. Three times the preferred 
alternative was switched due to fluctuations in the "Location of Personnel" measures. 
Increasing the importance of locating personnel in CONUS resulted in alternative 
preference switching from Alternative F to Alternative D. Increasing the importance of 
placing personnel in EUCOM or SOUTHCOM resulted in the recommendation changing 
from Alternative F to Alternative G. 
Also within the arena of "Responsiveness," the preferred alternative changed five 
times due to sensitivity analyses conducted on "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" 
measures. Increasing the importance of locating vehicles and equipment in CENTCOM 
changed the recommended alternative from Alternative F to Alternative D. Continued 
increases in the global weight of this measure produced another change in the 
recommended alternative, this time from Alternative D to Alternative I. Additionally, 
increasing the importance of locating vehicles and equipment in CONUS or 
SOUTHCOM, or decreasing the importance of locating vehicles and equipment in 
EUCOM or PACOM resulted in changing the preferred alternative from Alternative F to 
Alternative D. 
The remaining five preference changes occurred within the realm of "Political 
Considerations" - defined as the organizational and governmental influences that affect 
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the reorganization process [26]. The model recommended switching from Alternative F 
to Alternative D for each of the sensitivity analyses conducted within this arena, 
according to the following five scenarios: 
- Increasing the penalties for relocating Active Duty units, while 
diminishing the consequences for relocating Air Reserve Component 
(ARC) units 
- Minimizing the repercussions of changing the influences of Numbered Air 
Forces (NAFs) and overseas bases on RED HORSE, while amplifying the 
penalties associated with lessening the influence of Major Commands 
(MAJCOMs), the Air Force Civil Engineer and Services Agency 
(AFCESA), and ILE 
- Boosting the importance of possessing a unified chain of command for all 
RED HORSE units, while decreasing the importance of having all AD 
units report to the same units for Administrative Control (ADCON) and 
Operational Control (OPCON). 
- Increasing the significance of holding command of a RED HORSE 
organization at a specified level (MAJCOM, NAF, or base), while 
diminishing the importance of having AD Colonel slots within a 
macroscopic organizational structure 
- Lessening the importance of Air Force organizational influences, while 
increasing the impact of global considerations 
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According to the decision maker's representative, the three fundamental criteria 
(and their relative importance in the overall decision situation) in developing an 
organizational structure for RED HORSE are Responsiveness (41.8%), Political 
Considerations (33.2%), and Readiness (25%). Conducting simple "what-if' analysis 
indicated changes in alternative preference dependent on the relative weights of these 
primary objectives. Alternative F was preferred when the weight of "Responsiveness" 
was equal to or greater than the weight of "Political Considerations." Conversely, 
Alternative D was preferred as the weight of "Political Considerations" exceeded the 
weight of "Responsiveness." 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The first research objective that was addressed by this study was: 
-    What organizational structure is most suitable for the heavy construction 
and contingency engineering capabilities provided by RED HORSE? 
Alternative F was most preferred, based upon the preferences of the decision maker's 
representative. This alternative consistently ranked as one of the top two alternatives 
throughout the sensitivity analyses. Alternative F recommended maintaining all RED 
HORSE units at their current locations. The lack of any required relocations increases 
the feasibility of this alternative, as this change would be solely an administrative one. 
Alternative F also proposes realigning RED HORSE's command structure. It 
calls for each RED HORSE unit to report to a different theater command or NAF for both 
OPCON and ADCON, alleviating the conflicting ADCON/OPCON structure that 
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Fig 5.1 - Possible Macroscopic Organizational Structure for Alternative F 
recommended by this proposal. This proposed structure provides clearly defined regions 
of responsibility for each of the RED HORSE units, streamlining the accomplishment of 
theater requirements. By providing a matching command structure for each RED 
HORSE unit, this alternative allows units to train as they "go to war," thus reducing the 
training load of RED HORSE units by enabling each one to train for the specific, theater- 
dependent requirements that they would be called upon to accomplish. 
The greatest disadvantage to Alternative F is that it eliminates a central 
organization that provides ongoing, standardized support for RED HORSE specific 
concerns (i.e. UTC authorizations, adequacy of training, relevance of ConOps, vehicle 
and equipment replacement, pilot units, etc.). This alternative would reduce also any 
potential for a streamlined command for RED HORSE, as each unit would take orders 
from different theater commands. 
The second most preferred organizational structure was found to be Alternative D. 
This alternative also consistently ranked as one of the top two alternatives throughout the 
sensitivity analyses. Alternative D proposed co-locating all RED HORSE units (AD and 
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ARC units) at a single CONUS location that currently supports an Active Duty RED 
HORSE unit. Based on climate, available space, and the vicinity of seaports, this 
location would probably be Nellis AFB, NV (currently home to 820 RHS). Malmstrom 
AFB, MT (home to 819 RHS) would not be feasible, as its northern tier location is not 
conducive to year-round operations. In addition, the logistics of vehicle and equipment 
transport is further complicated by the installation's location, as it is not near any 
seaports. Hurlburt Field, FL (home to 823 RHS) is near several seaports (Jacksonville, 
Mobile, New Orleans,) and experiences weather conducive to year-round training. 
However, its location on the base does not allow for further expansion, especially of the 
magnitude that would be required of this proposed co-location. 
Co-locating all RED HORSE units and their assets (personnel, vehicles, and 
equipment) would enable the force to take advantage of both increased labor pools and 
vehicle fleets. If and when presidential call-up of the reserves occurs, the personnel 
would be well trained due to their exposure to ongoing operations throughout the year. In 
addition, vehicles and equipment currently reserved for ARC units could be utilized in 
support of global contingencies. The flexibility of an increased labor pool and vehicle 
fleet would tremendously improve RED HORSE's ability to support global 
contingencies. 
Alternative D also proposes to realign RED HORSE's command structure, 
providing a single command for all units. Fig 5.2 illustrates this proposed structure. The 
single command alleviates the conflicting ADCON/OPCON structure that currently 
exists. This single command would be located at the MAJCOM level - probably ACC or 
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Fig 5.2 - Potential Macroscopic Organizational Structure for Alternative D achieving concurrence to 
relocate ARC units, 31 RHF (currently stationed at Camp Darby, Italy), and 554 RHS 
(currently stationed at Osan AB, ROK). The logistics and political ramifications of 
relocating these units could make this scenario highly unlikely, if not entirely infeasible. 
One alternative of note is Alternative C. This was the highest-ranking alternative 
that prescribed placing all active duty CONUS RED HORSE units under one chain of 
command without relocating ARC units. This alternative offered an increased amount of 
flexibility by providing a single chain of command for all active duty RED HORSE units. 
However, this alternative only ranked eighth, primarily because it only placed 6 squadron 
equivalents and 6 equipment sets in CONUS. Additionally, it placed a RED HORSE unit 
under the command of a base (31 RHF reporting to 31 FW), allowed for 5 separate chains 
of command (ARC Units, CONUS active duty units, 7 AF, PACAF, and 31 RHF), and 
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recommended maintaining only one Colonel within the active duty RED HORSE 
community. 
Also of interest is the ranking of Alternative A - the "Status Quo" alternative. 
This alternative reflected the RED HORSE macroscopic organizational structure as it 
currently exists, and ranked 14th out of 20. This low ranking indicates that RED 
HORSE's current structure is failing to meet the objectives as identified by the decision 
maker's representative. This alternative specifically suffered because it did not propose 
matching peacetime and wartime command structure for any of the AD RED HORSE 
units, as well as recommending that the command for 31 RHF (Camp Darby, Italy) 
continue to be held at the base level (31 FW, Aviano AB, Italy). The analysis indicates 
that this structure should be changed to become commensurate with the objectives of 
RED HORSE leadership. 
Based upon the rankings of the alternatives, combined with need to continually 
address RED HORSE-specific issues, the recommendation of this study is to implement 
Alternative F, with one caveat. This caveat would be the formation of a standardization 
organization, designed to address RED HORSE issues outside the scope of this research 
i.e. vehicle and equipment replacement, UTC breakdown, pilot units for various 
engineering technologies, etc. This organization would operate similar to AFCESA. 
Whereas AFCESA provides a means to continually address issues specific to Civil 
Engineering, this proposed organization would continually address issues specific to 
RED HORSE, as well as provide a level of standardization among RED HORSE units. 
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Fig 5.3 - Recommended Macroscopic Organizational Structure for RED HORSE 
The second research objective addressed by this thesis was: 
- What criteria are most important in developing an optimal organizational 
structure for RED HORSE? 
The criteria that were determined to be most important to a decision addressing the 
macroscopic organizational structure of RED HORSE were encompassed by the three 
primary objectives. These primary objectives were: 
- Responsiveness - the ability of RED HORSE to quickly arrive at a 
contingency location with its required resources (personnel, vehicles, 
equipment) 
- Political Considerations - the organizational and governmental 
influences that affect the decision making process 
- Readiness - the ability of RED HORSE to adequately train and 
familiarize themselves with their designated vehicles and equipment 
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Of these three, "Responsiveness" was determined to be most important, accounting for 
over 40% of the total weight of the decision opportunity. This was not surprising 
however, as this primary objective measured RED HORSE's ability to accomplish its 
contingency tasks in a timely manner. This coincided with the results put forth by the 
RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study, citing that meeting RED HORSE mission 
requirements were of primary concern (accounted for by "Responsiveness" in this study). 
For this study, the "CONUS [Readiness]" evaluation measure possessed the 
greatest global weight. This evaluation measure related to the "Readiness" primary 
objective. This evaluation measure was not significant however, as most of the 
alternatives did not prescribe locating unequipped personnel in the CONUS. "CONUS 
[Vehicles and Equipment]" possessed the second "heaviest" global weight, and related to 
the "Responsiveness" primary objective of the decision maker's representative's value 
hierarchy. The global weight of the "Streamlined Command" evaluation measures 
("Matching Structures" and "Unity of Command") were the third most heavily weighted 
in the model. These evaluation measures further defined the primary objective of 
"Political Considerations." Sensitivity analysis indicated that subtle changes in the latter 
three evaluation measures ("CONUS [Vehicles and Equipment]," "Matching Structures," 
and "Unity of Command") directly affected the preferred alternative. As such, these 
three evaluation measures were the primary reason that the alternatives ranked as they 
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Fig 5.4 - Evaluation Measures Affecting Ranking of Alternatives 
Scope and Limitations 
Due to the complexity of the RED HORSE organizational structure, it is 
impossible to conceive and account for every subtle nuance and variable that contributes 
to the decision-making process. To focus this study on one specific, manageable aspect 
of the overall decision scenario, logical assumptions were made, the thesis scope was 
refined, and the VFT process was utilized. By focusing the thesis on one facet of the 
decision opportunity however, these techniques inevitably limited the overall research 
effort. 
To guide this thesis effort, assumptions were made to simplify and guide the 
modeling and analysis process; these assumptions are presented and discussed in chapter 
3. However, these assumptions limited the ability of the model to address each relevant 
topic. One of the most obvious omissions from this research was the issue of cost. It was 
assumed that all required funds would be available to fulfill any requirements arising 
from reorganization processes - an unlikely scenario. In addition, this research effort 
assumed that the RED HORSE ConOps would remain as it is. However, increasing 
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sentiment among the USAF CE community that RED HORSE's ConOps is outdated 
could invalidate this assumption. Finally, this study assumed that RED HORSE would 
be adequately trained to accomplish any mission in any theater. However, an 
inexperienced USAF CE labor pool, an aged vehicle fleet within the RED HORSE 
community, and an increased operations tempo threaten the ability of RED HORSE to be 
properly trained at all times. 
The research presented in this thesis was concerned with macroscopic issues of 
structure - i.e. how should the RED HORSE force be organized above the unit level. It 
did not address microscopic, unit-level issues such as the UTC distribution within a 
squadron, the training aspects of individual squadrons to ensure its personnel are capable 
of performing their contingency tasks, or the vehicle fleet existing within a unit. Instead, 
this research focused on issues of geographic location and chain of command - two of the 
issues highlighted as concerns by the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. In order to 
identify the best macroscopic organizational structure of the RED HORSE force these 
squadron level issues must be addressed, as they dictate the manning and resource 
requirements for RED HORSE units - essential considerations when addressing 
organizational structuring. 
Finally, the VFT process is one that relies heavily on the input of one group or 
individual. Any biases inherent in the thinking of that individual may manifest 
themselves in the attitudes, preferences, and values of the decision maker (or decision 
maker's representative). These personal biases could be imparted to the DA model and 
factor into the results generated by the model. Attempts to minimize biases are made 
during the objective solicitation processes by identifying a qualified decision maker (or 
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decision maker's representative) and soliciting the objectives and evaluation measures 
from him/her. Sensitivity analysis also tries to identify and reduce the impact of erratic 
biases on the model by evaluating the model along the entire spectrum of possible 
preferences. Due to the initially subjective nature of this process however, not all of the 
biases may have been accounted for and/or eliminated, and may have affected the results 
posited by this study. 
Areas of Further Study 
This research effort highlighted the need for additional areas of study concerning 
the issue of RED HORSE macroscopic organizational structure. These include further 
investigation into model variables, the opportunity to partner with other military 
contingency units (within the USAF as well as among the sister services), the effect of 
changing squadron size limits, and the ability of RED HORSE to maintain an adequately 
trained force. Investigation into any of these areas would provide further insight into the 
broad spectrum of the decision opportunity, highlighting additional opportunities for 
differences between potential alternatives. This clarification would provide additional, 
more detailed alternatives that would further satisfy the values and objectives of a 
decision maker. 
The sensitivity analysis indicated that the model was highly reactive to changes in 
the weights of different evaluation measures. Each of these evaluation measures should 
be explored more in-depth to ascertain the level of their effects on the model. Of 
particular interest is the stationing of resources (personnel and vehicles and equipment) in 
various theaters around the globe, as fluctuation in the weights pertaining to these aspects 
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yielded the most changes in alternative preference. A time-based scale (i.e. time zones 
crossed or transport time required to respond to a contingency) for these 
"Responsiveness" measures could provide further insight into the most beneficial 
locations at which resources should be located. The evaluation measures relating to 
"Political Considerations" should also be investigated further, as each of these measures 
produced fluctuations in the model as well. The "Responsiveness" measures were found 
to be most influential on the model however, and additional efforts should begin there. 
In addition, there are opportunities for RED HORSE to work with other, existing 
USAF contingency forces. Although this research addressed RED HORSE's ability to 
accomplish its contingency engineering mission, USAF requirements may be better 
satisfied through an overarching analysis that includes all of its various contingency 
engineering units. The 49 Material Maintenance Group (MMG) is another highly mobile 
USAF contingency engineering unit stationed at Holloman AFB, NM. It has been called 
on with increasing frequency to conduct beddown and bare base operations around the 
globe. Although troop training is not its primary mission, it is capable of training 
personnel in these operations - a role previously reserved for Prime BEEF. The inclusion 
of 49 MMG into the fold of RED HORSE operations poses interesting possibilities, and 
could be included in the model developed for this research effort. It would serve to 
increase the active duty labor pool, equipment inventory, and vehicle fleet of RED 
HORSE, potentially making it more flexible and responsive. The actual effect on such a 
merger has not been researched however. Similar results could be achieved via joint 
operations with Prime BEEF units. To accomplish this, the existing ConOps for RED 
HORSE and Prime BEEF would have to be readdressed. 
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On a broader scale, perhaps the contingency requirements of the US military as a 
whole could best be achieved by combining the contingency engineering forces of all the 
services. Additional research could explore the possibility of RED HORSE partnering 
with the contingency forces of sister military services. Both the US Navy and the US 
Army possess contingency engineering capability on a much larger scale than the USAF, 
in the Navy SEABEES and Army Construction Battalions (CBs). The US Marine Corps 
also possesses a contingency engineering capability (Marine CBs), albeit on a much 
smaller scale than the other three military services. Comparisons between contingency 
engineering capabilities among the four services have been made previously, and USAF 
contingency engineering (particularly RED HORSE) has looked to the SEABEES for 
benchmarking opportunities as recently as the RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study. 
Additional areas of study could include the possibility of merging the contingency 
engineering capabilities of each of the services into a joint organization, providing a 
massive labor pool and vehicle fleet from which the US military could draw. 
Further, RED HORSE was initially authorized to be half the size of an Army CB 
[27]. This study assumed that its size (in the means of manning or other resources) 
would be held constant. However, the reduction in force and continued drawdown of the 
US military opens the door for the size aspects of RED HORSE to fluctuate, in manning 
or other resources. In response to the increased demand of RED HORSE, the USAF has 
stood up 819 RHS and 219 RHF at Malmstrom AFB, MT, and restored 554 RHS (ROK) 
to full strength (from caretaker status). While the demand for RED HORSE contingency 
engineering services has not leveled-off, the continued outsourcing of USAF CE provides 
additional military manpower to the CE community that could be used to augment RED 
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HORSE's existing capabilities. These two phenomena allow for the possibility of 
increasing the size of existing RED HORSE units. As such, the effects of increasing the 
size of existing units beyond the 404-person limit should be explored. Rather than 
standing up new units, this scenario would provide additional flexibility to existing units. 
Conversely, these size increases could make RED HORSE even heavier, adversely 
affecting RED HORSE's ability to be responsive. 
This research effort assumed that all personnel were adequately trained to conduct 
their mission. However, the lack of an experienced labor pool, an aged vehicle fleet, an 
increased operations tempo, and a ConOps that has been deemed out of date present 
serious challenges to validating that assumption. In addition, only experienced CE 
personnel were eligible for RED HORSE assignment in the past; currently, Airmen 
Basics fresh out of tech school and newly commissioned Second Lieutenants are being 
assigned to RED HORSE units. The impact of all these issues could be playing a role in 
the ability of a REDHORSE unit to maintain a fully trained contingent of personnel. 
Research aimed at identifying the level and adequacy of training existing in RED 
HORSE units should be conducted to address these challenges. 
Finally, the issue of cost should quantified and incorporated into any additional 
study aimed at identifying an appropriate structure for RED HORSE. As with all 
government organizations, cost is a limiting parameter in any effort undertaken by RED 
HORSE, including reorganization. Several alternatives proposed relocating existing 
units, from state to state, from OCONUS to CONUS, and from CONUS to OCONUS. It 
is likely that these relocations would be very costly - a fact that would be accounted for 
when making a reorganization decision. 
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Additional Considerations 
Of additional consideration is the interactive role the US military's contingency 
engineering services must play with one another. Within the USAF, this means that RED 
HORSE and Prime BEEF must be organized and managed in such as way as to allow 
each to maintain a "separate but equal" identity [26]. Outside of the USAF, this implies 
that each service is given ample opportunity to showcase its engineering capabilities. 
There is a continual requirement for US military assistance abroad. Organizing the 
various military contingency units to meet this demand must be accomplished in such a 
way as to allow each service to receive their ".. .share of the pie [26]." 
Finally, the US military has been supporting contingency operations since its 
inception. Lessons learned from previous deployments have been used for planning 
purposes to posture military units and capabilities for future engagements. Any proposed 
organizational structure should be analyzed to ensure that it satisfies the requirements 
realized from previous contingencies. 
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APPENDIX A: WEIGHT CALCULATIONS 
This section depicts the swing-weight method used to assign weights to each for 
the twenty-four evaluation measures identified in this research effort. This process is 
described in-depth in the methodology chapter (chapter 3), under "Assessing Weights," 
p.3-22. The steps depicted here were used to calculate the local weights of each objective 
or evaluation measure. Tbl A. 1 indicates the global weight of each objective or 
evaluation measure at each level of the hierarchy. 
For all weight calculations: *D' 
W - Local weight 
G(W) - Global weight 
In addition, the following relationships apply: 
- The sum of all local weights must equal 1 
- Global weights are calculated by multiplying each local weight existing on 
that portion of the hierarchy, as they ascend through the hierarchy (beginning 
at the bottom) to the point of interest. 
Responsiveness Weights 
The ratio of the weight of CONUS [Personnel] (COP) to the weight of CENTCOM 
[Personnel] (CP) is 7:3: 
WCOP = 2.333WCP 
The ratio of the weight of EUCOM [Personnel] (EP) to the weight of CENTCOM 
[Personnel] (CP) is 1:3: 
WEp = 0.333WCp 
The ratio of the weight of PACOM [Personnel] (PP) to the weight of CENTCOM 
[Personnel] (CP) is 1:1: 
WPP = WCP 
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The ratio of the weight of SOUTHCOM [Personnel] (SP) to the weight of CENTCOM 
[Personnel] (CP) is 1:3: 
WSp = 0.333WCP 
WCp + WCOP + WEp + WPp + WSp = 1 
WCP + 2.333WCP + 0.333WCP + WCP + 0.333WCP = 1 
WCp = 0.2 
WCOP = 0.466 
WEP = 0.067 
WPP = 0.2 
WSP = 0.067 
The ratio of the weight of CONUS [Vehicles & Equipment] (COV) to the weight of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 3:2: 
Wcov=1.5WCv 
The ratio of the weight of EUCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (EV) to the weight of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 1:3: 
WEv = 0.333WCV 
The ratio of the weight of PACOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (PV) to the weight of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 1:1: 
Wpv = Wcv 
The ratio of the weight of SOUTHCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (SV) to the weight of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 2:3: 
WSv = 0.667WCv 
Wcv + Wcov + WEv + Wpv + Wsv = 1 
WCv + 1.5Wcv + 0.333Wcv + Wcv + 0.667WCv = 1 
Wcp = 0.222 
Wcop = 0.333 
WEP = 0.075 
WPP = 0.222 
WSp = 0.148 
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To quantify the relationship between the 2nd tier means objectives of Location of 
Personnel (LP) and Location of Vehicles and Equipment (LV), the evaluation measures 
of CENTCOM [Personnel] (CP) and CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) were 
compared. The ratio between the 2nd tier global weight of CENTCOM [Vehicles & 
Equipment] (CV) and CENTCOM [Personnel] (CP) is 4:1: 
G(Wcv) = 4G(WCP) G(Wcv) = WCv*WLV = 0.222*WLV 
G(WCp) = WCp*WLP = 0.2*WLP 
0.222*WLV = 4*0.2*WLP 
WLV = 3.604*WLP WLv + WLP = 1 
3.604WLP + WLP = 1 
WLP = 0.217 
WLV = 0.783 
Readiness Weights 
The ratio of the weight of CONUS (CO) to the weight of CENTCOM (C) is 4:1: 
Wco = 4Wc 
The ratio of the weight of EUCOM (E) to the weight of CENTCOM (C) is 1:1: 
WE = WC 
The ratio of the weight of PACOM (P) to the weight of CENTCOM (C) is 1:1: 
Wp = Wc 
The ratio of the weight of SOUTHCOM (S) to the weight of CENTCOM (C) is 1:1: 
Ws = Wc 
Wc + Wco + WE + WP + Ws = 1 
Wc + 4WC + WC + Wc + Wc = 1 
Wc = 0.125 
Wco = 0.5 
WE = 0.125 
WP = 0.125 
Ws = 0.125 
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Political Considerations Weights 
The weight of Command Level (CL) is worth twice the weight of Rank of Command 
(RC): 
WCL = 2WRC WCL + WRC=1 
2WRC + WRC=1 
WRC = 0.333 
WCL = 0.667 
The weight of Unity of Command (UC) is equal to the weight of Matching Structures 
(MS): 
Wuc = WMS WUC + WMS = 1 
WMs + WMS = 1 
WMS = 0.5 
Wuc = 0.5 
To quantify the relationship between the 4th tier means objectives of Streamlined 
Command (SC) and Level of Command (LC), the evaluation measures of Matching 
Structures (MS) and Command Level (CL) were compared. The 4th tier global weight of 
Matching Structures (MS) is worth 1.5 times the 4th tier global weight of Command Level 
(CL): 
G(WMS) = 1.5G(WCL) G(WMS) = WMS * Wsc = 0.5* Wsc 
G(WCL) = WCL * WLC = 0.667* WLC 
0.5*WSC = 1.5*0.667*WLC 
Wsc = 2*WLC Wsc + WLC = 1 
2WLC + WLC = 1 
WLC = 0.333 
Wsc = 0.667 
The weight of MAJCOMs & Higher HQs (MH) is equal to the weight of NAFs & 
OCONUS Bases (NO): 
WMH = WNO WMH + WNO=1 
WNO + WNO=l 
WNO = 0.5 
WMH = 0.5 
The weight of ARC Units (AU) is worth twice the weight of Active Duty Units (AD): 
WAU = 2WAD WAU + WAD=1 
2WAD + WAD=1 
WAD = 0.333 
WAU = 0.667 
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To quantify the relationship between the 4th tier means objectives of State Influences (SI) 
and DoD Influences (DI), the evaluation measures of ARC Units (AU) and MAJCOMs & 
Higher HQs (MH) were compared. The 4th tier global weight of ARC Units (AU) is 
worth twice the 4th tier global weight of MAJCOMs & Higher HQs (MH): 
G(WAU) = 2G(WMH) G(WAU) = WAU * WSi = 0.667* Ws, 
G(WMH) = WMH*WDI=0.5*WDI 
0.667*WSI = 2*0.5*WDi 
WSI=1.5*WDI WSI + WDI=1 
1.5WD, + WDI=1 
WDi = 0.4 
Wsi = 0.6 
To quantify the relationship between the 3rd tier means objectives of Change of Control 
(CC) and Management Considerations (MC), the evaluation measures of ARC Units 
(AU) and Command Level (CL) were compared. The 3rd tier global weight of Command 
Level (CL) is worth 1.5 times the 3rd tier global weight of ARC Units (AU): 
G(WCL) = 1.5G(WAU) G(WCL) = WCL * WLC * WMC = 0.667*0.333*WMC 
= 0.222*WMC 
G(WAU) = WAU * Wsi * Wcc = 0.667*0.6*WCC 
= 0.4*WCC 
0.222*WMC=1.5*0.4*Wcc 
WMc = 2.7*WCC WMc + Wcc = 1 
2.7Wcc + Wcc = 1 
Wcc = 0.271 
WMC = 0.729 
To quantify the relationship between the 2nd tier means objectives of Air Force (AF) and 
Global Constraints (GC), the evaluation measures of Command Level (CL) and Global 
Constraints (GC) were compared. The 2nd tier global weight of Command Level (CL) is 
worth 1.5 times the weight of Global Constraints (GC): 
G(WCL) = 1.5WGC G(WCL) = WCL*WLC*WMC*WAF = 0.222*0.729*WAF 
= 0.162*WAF 
0.162*WAF=1.5*WGC 
WAF = 9.259*WGC WAF + WGC = 1 
9.259WGC + WGC=1 
WGC = 0.097 
WAF = 0.903 
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Primary Objectives Weights 
To quantify the relationship between the primary objectives of Responsiveness (RES), 
Readiness (REA), and Political Considerations (PC), the evaluation measures of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV), CENTCOM [Readiness] (CR), and 
Command Level (CL) were compared. The ratio of the global weight of CENTCOM 
[Readiness] (CR) to the global weight of CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 
3:7: 
G(WCR) = 0.429*G(WCv)      G(WCR) = WCR * WREA = 0.125 *WREA 
G(Wcv) = WCv*WLv*WRES = 0.222*0.783*WRES 
= 0.174*WRES 
0.125*WREA = 0.429*0.174*WRES 
WREA = 0.597*WRES 
The ratio of the global weight of Command Level (CL) to the global weight of 
CENTCOM [Vehicles & Equipment] (CV) is 2:3: 
G(WCL) = 0.667*G(WCV) G(WCL) = WCL*WLC*WMC*WAF*WPC 
= 0.162*0.903*WPC 
= 0.146*WPC 
G(WCv) = 0.174*WRES 
0.146*Wpc = 0.667*0.174*WRES 
WPC = 0.795*WRES 
WRES + WREA + Wpc = 1 
WRES + 0.597*WRES + 0.795*WRES = 1 
WRES = 0.418 
WREA = 0.250 
WPC = 0.332 
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Tbl A.1 - Global and Local Weights for Objectives and Evaluation Measures 




4th Tier 3rd Tier 2nd Tier 1st Tier 
Responsiveness 0.418 0.4180 
Location of Personnel 0.217 0.0907 
CENTCOM 0.200 0.0434 0.0181 
CONUS 0.466 0.1011 0.0423 
EUCOM 0.067 0.0145 0.0061 
PACOM 0.200 0.0434 0.0181 
SOUTHCOM 0.067 0.0145 0.0061 
Location of V & E 0.783 0.3273 
CENTCOM 0.222 0.1738 0.0727 
CONUS 0.333 0.2607 0.1090 
EUCOM 0.075 0.0587 0.0245 
PACOM 0.222 0.1738 0.0727 
SOUTHCOM 0.148 0.1159 0.0484 
Readiness 0.250 0.2500 
CENTCOM 0.125 0.0313 
CONUS 0.500 0.1250 
EUCOM 0.125 0.0313 
PACOM 0.125 0.0313 
SOUTHCOM 0.125 0.0313 
Political Considerations 0.332 0.3320 
Air Force 0.903 0.2998 
Change of Control 0.271 0.2447 0.0812 
State influences 0.600 0.1626 0.1468 0.0487 
ARC Units 0.667 0.4002 0.1085 0.0979 0.0325 
AD Units 0.333 0.1998 0.0541 0.0489 0.0162 
DoD Influences 0.400 0.1084 0.0979 0.0325 
MAJCOM and Higher HQ 0.500 0.2000 0.0542 0.0489 0.0162 
NAFs and OCONUS 0.500 0.2000 0.0542 0.0489 0.0162 
Managerial Considerations 0.729 0.6583 0.2186 
Streamlined Command 0.667 0.4862 0.4391 0.1458 
Unity of Command 0.500 0.3335 0.2431 0.2195 0.0729 
Matching Structures 0.500 0.3335 0.2431 0.2195 0.0729 
Level of Command 0.333 0.2428 0.2192 0.0728 
Command Level 0.667 0.2221 0.1619 0.1462 0.0485 
Command Rank 0.333 0.1109 0.0808 0.0730 0.0242 
Global Constraints 0.097 0.0322 
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APPENDIX B: STRATEGY GENERATION TABLE 
This section presents the strategy generation table (Tbl B.2) used to develop the 
majority of alternatives analyzed in this research. This table lists each of the evaluation 
measures across the top row, and lists all the possible outcomes for each evaluation 
measure in the columns underneath the appropriate evaluation measure. Alternatives 
were then generated by tracing a path (from left to right) through the strategy generation 
table, selecting various outcomes for each evaluation measure. This technique of 
alternative generation is described in more detail in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3), 
under "Identify Alternatives," p. 3-7. 
The only additional constraint used in developing alternatives with the strategy 
generation table concerned the outcomes for each of the "Responsiveness" measures. 
This study assumed that no resources (personnel or vehicles and equipment) would be 
added or removed from those currently existing in the RED HORSE inventory. 
Therefore, the total number of squadron equivalents (located in all theaters) for an 
alternative had to equal seven. Similarly, the total number of equipment sets had to sum 
to nine. 
There were 6 alternatives included in this research that did not use this approach. 
These alternatives, and the reasons for their inclusion are given in Tbl B.l below. 
Tbl B.1 - Non-Generated Alternatives 
Alternative Title Reason for Inclusion 
A Status Quo Decision Analysis Requirement 
C As-is Unified Posited by Decision Maker 
K Study MTW Relocation I Posited by RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study 
L Study MTW Relocation II Posited by RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study 
M Study MTW Relocation m Posited by RED HORSE 2010 Strategic Study 
T No RED HORSE Decision Analysis Requirement 
B- 1 
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APPENDIX C; EVALUATION MEASURE OUTCOMES FOR ALTERNATIVES 
This section presents the evaluation measure outcomes table (Tbl C.l) used to 
assign values for each alternative. This table depicts the outcomes for each alternative 
for all twenty-four evaluation measures. For example, Alternative A ("Status Quo") 
recommends that all squadron equivalents remain as they currently exist - 0 in 
CENTCOM, 6 in CONUS, 0 in EUCOM, 1 in PACOM, 0 in SOUTHCOM. These 
outcomes are reflected in the appropriate columns of the row entitled "Alternative A." 
Similarly, this table reflects the outcomes for all twenty alternatives with respect to each 
evaluation measure. These evaluation measure outcomes were then used to score the 
alternatives according to the evaluation measure value functions solicited from the 
decision maker's representative. This technique of alternative scoring is described in 
more detail in the results and analysis chapter (Chapter 4), under "Alternative Scoring 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS 
This section presents the results table (Tbl D.l) used to identify the preferred 
alternative for this research. This table lists the twenty alternatives in the leftmost 
column and each of the evaluation measures across the top row. Each row indicates the 
scores achieved by that alternative for each evaluation measure. These scores represent 
the value assigned by the decision maker's representative to the outcome of that 
alternative, as identified at Appendix C in Tbl C.l. The total score for each alternative is 
listed in the last column, under "Total." It was calculated by multiplying the global 
weight of each evaluation measure (given in the gray boxes in the row directly 
underneath the evaluation measures), by the score for that evaluation measure, and 
summing the products. This method of alternative scoring and ranking is described in 
more detail in the results and analysis chapter (Chapter 4), under "Alternative Scoring 
and Ranking," p. 4-48. 
The first row under the "Total" column of Tbl D. 1 reflects the total possible score 
of an alternative as 1. This score is the sum of the evaluation measures' global weights, 
and could only be achieved if an alternative recommended the decision maker's 
representative's maximum value outcomes for each evaluation measure. Due to the 
constraints of this research effort however, this was not possible; more specifically, 
utilizing only existing RED HORSE resources (personnel and vehicles and equipment) 
meant that only seven squadron equivalents and nine equipment sets could be 
recommended by any alternative. Hence, it was impossible to attain the maximum value 
outcome for each of the "Responsiveness" evaluation measures, which would require all 
squadron equivalents and equipment sets be placed in each theater. Similarly, it was 
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impossible to achieve the maximum value outcome for each of the "Political 
Considerations" measures, as increasing the value outcome for one would decrease the 
value outcome of another. Consequently, no alternative achieved the maximum possible 
score of 1. 
Figs D.l - D.4 illustrate how each alternative scored in each evaluation measure 
with respect to the maximum possible score. The leftmost bar, labeled "Key," in each 
figure depicts the maximum possible total score for each alternative. It is comprised of 
separate sections, each section indicating the maximum possible score for an evaluation 
measure.   Comparing the twenty alternative bars to the "Key" bar illustrates how each 
alternative scored against the maximum possible total score. It also reveals how each 
alternative scored with respect to the maximum possible score for each evaluation 
measure, shown by the separate sections comprising each bar. For clarity, each figure 
only depicts the alternative scores with respect to a subset of evaluation measures, as 
follows: 
Fig D.l - Scores for "Location of Personnel" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.2 - Scores for "Location of Vehicles and Equipment" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.3 - Scores for "Readiness" Evaluation Measures 
Fig D.4- Scores for "Political Considerations" Evaluation Measures 
Also for clarity purposes, the horizontal axis of each figure only shows labels for every 
other alternative. 
D-2 
SO   S    «1   N    *    t»    M    W    •    N    S°{flSS«[3p>N 
ooöoöö   öö   öoo   oöoöööooo 
o  o   o  o  o o  o o  w  o o 
O    O    O    y~ oo ooooo 
O   i-   o   «-   o 
_   T-    *-;   tt>    ^    ^   ^    PJ   q    q    *-; 
o  o   o        o   o   o o   o   o   o   o   "   o 
•-      «-      O     O 
I? •~'~'-rtP)T~OcD   offiOrtrtrtco <o  *-   o  M  ' ö ö  ö  ö  ö  ö ö 
' 8 
t-NOINOI'-'-'-W^'-'-W'- 
o  o  o  o 
O    O    O    O    < o  o o  o 
o  o   8  o   8oooooooo| 
ö ö 
T^r^r "*   * T   f   O)   *r   •?   *T *t 
I-*-*-OOT-*-0T-T-04'-*---O*- 
doo oo oooooo o 
S)oSoooooooo| 













I I I I II HUM 
X  ^ ^  CO 
h- o o 2 h- 
3 O O Z z 
O  < D O  111 
(0 0. LUÜÜ 














I     IHHHHH'HH 
□ZEHHHHHHHHH 
H+H I     IHUHHOTTTT 
HHHHHHHHHHHUHHH 








|  IHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHIii 










































HI  IHMHHH 
HI   IHHH'HHHUT 
II    IHHHHMHHHHH 
kl     IHHHHHHHITTm 
W   I     II 





U A  IHHUHUTT 
U\     IHHHt 




kl     IMHHHHHHHHH 



















o    o o    o 













o o o o 





























I  ^ ^ CO 
I- O O 3 h- 
3  ü ü g  z 
CO CL 111 o o 
D D 




















































































CO       v>     — 
O 
O 
£   co   g>   co   c < <  O  DC 
OGCJ^DZ2<< 
D I El i n D 
I ^SS:v^|iv^ IHHHHHHHI \ 
i    lyss^H  i T 
mm    ^wwNb' x>IH    \m 
H+ttt       H     I     frxf 
mZZE^3E 
IHH 
II [III     E ^^SSMSsk 
^H    I W:- 
m 
FFFtfflT 
H4+4I      I\\\\\\\^^v///^HHI   FT 
I    iy^N>y:lx^x>x>x>>vxx-<lH    iTx": 
I       k\\\\Sfr/wJH I    tyJ-- 
KWWXi^ 3EI 
i 
IH H H H H   I N. 
I     K 3HI 
I II I II tSSNNNXl■' IH   I fr4 
HWtil IwWwwW ^IHHHHH \ 
h+Wfti lm\\\s\l///^////////l H H H H H H HI K 
h+W< W////////A H   I     R*a: 
E^^3SS 
mm    IHH im 
1111II   —n- mi II        n TS5T 





































APPENDIX E: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section presents the sensitivity analysis used to identify variations in the 
preferred alternative as a result of fluctuations in the evaluation measure weights. Tables 
E.l - E.20 show the adjusted evaluation measure weights as a result of increasing the 
overall weight of a specific evaluation measure from 0 to 1. In addition, these tables also 
show the overall score of each alternative as a result of these fluctuating weights. The 
bottom row of each table indicates the preferred alternative based upon the evaluation 
measure weights at each specified interval along the spectrum of possible weights, as 
indicated in the tables. Figures E.l - E.20 illustrate how the overall scores for the 
alternatives changed over the entire range of fluctuating weights. To provide additional 
insight, the dotted line in each figure indicated the point associated with the weights 
assigned by the decision maker's representative. The method of conducting sensitivity 
analysis is described in more detail in the results and analysis chapter (Chapter 4), under 
"Sensitivity Analysis," p. 4-50. 
There was no change to the preferred alternative for seven of the evaluation 
measures; that is, Alternative F remained dominant throughout the entire range of 
possible evaluation measure weights. However, the model did recommended different 
alternatives as a result of fluctuating weights in thirteen instances. These were described 
in detail in the results and analysis chapter (Chapter 4), under "Location of Personnel," 
p. 4-51; "Location of Vehicles and Equipment," p.4-54; and "Political Considerations," 
p. 4-58. The tables and figures depicting the sensitivity analysis for all twenty-four 
evaluation measures are contained here. 
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APPENDIX F: DECISION MAKER'S REPRESENTATIVE'S BIOGRAPHY 
This section presents the decision maker's representative's biography, as released 
by public affairs. The diverse experiences he has had in civil engineering, in RED 
HORSE as well as Prime BEEF, are evidenced in this biography. These experiences 




UNITED    STATES    AIR    FORCE 
Air Combat Command 
Office of Public Affairs 
Langley Air Force Base, Va. 23665-1987 
COLONEL JAMES T. RYBURN 
Colonel James T. (Tom) Ryburn is the Chief, Readiness Division, Directorate of The Civil 
Engineer, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. He is 
responsible for the Prime BEEF, RED HORSE, Fire Protection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 
Disaster Preparedness, and Individual Mobilization Augmentee programs. He provides 
oversight of CE's Research, Development, and Acquisition programs for the Combat Air 
Forces (ACC, USAFE, PACAF) and represents ACC/CE on the Battle Staff directing all CE 
support during contingencies or exercises. He is also responsible for planning and training of 
the Response Task Force in event of incidents involving any Air Force nuclear weapons in the 
CONUS. 
Colonel Ryburn was commissioned from Officers Training School in 1975 after graduating 
from the University of Arkansas with a Bachelor of Architecture Degree. He has commanded 
three civil engineer squadrons and a support group. He was the 1994 USAFE Outstanding 
Civil Engineer Senior Military Manager and was runner-up for the Air Force Award. He is 
married to the former Rebecca Willard of Dublin, Virginia. They have one son, Matthew. 
EDUCATION: 
1975 Bachelor of Architecture, University of Arkansas 
1978 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 
1980 Education with Industry, Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall, Los Angeles, Calif. 
1984 Masters of science in Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology, 
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 
1988 Air Command and Staff College, 
1998 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 
ASSIGNMENTS: 
1. October 1975 - July 1978: Civil Engineering Officer, 363rd Civil Engineer Squadron, Shaw 
AFB, South Carolina. 
2. July 1978 - August 1979: Civil Engineering Officer, 554th RED HORSE Squadron, Taegu 
AB, Korea. 
3. August 1979 - June 1980: Student, Education with Industry, Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and 
Mendenhall, Los Angeles, California. 
4. July 1980 - July 1981: Architect, 36th Civil Engineer Squadron, Bitburg AB, Germany. 
5. July 1981 - June 1983: Civil Engineering Inspector, Inspector General, United States Air 
Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. 
6. June 1983 - August 1984: Student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson 
AFB, Ohio. 
7. August 1984-August 1987: Chief, Operations, 823rd RED HORSE Squadron, Hurlburt 
Field, Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. 
8. August 1987 - June 1988: Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, 
Montgomery, Alabama. 
9. July 1988-July 1991: Chief, Civil Engineering and Services Officer Assignment Section, Air 
Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, San Antonio, Texas. 
10. July 1991 -July 1993: Chief, Operations, 18th Civil Engineer Squadron, Kadena AB, 
Japan. 
11. July 1993 - July 1994: Commander, 36th Civil Engineer Squadron, Bitburg AB, Germany. 
12 July 1994 -January 1997: Commander, 786th Civil Engineer Squadron, Ramstein AB, 
Germany. 
13. January 1997 - August 1997: Commander, 89th Civil Engineer Squadron, Andrews AFB, 
Maryland. 
14. August 1997-June 1998: Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 
15. July 1998 - August 2000: Commander, 305th Support Group, McGuire AFB, New Jersey. 
16. August 2000 -- Present: Chief Readiness Division, Directorate of the Civil Engineer, 
Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia. 
PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS: 
Registered architect, Minnesota 
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: 
Legion of Merit 
Meritorious Service Medal with seven Oak Leaf Clusters 
Air Force Commendation Medal 
Air Force Achievement Medal 
EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION: 
Second Lieutenant Oct. 16,1975 
First Lieutenant Oct. 16, 1977 
Captain Oct. 16, 1979 
Major Jan. 1, 1987 
Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1992 
Colonel May 1,1998 
(Current as of 16 August 2000) 
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Captain Lance D. Clark was born on ^■■^^■■■1 at Wright-Patterson 
AFB, Ohio. He graduated from Armwood High School in Brandon, Florida in June 
1990. He entered undergraduate studies at Texas A&M University in College Station, 
Texas where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in May 
1995. He was commissioned through the Detachment 285 AFROTC at Texas A&M 
University where he was recognized as a Distinguished Graduate. 
His first assignment was at Randolph AFB as the Pollution Prevention Program 
Manager. In April 1996, he was assigned to the 823rd RED HORSE Squadron, Hurlburt 
Field AFB, Florida where he served as a project engineer. In July 1999, he entered the 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology. 
Upon graduation, he will be assigned the 36th Civil Engineering Squadron at Andersen 
AFB, Guam. 
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